And the last of Aquinas's article seven questions:
Whether those temporal relations are in God, according to reason [ratio].
Sed Contra:
Names signify reasons, or understandings, as is said in the first book of De Interpretatione. But then these names must be said relatively. Therefore such relations must be according to reason.
Corpus:
Just as a real relation consists in the order of a thing to a thing, so too a relation of reason consists in an order of intellects, which can come about in two ways: one way is that according to which the order is discovered by the intellect, and attributed to that which is spoken of relatively. And such are those relations that are attributed by the intellect to things understood, insofar as they are understood, such as the relation of genus and species, for it discovers these relations by considering the order of that which is in the intellect to things that are outside, or even an order of intellects to each other. But in another way, according to which such relations as follow upon the mode of understanding, namely that the intellect understands something in order towards another, although the intellect does not discover that order, but rather it follows by some necessity upon the mode of understanding. And such selations the intellect does not attribute to that which is in the intellect, but that which is in the thing. And this happens as something not having order according to itself is understood ordered, although the intellect does not understand it to have an order, since that would be false. But that to which some things have an order must both be beings and both distinct (since there is no order of a same to itself) and bother orderable to each other. But sometimes the intellect takes some two things as beings, of which only one, or neither, is a being, such as when it takes two future things, or one present and the other future, and it understands one with an order to the other, saying that the one is before the other. Hence these relations are of reason only, rather as following the mode of understanding. But sometimes it takes one thing as two, and understands them with some order , such as when it is said that something is the same as itself. And then such a relation is of reason only. But sometimes it takes two as orderable to each other between which there is no mediate order, but rather they are is essentially ordered of themselves, such as when one says that a relation happens [as an accident] to a subject -- such a relation of a relation to something else is a relation of reason only. But sometimes it takes one thing with an order to another in so far as it is the term of an order of the other to the one, even though the one is not ordered to the other, such as taking a knowable as the term of the order of knowledge to it, and so the word signifies knowable things with some order to knowledge, and this is a relation of reason only. And similarly our intellect attributes some relative words to God inasmuch as it takes God as the term of relations of creatures to him. Hence such relations are of reason only.
Objections and Replies:
1. A ratio to which there does not correspond a thing is empty and vain, as Boethius says. But these relations are not in God really, as is clear from what has been said above. Therefore the ratio would be empty and vain if they were in God according to ratio.
-- Something in these relations answers on the part of the thing: namely the relation of creature to God. For just as the knowable is spoken of relatively, not because it is itself refered to knowledge but because knowledge is referred to it, as it says in V Metaph., so too God is spoken of relatively because creatures are referred to him.
2. Things like genus and species and order, which exist only according to ratio are not attributed to things except insofar as they are in the intellect. But those temporal relations are attributed to God not only insofar as he is our intellect: for then it would be nothing to say God is lord, because God is understood to pre-exist creatures, which is clearly false.
--That argument concerns those rational relations that are discovered by reason and are attributed to things existing in the intellect. But the relations we are discussing are not of that sort, rather they are what follows upon a mode of being understood.
3. The word "lord" signifies a relation, since it is relative according to being. But God is lord not according to reason only. Therefore neither are such relations in God according to reason only.
4. If no created intellect existed, God would still be lord and creator. But if no created intellect existed, there would not be a thing of reason. Therefore "lord" and "creator" and suchlike do not involve only relations of reason.
-- Just as someone is the same as himself, really, and not only according to reason, although the relation exists only according to reason, because the cause of the relation is real, namely, the unity of substance which the intellect understands under a relation, so too, the power of coercing his subjects is in God really, which the intellect understands as an order toward his subjects because of the order of his subjects to him. And because of this he is said to be lord really, although the relation is of reason only. And in the same way it appears that he would be lord even if no intellect existed. And this answers objections 3 and 4.
5. That which exists according to our reason only has not existed from eternity. But some relations of God to creatures existed from eternity, such as relations described in the words "knowledge" and "predestination". Therefore such relations are in God not only according to reason.
-- The relation of God's knowledge to the creature is not first and per se, as was said before, but to the essence of the creator, through which God knows all things.
Aquinas, penultimately:
Whether God is really referred to the creature so that that relation is something real in God.
Agustine V de Trinitate, "Clearly God is spoken of relatively according to an accident of that to which God is said to begin to be related." Therefore it seems that those relations are said of God not according to something that is in him, but according to something that is outside of him, and so they do not really posit anything in him. Moreover, just as the knowable is the measure of knowledge, so God is the measure of all things, as Averoes says in his Commentary on X Metaph. But the knowable is not referred to knowledge through a relation that really exists in it, but rather by a relation of knowledge to it, as Aristotle explains in V Metaph. Therefore it seems that God is not spoken of as related to the creature because of some relation that really exists in him. Moreover, Dionysius says, "there is no conversion of similitude in cause and effect, for the effect is called similar to the cause, but not the other way around. But the same reasoning seems to hold concerning the relation of similitude and other relations. Therefore it seems that no other relations can suffer converion from God to creatures. Thus one cannot infer from "the creature is really referred to God" that "God is really referred to the creature".
Corpus:
Relations that are spoken of as God's relations to creatures are not really in God. In order to see this, it must be known that since a real relation consists in an ordering of one thing to another, as has been said, the only place where a mutual real relation is found is in things in which there is the same reason [ratio], on both parts, for the ordering of one to the other. In fact, this is the case in all relations that follow quantity. For since the notion [ratio] of quantity is abstracted from all sensible things, quantity is of the same notion [ratio] in all natural bodies, and with equal reason [ratio] each is referred to the other. But a quantity, absolutely considered, has an ordering to another according to the notion [ratio] of measure and measured, and according to the name of whole and part, and of other such things that follow quantity.
But in relations that follow action and passion, or active and passive power, the ordering of motion is not always on both parts. For what always has the account of a patient, and of a moved or caused thing, must have an ordering to an agent or mover, since the effect is always perfected by the cause and depends on it, hence it is ordered to is as to its perfection. For agents or movers or causes sometimes have an ordering to a patient or moved or caused thing: this happens when some good and perfection of the mover or agent is aquired in the effect, as is most clear in univocal agenst which through the action of their species induce a likeness, and consequently they conservers themselves perpetually as far as that is possible. It is also clear in all other moved things that move, or act, or cause. For from their own motion they are ordered unto the producing of their effects, and similarly in all things in which any good adheres to the cause from the effect.
But in some cases one thing is ordered to another, but not conversely, since they are entierely extrinsic to those kinds of action or virtue that such ordering follows, just as it is clear that knowledge is referred to the knowable because the knower, by an intelligible act, has an ordering to the known thing that is outside of the soul. But that thing outside the soul is not at all reached by such an act, since the act of understanding does not cross over and change exterior matter. Hence that thing that is outside the sould is also entirely outside of the intelligible genus. And because of this the relation that follose the act of understanding cannot be in it. And a similar account holds for sense and the sensible. For although the sensible changes the organ of sense by its action (and thus has a relation to it -- just as also other natural agents have relations to those things that undergo something from them) nevertheless, the alteration of the organ is not sufficient for actually sensing, which comes about rather by the act of the senstive power; and the sensible thing outside the soul has no part in this. Similarly a man is compared to a column as being to the right of it, by reason of the motive power that is in the man according to which he can be right and left, behind, in front, above and below. And thus such relations in a man or animal are real, but not in the thing that lacks such power. Similarly a coin is outside of the genus of that action by which monetary value comes to be (which happens by human convention). Aslo a man is outside of the genus of artificial action, through which an image of him is made. And thus the man has no real relation to his image, nor a coin to its monetary value, but rather conversely.
However, God does not act by a mediated action, understood as something proceding from God and terminating in the creature. Rather, his action is his substance, and whatever is in him is entirely ouside of the genus of a created thing by which the creature is referred to God. Nor does the creator gain some good from the production of the creature. Hence such action is most liberal, as Avicenna says. It is also clear that he is not moved unto what he does, but without any change in him he makes changeable things. Hence it follows that in him there is no real relation to creatures, although there is a relation of creatures to him, as effects related to their cause. But in this Rabbi Moses makes many mistakes. He wanted to prove that there could not be a relation between God and creatures because since God is not a body he has no relation to time or place. He only considered relations that follow quantity, not those that follow action and passion.
1. The mover is really referred to the moved. Hence Aristotle (V Metaph) posits the relation of mover and moved as a species of the category of relation. But God is compared to the creature as mover to moved. Therefore he is really referred to the creature.
--A natural mover or actor moves or acts by a meditating action or motion that is between the mover and the moved, the agent and the patient. Hence, at least in this middle, agent and patient, mover and moved, must come together. And so an agent, as agent, is not extraneous from the genus of patent, as patient. Hence the ordering of one to the other is real in both, especially since the mediating action is some proper perfection of the agent. Consequently that in which the action terminates is its good. But this is not the case with God, as has been said, and thus the two cases are not alike.
2. But if it be said that he moves the creature without himself changing, and so is not really referred to the creature - On the contrary, a relation is not the reason why its own relative opposite relation is said of the same thing, for it is not because something is half that it is double, nor is God the father because he is the son. Therefore if mover and moved are said relatively, the relation of "mover" is not in something because there is in it the relation of "moved". Therefore the fact that God is not moved does not prevent him from being really referred, as mover, to what is moved.
--That a mover is itself moved is not the reason why the relation of mover is really in it, but is a sort of indication of that. For from this indication it appears that it coincides somehow in the genus of the moved, by which it moves what is moved by it. And also it appears that that to which it is moved is good for it, which is why it is ordered to it by its own motion.
3. Just as the father gives being to the son, so the creator gives being to the creature. But the father is really referred to the son. Therefore also the creator to the creature.
--The father gives to the son being of his own kind, since he acts univocally; but God does not give such being to creatures, and thus the two cases are not alike.
4. Things said of God literally, and not metaphorically, posit the thing signified in God. But among those names Dionysius includes this name: "lord". Therefore the thing signified by the name "lord" is really in God. But this is a relation to creatures. Therefore, etc.
--Three things are included in the understanding of the name "lord": namely, the power to coerce subordinates, an ordering to subordinates who follow such power, and the termination of the ordering of of subordinates to the lord, for in the one relative is the understanding of the other. Therefore the signification of this name is saved in God as to the first and third, but not as to the second. Hence Abrosius says that the name "lord" is a name of power; and Boethius says that lordship is some power by which a servant is coerced.
5. Knowledge is really referred to the knowable, as is clear from V Metaph. But God is compared to created things as knower to known. Therefore in God there is some relation to creatures.
--God's knowledge and our knowledge are compared to things in different ways. For God's knowledge is compared to things as their cause and measure. For such things are according to truth as however God orders them by his knowledge. But the same things are the cause and measure of our knowledge. Hence just as our knowledge is really refered to things, but not conversely, so too things are really refered to God's knowledge, and not conversely. Or it must be said that God understands other things by understanding himself. Hence the relation of divine knowledge is not to things directly, but to the divine essence itself.
6. That which is moved always has a real relation to the mover. But the will is compared to what it wills as moved to mover, for what is desirable is mover, not moved. Desire, is a moved mover, as is said in XII Metaph. Since therefore God wills things to be, it seems that he is really referred to the creature.
--The desirable, which moves desire, is an end. But those things that exist for an end move desire only by reason of that end. But the end of the divine will is nothing other than divine goodness. Hence it does nto follow that other things are compared to the divine will as mover to moved.
7. If God is not referred to creatures this, it seems, is for no other reason than because he does not depend on creatures, and because he transcends creatures. But similarly heavenly bodies do not depend on elementary bodies, and transcend them as it were improportionally. Therefore on this view it would follow that there would be no real realation of superior bodies to inferior bodies.
--Heavenly bodies are really referred to inferior bodies according to relations that follow quantity because there is the same notion of quantity in both. And also as to relations following active and passive virute, since they move moved through a mediating action that is not their substance since they attain some good in being the causes of inferior things.
8. Every denomination is from form. But form is something inhering in what it informs. Since therefore God is named from relations to creatures it seems that those same realtions would be something in God.
--That by which something is denominated does not always have to be a form according to the nature of things, but it is enough that it be signified in the manner of a form, gramatically speaking. For a man is denominated from his action and from his clothing, and from other such things, which are not really forms.
9. Proportion is some real relation, such as double and half. But there seems to be some proportion of God to creatures, since there must be proportion between mover and moved. Therefore it seems that God is really referred to creatures.
--If proportion is understood to mean some determinate excess, ther is no proportion of God to creatures. But if proportion is understood to mean a habitude only, then it is celar that such a thing does exist between the creator and the creature: in the creature really, but not so in the creator.
10. Since understanding is of similitudes of things, and spoken words are the signs of things, as Aristotle says, those things are ordered differently among the teacher and the student. For the teacher begins from reality from which he receives knowledge in his understanding, of the conceptions of which his words are signs, but the student begins from the words through which he acquires the conceptions of the teacher's understanding, and from these unto the apprehension of reality. But such things as are said of the aforementioned relations must be received first by some teacher. Therefore with him such relative names follow the conceptions of his understanding, which follow reality. And thus it seems that such realtions are real.
--Although the teacher begins with things, nevertheless, in an other way, conceptions are received in the teacher's mind in an other way than they are in the nature of the thing, since any given thing is received in another by the mode of the receiver. For it is clear that conceptions exist immaterially in the mind of the teacher, and materially in nature.
11. Such relatives as are said of God temporally are either relative according to being or relative according to being said. If they are relative according to being said, then they do not really posit anything in either extreme. But this is false with respect to the aforementioned, since they really exist in the creature related to God. Therefore they must be relative according to being. And so it seems that they really posit something in both extremes.
--The distinction of relatives according to being and according to being said is not the same as that between relations that are real and merely rational. There are some relatives according to being that are not real, such as right and left in a column; and there are some things relative according to being said that nevertheless imply real relations, as is clear concerning knowledge and sense. For things are called relative according to being when the names are imposed toward signifying the relations themselves. But they are called relative according to being said when the names are imposed for signifying qualities, or something like that, principally, from which relations follow. They don't differ as to whether the relations are real or merely rational.
12. This is the nature of relatives: that by the positing of one, the other is posited, and by the elimination of one, the other is eliminated. Thus if there is some real relation in creatures, the relation in God to creatures must be real.
--Although by the positing of one relative, the other is posited, nevertheless, it doesn't have to be posited in the same way in both, but it is enough that one be posited as real, and the other as rational.
Aquinas:
Whether such relations that are between creatures and God exist in a real manner in the creatures.
Whether such relations that are between creatures and God exist in a real manner in the creatures.
Augustine says that "what God, in time, begins to be called (which he was not called before) he is clearly called relatively," but not as an accident of God where something happens to him, but rather as an accident of that in relation to which God begins to be spoken of. Now, an accident is something real in a subject. Therefore a relation to God is something real in creatures. Moreover, when something is referred to another by its changing, it is referred to it in a real manner. But creatures are referred to God by their changing. Therefore they are referred to God in a real manner.
Corpus:
A relation to God is something real in creatures. In order to see the reason for this it should be known that, as Averoes says in his Commentary on Metaph XI, since the to-be of relation is the weakest among all the categories, they therefore thought that relations were among things secondly understood. For what is first understood are things outside the soul, where the first understanding supposes them. But things secondly understood are called intentions consequent on the mode of understanding. For this is what the second understanding understands inasmuch as it reflects upon itself, understanding both that it understands and the mode by which it understands. From this theory it follows that relations are not in things outside the soul, but only in the understanding, just like the intentions of genus and species and second substances. But this cannot be the case. For in no category is anything posited unless it is a thing existing outside of the soul. For being-of-reason is contrasted with being that is divided by the ten categories, as is clear in V Mataph. However, if relations were not in things outside the soul it would not be the case that one of kind of category is relational.
Moreover, the perfection and good that are in things outside the soul are attained not only as something absolute, inhering in things, but also as the order of one thing to another, just as a good army consists in the order of its parts. Aristotle compares the order of the universe to this. Thus there must be some order in things themselves. But this order is a certain relation. Hence there must be some relations in things themselves, according to which one is orderd to another. But one thing is ordered to another either according to quantity or according to some active or passive virtue. For from these alone something in one attains to two, in respect of what is extrinsic. For a thing is measured not only by its intrinsic quantity, but also by an extrinsic quantity. Also, by active virtue, something acts in another, and by passive it is acted upon by another. But by substance and quality something is ordered to itself alone, not to another, except accidentally, namely insofar as quality (or substantial form, or matter) has a ratio of active or passive virtue, and insofar as some ratio of quantity is considered in them, for unity of substance makes things the same, and unity in quality makes them similar, and number, or multitude, dissimilar and diverse in the same -- and dissimilar as something more or less by something else. For thus one thing is called more white than another. And because of this Aristotle in V Metaph, describing different kinds of relations, describes some caused by quantity and others by action and passion.Thus it must be that things having an order to something are really referred to it, and that some real thing in them is a relation. But all creatures are ordered to God both as to their sorce and their end, for the ordering of the parts of the universe to each other exists through the ordering of the whole universe to God, just as the order that exists among the parts of an army exists because of the ordering to the leader, as is clear from XII Metaph. Hence creatures must be really referred to God, and that relation must be something real in the creature.
Objections and Replies:
1. Some relations may be found in which nothing real is posited on either end, as Avicenna says concerning the relation that exists between what is and what is not. But there are no extremes of any relation that are farther from each other than God and creature. Therefore that relation does not posit anything in a real manner on either end.
--When there is a relation between creatures in which neither extreme posits something, this is not because of the distance between the creatures, but because some relation does not obtain according to some ordering that is in things, but only according to an ordering in the understanding. This cannot be said concerning the ordering of creatures to God.
2. That which implies an infinite regress must be rejected. But if a relation to God is some real thing in a creature, there will be an infinite regress, for that relation will be something created, if it is a real thing, and thus, with equal reason, it will itself have a relation to God, and so on to infinity. Therefore one should not suppose that a relation to God in creatures is some real thing.
--Relations themselves are not referred to something else by another relation, but by themselves, since they are essentially relations. In this they are unlike things that have absolute substance. Hence the infinite regress does not follow.
3. Things are referred only to that which is determinate and one. For instance, double is not referred to just anything, but to half, and father to son, and so on. Therefore since there are relative differences in things that have the relations, there must be corresponding differences in what they are related to. But God is one simple being. Thus a relation of all creatures to him cannot be come about by any real relation.
--Aristotle concludes in the same place that if all are referred to what is best, that which is best must be unlimited by species. And so there is no reason why infinite things should not be referred to what is unlimmited by species. But such is God, since the perfection of his substance is not determined to any genus, as has been explained above. And because of this nothing prevents infinite creatures from being referred to God.
4. According to this, creatures are referred to God insofar as they procede from him. But creatures procede from God according to his substance. Therefore according to his substance they are referred to God, and not according to some supervening relation.
--Yes, creatures are referred to God according to his substance, as the cause of the relation, but formally with respect to the relation itself, just as something called causally similar with respect to quality, but formally with respect to similarity: it is from this that the creature is called similar.
5. A relation is a sort of middle between the extremes of the relation. But nothing can be really a middle between God a creature immediately creatued by God. Therefore relation to God is not something real in creatures.
--If a creature is said to be immediately created by God, this rules out the possibility of God's creating it by a mediating cause, but it does not rule out a real "middle" habitude that naturally follows on the production of the creature, just as equality follows the production of quantity indeterminately, so too the real habitude naturally follows on the production of a created substance.
6. Aristotle says that if all appearances were true, reality would follow our opinions and sensations. But all creatures do follow the judgement or knowledge of their creator. Therefore all creatures are referred to God substantially and not by some relation that inheres in them.
--Creature's follow God's knowledge as an effect follows a cause, not in the manner of a proper account of being in such a way that to-be-a-creature would be nothing other than to-be-known-by-God. But this is what they suppose when they say that all appearances would be true, and things would follow opinions and sensations, so that, namely, the to-be of any given thing would be that it be sensed or opined by another.
7. The greater the distance between things, the less seems to be their relation. But the distance between creatures and God is greater than the distance between one creature and another. But the relation of creature to creature is not some real thing, so it seems, for since it is not a substance, it must be an accident, and thus it must be something that is in a subject, and cannot be removed without changing the subject. But this is contrary to what was said above, concerning relations. Therefore the relation of creatures to God is not something real.
--This relation that is nothing other than an ordering of one creature to another: on the one hand it has a certain character as an accident, and on the other it has a certain character as a relation or ordering. For as an accident, it's character is that it is in a subject, but this is not its character as a reation or ordering. Rather, its character as a relation or ordering is that it is "to another" as if crossing over unto the other, and somehow standing by the related thing. And thus a relation is something inherent, although it is not so on account of it being a relation, just as action, as action, is considered as from an agent, but as an accident it is considered as being in the acting subject. And thus nothing prevents such accidental being from falling away without any change of what it inheres in, since its account is not perfected as it is in its own subject, but as it crosses over to another, and when that is taken away, the account of this accident is taken away as to act, but remains as to cause, just as when matter is removed, heat is taken away, although it remains the cause of heat.
8. Just as a created being is infinitely far from a non-being, so also is it infinitely far from God. But there is no relation between a created being and a pure non-entity, as Avicenna says. Therefore, neither is there a relation beween a created being and the uncreated being.
--Created being has no ordering to non-being, but it does have an ordering to uncreated being, and so the two casses are not alike.
Aquinas's eighth article (just three more articles follow after this one):
Whether there is any relation between God and creatures
Whether there is any relation between God and creatures
Augustine says that "creator" is said relatively to creature, just like lord to servant.
Corpus:
Relation differs from quantity and quality in this: quantity and quality are some accidents remaining in a subject, but relation does not signify in the manner of something remaining in a subject (as Boethius says), but as in some kind of transit to another. Hence also the Porretani (?) said that relations are not inherent, but assistent, which is true in a manner of speaking, as will be shown later. However, what is attributed to something as proceding from it unto another makes no composition with it, just as action makes not composition with the agent. And because of this the philosopher also proves in Phys 5 that there can be no motion in "to another", since a relation can cease to be when there is only a change in the other thing, without any change of it, which refers it to the other, as is also clear concering action: action, as such, is not motion, except metaphorically and improperly (just as when we say that something is changed when it goes from rest to act). This would not be the case if relation or action signified something remaining in the subject. From this is appears that it is not contrary to the notion of simplicity for there to be a multitude of relations between it and another. Rather, by as much more simple it is, by so much are many relations concomitant with it. For as much as something is more simple, bu so much is its virtue less limited; hence it's causality extends itself to many. And thus in the book of causes it is said that all of virtue united is more infinite than virtue multiplied. But some relation between a principle and those things that are from the principle must be understood: not only a relation of origin, as the things made come from the principle, but also a relation of diversity, since cause and effect must be distinguished, because nothing is the cause of itself. And thus with the highest simplicity of God there follows infinite habitudes or relations existing between creatures and him, insofar as he produces creatures diverse from himself; nevertheless, they are somehow made like him.
1. Relatives exist at the same time, according to Aristotle. But a creature cannot exist at the same time as God, for God is in every way prior to creatures. Therefore there can be no realtion between creature and God.
--Those relatives where each is with equal reason refered to the other exist at the same time by nature, such as father and son, lord and servant, double and half. But those relatives in which there is not the same reason for referring to the other on both parts are not at the same time by nature, but one is naturally prior, as Aristotle says of sense and the sensible, knowledge and the knowable. And so it is clear that God and creatures should not be at the same time by nature, since there is not the same reason for referring each to the other, on both parts. Nonetheless, even with the relatives that are at the same time by nature, the subjects need not exist naturally at the same time, but only the relations.
2. Wherever there is relation, there is also comparison. But between God and creatures there is no comparison, for things that are not of one genus are not comparable, such as number and line. Therefore there is no relation between God and creatures.
--There is not a comparison wherever there is a relation, but only when the relation is according to one quantity or quality, so that from this one can be called greater or better than the other, or whiter or something else like this. But there can be plenty of relations of things referred each to the other, even when they are of diverse genera, for things that are of diverse genera are diverse from each other. But still, even though God is not in the same genus as a creature, as contained under that genus, he is, nevertheless, in every genus as the principle of the genus; and from this there can be some reation between creatures and God as between a principle and what flows from it.
3. In whatever genus one of a pair of relatives is found, so is the other. But God is not in the same genus as any creature. Therefore no relative can be said between them.
--The subjects of the relations don't have to be in the same genus, only the relations themselves, as is clear from the fact that quantity is said from diverse quiddities. Nevertheless, as has been said, there is not a same account of God and creatures, just as of those that are in diverse genera in no way coordinated with each other.
4. Creature cannot be opposed to creator since opposite is not the cause of its own opposite. But relatives are opposed to each other. Therefore there cannot be a relation between creatures and God.
--The opposition of relation differs in two ways from other oppositions. First, in other opposites, one is said to be opposed to the other insofar as it removes it, for negation removes affirmation, and on account of this is opposed to it. But opposition of privation and habitus and contrariety includes the oposition of contradition, as is said in IV Metaph. But this is not the case with relatives. For the son is not opposed to the father as that one should remove the other, but by reason of a habitude toward the same. And from this the second difference is caused: in other opposities one is always imperfect, which happens by reason of negation which is included in privation and other contraries. But this cannot be the case with relatives. Rather, both can be considered as perfect, as is most clear in relatives of equivalence and in relatives of origin, such as equal, similar, father and son. And thus relation can be attributed to God more than other oppositions. By reason of the first difference an opposition of relation can obtain between creatures and God, but no other oppostion, since the positio of creatures from God is more than their remotio. Still, there is some habitude of creatures to God. But by reason of the second difference there is in what is divine an opposition of persons by relation, and no other, as will become clear later.
5. Whenever something begins to be newly said, it can in some way be said to be made. Therefore it follows if something relative to the creature is said of God, God would in some way become, which is impossible, since he is immutable.
--While becoming is properly a kind of change, it is not according to relation except accidentally, namely, by the change of that on which the relation follows, and the same goes for becoming. [?] For a body that is changed with respect to quantity becomes equal, but change itself does not imply equality, but it has this feature accidentally. Nevertheless, when some relation comes to be newly said of something, this does not mean there must be some change in it, but it is enough that a change come to be in either extreme, for the cause of a habitude among two things is something inhering in both. Hence, on whatever side the change comes to be, from that, which causes the habitude, is taken a habitude that is between both. And for this reason, when a change comes to be in a creature some relation begins to be said of God. Hence he cannot himself be said to become, except metaphorically, because he has a similitude to what becomes inasmuch as something comes to be newly said of God. And so we say, "Lord, you have become our refuge."
6. Whatever is predicated of something is predicated of it either per se or accidentally. But things that imply a relation to creatures are not predicated of God per se, since per se predidates are predicated by necessity and always, unlike accidental predicates. Therefore in no way can any such relatives be predicated of God.
--Such relations, since they begin to be said of God because of a change that comes about in the creature, it is clear that the reason why they are said of God is on the part of the creature, and they are said of God accidentally. Not that an accident is in God, as Augustine says, but according to something existing outside of him which is compared to him accidentally. For God's being does not depend on the creature, just as the being of the architect does not depend on the house. Hence just as it happens to an architect that the house exist, so it happens to God that the creature exists. For of anything that has a relation that it can be without we say it has it accidentally.
Aquinas's next question is: Whether those names are said of God and creatures univocally or equivocally.
Corpus:
It is impossible that anything should be predicated univocally of God an creatures. This is clear because: every effect of a univocal agent is adequate to the strenth of the agent. But no creature, since it is finite, can be adequate to the strength of the first agent, since it is infinite. Hence it is impossible that a similitude to God be received univocally in a creature. This is also clear because even if the account of the form existing in the agent and in the effect are one, still, a diverse mode of existing prevents univocal predication. For although the account of a house that is in matter and a house that is in the mind of the builder be the same -- since one is the account of the other -- still, "house" is not univocally predicated of both since the species house has material existence in matter, but in the mind of the builder immaterial existence. Let it be granted, though imposible, that the goodness in God and creatures are of the same account. Still, good would not be predicated univocally of God since it is in God immaterially and simply, and it is in creatures materially and multiply. Moreover, being [ens] is not said univocally of substance and accident because substance is a being as having existence per se, but an accident as something of which to be is to be in. From this it is clear that a diverse habitude toward existing prevents univocal predication of being. Rather, God has existence in a different way than creatures, for he is his own to be, and this is not the case for any creature. Hence in no way is "to be" said univocally of God and creatures, and consequently neither is any of the other predicables among which being itself is first [or, among which he is the very first being?]. For where there is diversity existing in what is first, diversity must also be found in others, which is why nothing can be univocally predicated of substance and accident.
But some people have said the opposite: that nothing is predicated analogically of God and creatures, but only by pure equivocation. And Rabbi Moses is of this opinion, as is clear from things he has said. But that opinion cannot be true, since in pure equivocation, which the philosopher names from the case of equivocals, something is not said of one in respect to another. [?] But all things said of God and creatures are said of God according to some respect to creatures, or contrariwise, as is clear from all the opinions set forth concerning the explanation of divine names. Hence it is impossible that it is by pure equivocation.
Again, since all of our thoughts concerning God are taken from creatures, if there were no agreement between the them except in name only, we would know nothing of God except empty names, which would not describe him [?] And it would follow that all philosophers proofs concerning God would be fallacious. And thanks to this, if it be said that all everything that is in potency is reduced to act by a being in act -- and if it be inferred from this that God is a being in act, since it is through him that everything is brought into existence -- this would involve the fallacy of equivocation. And the same holds for all the others.
Moreover, an effect must be somehow like its cause. Hence it must be that concerning effect and cause nothing is predicated by pure equivocation, just like health concerning medicine and an animal. And thus is must be said that concerning God and creatures nothing is predicated univocally; however, those things that are predicated in common are predicated not by pure equivocation, but, rather, analogically. But this predication can happen in two ways. First, there can be predication of two things in respect of a third, as being is said of quality and quantity in respect of substance. Secondly, there can be predication of two things in respect of one to the other, as when being is said of substance and quantity. In the first way of predication, there must be something prior to the two, to which both have respect, as substance is prior to quantity and quality. But in the second way this is not the case, rather one of the two must be prior to the other. And thus since nothing is prior to God, but he himself is prior to the creature, predication of God happens in accord with the second way of analogy, and not the first.
1. The measure and the measured are of one account. But divine goodness is the measure of all created goodnes, and his wisdom of all wisdoms. Therefore they are said univocally of God and creature.
--This argument concerns the kind of measuring in which the measure can be coequal or commensurate to the meausred. But God is not a measure in this way, since he infinitely excedes all that is measured by him.
2. Things that are similar are things that share a form. And a creature can be similar to God, as is clear from Gen, 1.26: "let us make man in our image and similitude." Therefore there is some sharing of form between the creature and God. But wherever there is sharing of form something can be predicated univocally. Therefore something can be univocally predicated of God and creatures.
--A creatures similiarity to God falls short of univocal similarity in two ways. First, it is not by way of participation in one form, as two things are hot by participation in one heat, for what is said of God and creatures is predicated of God essentially, but of the creature by participation, so that the creature's similarity to God is understood as how a hot thing is similar to heat, not as how a hot thing is similar to a hotter thing. Secondly, the form that creatures participate in falls short of the account of what God is, just as the heat of fire falls short of the account of the virtue of the sun, by which it gererates heat.
3. Greater and lesser do not make for a diversity of species. But when the creature and God are called good, the difference seems to be this: that God is better than every creature. Therefore God's goodness and the creature's goodness are not diverse in species; and so "good" is predicated univocally of God and creatures.
--Greater and lesser can be considered in three ways, and so they can be predicated in three ways. In one way, as things participate in quanity alone, just as snow is called whiter than a wall since whiteness in the snow is more perfect than in the wall, but it is is still of one account, which is why this kind of diversity of greater and less does not give rise to a diversity of species. In another way, one thing participates and another is said essentially, as we may say that goodness is better than the good. In the third way, according as the same something corresponds to one thing in a more eminent way than to another, just as heat to the sun more than to fire. And these two ways prevent a unity of species and univocal predication. And according to this something is predicated more or less of God and creatures as is clear from what has been said.
4. There can be no comparing things that are diverse in genus, as Aristotle proved. For there is no comparing the speed of alteration with the speed of local motion. But between God and creature some comparison is attained, for it is said that God is the highest good, and the creature is good. Therefore God and creature are in one genus, and thus something can be predicated univocally of them.
--God is not compared to creatures as called better, or the highest good, as if participating in a nature of the same kind with creatures, as a species of some genus, but rather as the principle of a genus.
5. Nothing is known except through a species of one account. For the whiteness that is in a wall is known by the species which is in the eye only if they are of one account. But God knows all beings through his goodness, and the same goes for the other things. Therefore the goodness of God and creature are of one account, and so good is predicated univocally of God and creatures.
--By as much as an intelligible species is more eminent in something, by that much it is more perfectly known, just as the species of a stone is more perfectly known in the intellect than in sense. Hence through this God can most perfectly know things through his essence, inasmuch as his essence is a supereminent likeness of things, and not an adequated likeness.
6. The house that is in the mind of the builder [artifex] and the house that exists materially are of one account. But all creatures procede from God as artifacts from a craftsman [artifex]. Therefore the goodness that is in God is of one account with the goodnes that is in the creature, and so ... the same as before.
--There is a twofold likeness between creatures and God. One is of the creature to the divine intellect, and so the form understood by God is of one account with the thing understood, although it does not have the same mode of being, since the understood form exists only in the intellect, but the form of the creature exists also in the thing. In another way according as the divine essence itself is the superexcelling likeness of of all things, and not of one account. And it is from this kind of likeness that it happens that good and suchlike are predicated in common of God and creatures, but not from the first kind. For this is not the account of God when it is said "God is good", that the goodness of creatures is understood, since it should be clear already from what has been said that even the house that is in a builder's mind is not called a house univocally with the house that exists in matter.
7. Every equivocal agent's acting is led back to something univocal. Therefore the first agent, which is God, must act univocally. But of an agent acting univocally and its proper effect something can be univocally predicated. Therefore of God and creature something can be univocally predicated.
--The action of an equivocal agent must be prior to that of a univocal agent, since a univocal agent does not have causality beyond the whole species, its own cause must be elsewhere. But only beyond every individual of the species. But an equivocal agent has causality beyond the entire species. Hence the first agent acts equivocally.
Sed Contra:
1. Aristotle says that the eternal and the temoral have nothing in common except a name. But God is eternal and creatures anre temporal. Therefore God and creatures cannot have anything in common except a name. And so names are predicated of God and creatures in a purely equivocal manner.
--Aristotle is speaking of what is in common naturally, not logically. But things that have a diverse mode of being do not have in common something according to being from a natural perspective. But they can have something in common intentionally from the perspective of logic. Also, naturally, terrestrial and celestial bodies are not of one kind, but logically they are. Nonetheless, Aristotle did not mean to exclude analogical commonness, but only univocal. For he wanted to show that the corruptible and the incorruptibe do not have a common genus.
2. Since the genus is the first part of a definition, when the genus is taken away, the concept signified by the name is removed. Hence if some name is imposed to signify what is in another [genus?], the name will be equivocal. But wisdom said of creatures is in the genus of quality Since therefore wisdom said of God is not a quality, as was shown above, it seems that this name "wisdom" is predicated equivocally of God and creatures.
--Although diversity of genus takes away univocation, nevertheless, it does not take away analogy. Which is clear in this way: healthy, insofar as it is said of urine is in the genus of a sign, but insofar as it is said of medicine, it is in the genus of cause.
3. Where there is no similitude nothing can be predicated in common, except equivocally. But between creatures and God there is no similitude, for Isaiah says (40.18) "to whom will you make God out to be similar?" Therefore it seems that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.
--God is in no way said to be similar to a creature, but contrariwise, since, as Dionysius says, the conversion of similitude is not received in cause and effect but only in things that are coordinate, for a man is not called similar to his image, but, contrariwise, because that form by which a similitude obtains is in the man prior to being in the image. And thus we do not say that God is similar to creatures, but contrariwise.
4. If it be said that although God cannot be called similar to a creature, a creature can be called similar to God -- On the contrary, it says in Ps 82.2 "God, who is similar to you?" the implied answer being: no one.
--When it is said that no creature is like God, as Dionysius says in the same chapter, this should be understood according as effects have less than their cause, falling short of it incomparably. And this is not to be understood according to quantity participated in, but in the other two ways, as was said above.
5. No accidental thing can be similar to substance. But wisdom in creatures is accidental; but it is substance in God. Therefore man through his wisdom cannot be similar to divine wisdom.
6. Since in creatures, existence is one thing and form or nature is another, nothing is, by form or nature, similar to that which is existence. But those names predicated of creatures signify some nature or form. But God is that which is his own existence. Therefore through such things said of creatures the creature cannot be similar to God, and so ... the same as before.
--Accidents cannot be like a substance by the likeness that obtains according to a form of one account; but as for the likeness that is between cause and effect, nothing prevents this from obtaining. For the first substance must be the cause of all accidents. And this anwers both 5 and 6.
7. God differs from creatures more than number differs from whiteness. But it is stupid to say that number is similar to whiteness, or conversely. Therefore even more stupidly is it said that some creature is similar to God, and so ... same as before.
--Whiteness is neither in the genus of number, nor is it the principle of that genus, and thus no similitude of one to the other obtains. But God is the principle of every genus, and thus all are somehow similar to him.
8. Whenever things are similar to each other, they agree in something. But that in which they agree is transmutable from each to the other. But God is entirely untransmutable. Therefore there can be no similitude between God and creatures.
--This argument concerns things that agree in a genus or in matter, which is not how things are with God and creatures.
Past the half-way point.
Here is Aquinas on the question: "Whether those names are synonyms"
Synonymous names when conjoined, result in a nugatory repetition, as if one were to say "clothes and garments" Therefore if those names were synonyms, it would be nugatory to say that God is good, or, God is wise, which is false. Moreover, whoever denies one synonym of something denies also the rest. But some people deny his power without denying his knowledge or goodness. Therefore those names are not synonyms. Moreover, this is clear from Averoes's commentary on Metaph. XI. He says that these names, said of God, are not synonyms.
Corpus:
All intelligent people agree that these names are not synonyms. This is easy to maintain for those who say that these names signify not the divine substance, but rather essential intentions, by some addition, or his working in his effects, or the negations of creaturely things. But supposing that these names signify the divine substance, as has been shown above, the right answer seems more difficult to defend, since on this view there is one and the same simple thing signified by all those names: the divine substance.
But it must be known that the significiation of a name does not refer to things immediately, but by the mediation of the intellect. For the spoken words are marks things that exist as passions in the soul, and their conceptions in the intellect are similitudes of things, as Aristotle explains in I De Interp. The fact that names are not synonyms can therefore come either from the things signified or from the concepts of the understanding that names are made to signify. So these names that are said of God cannot be prevented from being synonymous on account of any diversity in the thing signified, as was suggested above, but only on account of the conceptions of intellects. And thus Averoes commenting on the metaphysics XI says that in God multiplicity exists only according to a difference in the intellect, and not in being, which we say is one in reality and many in concept. But it cannot be that nothing in reality answers to these diverse concepts existing in our intellect, for our intellect attributes to God those names of which they are the concepts. So were there nothing answering to these concepts in God, either according to himself or to his effects, the intellect would be false in attributing them to him, and so would be all propositions signifying such attributions; which is inappropriate.
There are some concepts to which nothing answers in the thing understood; but the intellect does not attribute what is conceived in that way to things as they are in themselves, but only insofar as they are understood. This is clear in the case of the concepts of genus and species, and other intellectual intentions. For there is nothing in things outside the soul to which there is a similitude of the concept of genus, or species. But that doesn't mean the understanding is false, since it doesn't attribute what it conceives in that way (genus and species) to things as they are outside of the soul, but only as they exist in the understanding. For as the understanding reflects upon itself it finds that just as it understands things existing outside the soul, so it understands that they also are understood, and so just as there is some conception of the understanding corresponding to the thing itself, which is outside ths soul, so too there is a concept corresponding to the thing understood as such. For instance, the concept of man corresponds to the thing outside the soul, but the concept of genus or species corresponds only to something understood. But it is not possible for such things to be the concepts of names that are said of God, since thus the intellect would not attribute them to God as he is in himself, but only as he is understood, which is clearly false, for then the meaning of "God is good" would not be that he is such, but that he is understood in that way.
And thus some say that the concepts of these names are diverse because of their diverse connotations, as they connote differet effects of God. On their view, "God is good" signifies his essence with some effect connoted, so the meaning would be that God is and causes goodness. In this way the diversity of the concepts would be caused by a diversity of effects. But this does not seem appropriate, since when the effect procedes from the cause according to similitude, the cause should be understood to be a certain way before the effect is that way. It is not that God is called wise because he causes wisdom; rather he causes wisdom because he is wise. Hence Augustine says that we are good because God is good, and insofaras we are, we are good. Moreover, on this view it would follow that such names are said of creatures prior to the creature, just as health is said of the healthy prior to what is conducive to health (which is also called "healthy" because it causes health). If nothing else were understood when it is said that God is good than that God is and is the causer of goodness, it would follow that all names of divine effects could with equal reason be predicated of him, so that it would be said "God is the sky" since he causes the sky.
And, again, if this is said of causality in act, it is clearly false, since on this view we wouldn't be able to say that God, from eternity, is good, wise, etc. -- for he was not actually causing from eternity. But if this is understood rather of causality according to virtue (so that he is called good because he is and has the virtue of instilling goodness) then one would have to say that the name "good" signifies that virtue. But that virtue is some supereminent similitude of its effect, just like any virtue of an equivocal agent. Hence it would follow that the intellect, conceiving goodness, would be assimilated to that which is in God and which is God. And so something that is in God, and is God, would correspond to the concept of goodness. And thus one would have to say that all these many different names have an element that corresponds to God in himself, of which all these understood conceptions are similitudes. For there can be only one form of one similitude, according to a species that is of the same concept as it. Nevertheless, there can be diverse imperfect similitudes, falling short of perfect representations. Therefore, since, as is clear from what was said above, concepts of perfections found in creatures are imperfect similitudes and not of the same account as the divines essence -- since this is the case, nothing prevents that one essence from corresponding to all the aforesaid conceptions, as through those things that represent it imperfectly. And so all concepts are something in our intellect subjectively but they exist in God as in the root verifying these conceptions. For these conceptions of the intellect would not be both true and fit for making a claim about reality unless, by way of similitue, if the reality correspond not to those concepts. Therefore the cause of the diversity or multiplicity of names is on the part of our intellect, which cannot pertain to the seeing of God's essence as it is, but rather it sees him through many similitudes that fall short of him and that reflect him so that he can be seen in creatures as if in a mirror. Hence, if one were to see the essence itself one would not need many names nor many concepions. And because of this God's word, which is his perfect coneption, is one. Because of this Zach 14.9 says "in that day the Lord will be one and his name will be one" when God's essence will be seen and the knowledge of God will not be derived from creatures.
Objections and Replies:
1. Synonyms are names that signify entirely the same thing. But all these names, said of God, signify the same thing, because they signify the divine substace, which is entirely simple and one, as has been shown. Therefore they are all synonymous.
--Although these names signify one thing, they do so by many concepts, as has been said, and because of this they are not synonyms.
2. Damascus says that in divine things, all are one, except unbegottenness, begetting, and procession. But names signifying one are synonyms. Therefore all names said of God, except those that signify the personal properties, are synonyms.
--Damascus understood that in divine things all are one in reality, except the personal properties which constitute a real distinction of persons. Nevertheles, he did not rule out the idea that those things that are said of God differ in concept.
3. Sameness is transitive. But wisdom in God is the same as his substance. Similarly will and power. Therefore wisdom, power and will in God are entirely the same, and so it follows that these names are synonyms.
--Just as goodness and wisdom are one with the divine essence in reality, so they are one with each other, while, nevertheless, the concepts of these names differ, as has been said.
4. If you say that these names signify what is one in reality, but they signify diverse concepts, and thus are not synonyms -- On the contrary, a concept to which nothing answers in reality is false and empty. But if the concepts of these names are many, and the thing is one, it seems that those concepts are empty and false.
--It is already clear from what has been said before that although God is entirely one, nevertheless those many conceptions are not false, since one and the same thing, imperfectly represented by those concepts, answers to all of them. However, they would be false if nothing answered to them.
5. And if you say that those concepts are not empty since something that is in God answers to them -- On the contrary, a created things is assimilated to God according as it procedes from him by an ideal similitude. But plurality of ideas or of ideal concepts is not reached in respect of creatures, for God himself according to his one essence is the idea of all. Therefore the concepts of names that are said of God from the similitude of creatures do not have anything responding to them on the part of the divine substance.
--There is complete unity on the part of God, and multiplicity on the part of creatures, so in God's understanding of several creatures there must be one essentially intellgibile form with many respects to diverse creatures, and in our understanding, which from the multiplicity of creatures ascends unto God, there must be there are many species with relations to one God.
6. What is most one cannot be the root and ground of multitude. But the divine essence is most one. Therefore the aforementioned concepts of names cannot be grounded or rooted in the divine substance.
--Those concepts are grounded in the divine essence not subjectively but as in the cause of truth, or as in what is represented by all. And this does not take away from his simplicity.
7. A distinction among relations that really are in God makes for a plurality of persons. Therefore if there were something in God answering to those concepts attributed in common there would also be a further multiplication of persons in God in accordance with the miltitude of attributes. And so there would be more than three persons in God, which is heretical. And thus it seems that all of those names are synonyms.
--Paternity and filliation are complementary opposites, and thus they give rise to a distinction of suposits. But this is not the case with goodness and wisdom.
More Aquinas: asking whether those words we've been talking about signify the divine substance
Augustine says "God's to-be is the to-be that is to-be-strong or to-be-wise, and if you speak of this simplicity what you say will signify his substance." Therefore all such words signify the divine substance. Moreover, Boethius says that when someone turns predication toward divine things, speaking in categories other than relation, everything is turned into substance, as "just", though it may seem to signify quality, signifies rather substance. The same holds for "great" and other such words. Moreover, whatever is spoken of by participation is led back to something said per se and essentially. But the aforesaid names are said of creatures by participation. Therefore when they are led back unto God as unto the first cause, they must be said essentially of God, and so it follows that they signify his substance.
Corpus:
Some have supposed that those names said of God do not signify the divine substance. Rabbi Moses says this most explicitly. Rather, he says, these names must be understood of God in two ways. First, by the similitude of his effects. In this way God is called wise not because wisdom is something in him, but because he works his effects in the way of wisdom, namely, by ordaining each thing unto the end that it ought to have. And in the same way he is called alive insofar works in the way of the living, as acting from himself. In another way, God is spoken of by the way of negation. In this way we say that God is alive, not meaning that life is something in him, but rather removing from God that way of being by which inanimate things exist. Similarly, when we call God intelligent, we do not mean to signify that intellect is something in him, rather we remove from God that mode of being by which the brutes exist. And so on. But both of these ways seem to be insufficient and inappropriate.
The first way is insufficient and inappropriate for two reasons: (a) according to this explanation there would be no difference between saying that God is wise and saying that God is angry, or even that God is fire; for he is called angry because he works in the way of the angry when he punishes, since this pertains to men who act from anger. And he is called fire because he works in the way of fire when he purges, which fire does in its own way. But this is contrary to what the saints and prophets suppose when they speak of God, for they affirm some things of God and others they remove from him: they say that he is alive, wise, and suchlike, and that he is not a body, nor subject to passions. But according to the foregoing opinion, all things can with equal reason be affirmed and denied of God, not one thing more than another. (b) According to our faith we suppose that creation has not always existed. If this be granted it would follow that we could not say that God was wise or good before creatures existed. For before there were creatures, he was not at work in any effects, neither in the way of what is good nor in the way the wise. But this is entirely repugnant to a healthy faith, unless someone might want to say rather that God could be called wise before creatures, not on account of his actually working as to something wise, but merely because he would have been able to work in that way. But in that case it would follow that someting existing in God would be signified through this, and consequently it would be substance, since whatever exists in God is his substance.
The second way (the way of negation) seems inappropriate for the same reason. For every kind of thing from which we might name God involves something that must be removed in some way from God. For each name of a kind includes the signification of a difference by which other kinds that are divided against it are excluded, just as the name "lion" includes the difference "quadruped" through which a lion differs from a bird. Therefore if predications of God were introduced only in the negative way (calling God alive because he doesn't have being in the mode of inanimate objects, as has been said) we would in that way be able to say that God is a lion because he doesn't have being in the mode of a bird. And, moreover, the understanding of a negation is always grounded in some affirmation (this is clear from the fact that every negative is proved from an affirmative). Hence unless the human understanding knows something affirmative of God it would not be able to deny anything of God. But it would not be able to know anything affirmative if nothing that it says of God were verified affirmatively of him.
And thus, according to the saying of Dionysius it must be said that such names signify the divine substance, but deficiently and imperfectly. Since every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act (and consequently it acts in a manner that reveals a similarity) the form of the thing made must in some way be in the agent -- but this can come about in various ways. When an effect is adequate to the virtue of the agent, the form must be in maker and made according to the same account. For then maker and made coincide in the same species. This happens when there is univocal making: for man begets man and fire generates fire. But when the effect is not adequate to the virtue of the agent, the form is not in the agent and the thing made according to the same account. Rather, it is in the agent more eminently. For according as it exists in the agent the agent has virtue toward producing the effect. Hence if the whole virtue of the agent is not expressed in the thing made, it remains that the way in which the form exists in the agent excedes the way in which it exists in the thing that is made. And we see this in all equivocal makings, as when the sun generates fire. Now, no effect is adequate to the virtue of the first maker, which is God. Otherwise, from his one virtue there would procede only one effect. But since we find that many and varying effects are produced from his one virtue, we are shown that each and every effect falls short of the virtue of the agent. Thus, no form of any divine effect is in God through the same account by which it is in the effect. Nonetheless it must still be there in some other way, and thence it is that all forms which are distinct and divided from one another in diverse effects are united in him as in one common virtue, just as all the forms that are produced in inferior things through the virtue of the sun exist in the sun according to the unity of its virtue to which all things generated by the action of the sun are similar according to their forms. In the same way, the perfections of created things are assimilated to God according to the unity and simplicity of his essence.
But our intellect, when it receives awareness from created things, is informed by the similitudes of perfections that are found in creatures, such as wisdom, virtue, goodness, and suchlike. Hence, just as created things are somehow (however difficiently) assimilated to God through their perfections, so also our understanding is informed by species of these perfections. But when the understanding is assimilated to something through its intelligible form, then what it conceives and describes according to that intellgible species is verified of that thing to which it is similar through its species, for knowledge is the assimilation of the understanding to the thing known. Hence it must be that what the understanding (informed by the perfections of these species) thinks and says of God does exist in God who answers to any of the aforesaid species as that to which all are similar. But if, by the intelligible species of such things, our intellect were adequate in assimilating to the divine essence, it would comprehend that essence, and that very conception would be a perfect account of God, just as walking animal biped is a perfect account of man. But it does not perfectly assimilate to the divine essence by the aforesaid species, as has been said. Thus even though such names (which the understanding attributes to God by such conceptions) may signify that which the divines substance is, nevertheless, they do not perfectly signify it as it is, but rather as it is understood by us. Thus it must be said that each of those names signifies the divine substance, but not as if comprehending it, but rather imperfectly. And because of this, the name "He Who Is" fits God best, since it does not determine any form in God, but rather signifies being indeterminately. And this is what Damascus meant when he said that the name "He Who Is" signifies an infinite ocean of substance. But this solution is confirmed by that word of Dionysius, who says that "since divinity fore-encompases all, existing simply and illimitably in itself, it is rightly praised and named from diverse things." He says "simply" because those perfections that are in creatures according to diverse forms are attributed to God according to the simplicity of his essence. He says "illimitably" in order to show that no perfection found in creatures comprehends the divine essence so that the intellect could define God in himself under the account of those perfections. This is confirmed also through what it says in the Metaphysics V: what is simply perfect has in itself the perfections of every genus. Averoes identifies this as God in his Commentary on that passage.
Objections and Replies:
1. Damascus says in book 4, "each of those things that are said in God must signify not what he is according to substance, but rather they must show that he is neither some habitude nor something of those from which he is separated, nor something of those which follow after nature or operations." But the to-be that is substantially predicated of something signifies what its substance is. Therefore the aforesaid names are not predicated substantially of God, as if they are things that signify his substance.
--Damascus understood that such names do not signify what God is, as if defining and comprehending his substance. Thus he also adds that the name "He Who Is", which signifies God's substance indefinitely, is most propertly attributed to God.
2. No name that signifies the substance of something can be truly denied of it. For Dionysius says that in divine things, negations are true, but affirmations are incompact. Therefore, such names do not signify the divine substance.
--When Dionysisus said that the negations of these names are true of God he did not assert that the affirmations are false and incompact. For as to the thing signified, which is in him in some way, they are truly attributed to God, as has already been shown. But as to the mode which they signify of God, they can be denied. For each of those names signifies some definite form, and that is not to be attributed to God, as has been said. Thus, absolutely, they can be denied of God because they do not correspond to him by the mode which is signified. For the mode is signified according as it is in our understanding, as has been said. But they correspond to God in a more sublime mode. Hence affirmation is called incompact as not entirely appropriately put together because of the diverse mode. And thus, according to the teaching of Dionysius, these things are said of God in three ways. First, affirmatively, so that it is said that God is wise, and we must say this of him because there is in him a similitude of the wisdom that flows from him. But since wisdom is not in God as we understand and name it, it can be denied, so that it is said that God is not wise. However, wisdom is not denied of God because he falls short of wisdom, but because it is more supereminently in him than is said or understood. Thus it right to say that God is beyond wisdom. And so in these three ways of speaking according to which God is called wise, Dionysius explains perfectly how these things are attributed to God.
3. These names signify the outflowing of divine goodness into things, as Dionysius says. But the goodnesses that procede from God are not the divine substance itself. Therefore, suchlike names don't signify the divine substance.
--These names are said to signify the divine outflowing because they are first imposed for signifying those outflowings according as they exist in creatures, and from their similitude our intellect is led by the hand so that it attributes such things to God in a more eminent way.
4. Origin says that God is called wise because he fills us with wisdom. This, however, signifies not the divine substace, but one of his effects. Therefore the aforesaid names don't signify the divine substance.
--What Origin said should not be understood as meaning that we intend to signify that God is the cause of wisdom when we say that God is wise, but that from the wisdom that he causes our intellect is led by the hand so that it attributes wisdom to him, as has been said.
5. In the Book of Causes it is said that the first cause is not named except by the first caused, which is intelligence. But when a cause is named with the name of its effect, it is not predicated essentially, but causally. Therefore, those names that are said of God are not predicated of God substantially, but only causally.
--When it is said that God is intelligent, he is named by the name of what he has caused. Because the name that signifies the substance of what he has caused cannot be definietely attributed to him according to the mode the name signifies. And so this word, although it corresponds to him in some way, nevertheless does not correspond to him as his name, since what the name signifies is a definition. But it does correspond to what has been caused as its name.
6. Names signify conceptions of intellects, as Aristotle makes plain. But we can't understand the divine substance, for we know not concerning him what he is, but only that he is, as Damascus says. Therefore we cannot name him by any name, nor signify his substance.
--This argument proves that God cannot be named by a name that defines or comprehends or is adequate to his substance, for, indeed, we do not know, concerning God, what he is.
7. Everything participates in divine goodness, as Dionysius makes plain. But not everything participates in his substace, which is in the three persons alone. Therefore "divine goodness" does not signify his substance.
--Just as all things participate in God's goodness (not as numerically the same, but by similitude) so too they participate by similitude in God's being. But they differ in this: goodness indicates the habitude of some cause, for the good is diffusive of itself, but essence is signified in that in which it is, as remaining there.
8. We cannot know God except from the similitude of the creature, since, as the Apostle says, "the invisible things of God, understood from the creation of the world through those things that have been made, have been made plain" (Rom1.20). But we name things according as we know them. Therefore we name the invisible things of God from their similitude with creatures. But when something is named from the similitude of another, that name is not predicated of it substantially, but metaphorically (this is clear from the fact that they are said first of things from which the similitude is taken, and only later are said of God -- and what signifies the substance of something is predicated of it first).
--In the effect there is to be found something by which it is assimilated to its cause and something through which it differs from its cause, and that either from matter or from something of the sort, as when a brick is hardened by fire. For when mud becomes hot by fire, it is similar to fire. But it differs from fire in that, being made hot, it is thickened and hardened. But this comes from its material condition. Therefore if that in which the brick is similar to fire is said of fire, it is properly said of it, and more eminently, and first. For fire is hotter than the brick, and, again, more eminently so: for the brick is hot as something made hot, but fire is naturally hot. However, if that in which the brick differs from fire is said of fire, it will be false. And whoever has the name of this condition in his intellect could not attribute it to fire, except metaphorically. For fire, which is the most subtle of bodies, is falsely called "thick." But it can be called "hard" because of the violence of its action, and its not-easy potency for being acted upon. Similarly there is something in creatures that is similar to God, which, as to the thing signified, indicates no imperfection -- such as: to be, to live, and to understand, and the like -- and these are properly said of God, but of him first and more eminently than of creatures. But there are other things according to which creatures differ from God, as a consequence of the fact that they are from nothing -- such as: potentiality, privation, motion, and other things like this -- and these things are false of God. Whoever has the names of of these conditions in his intellect could not attribute them to God, except metaphorically -- names like "lion", "rock", and the like -- because these things have matter in their definitions. But they are said of God metaphorically because of the similitude of the effect.
9. According to Aristotle, to signify substance is to signify that and nothing else. Therefore, if the name "good" signifies the divine substance, nothing will be in the divine substance that would not be signified by that name, just as also nothing is in human substance that is not signified by the name "man". But the name "good" does not signify wisdom. Therefore wisdom will not be in the divine substance, and by similar reasoning the same thing will hold for all the other names. Therefore, it cannot be that suchlike names should all signify the divine substance.
--This argument assumes that the only way to signify a substance is by defining or circumscribing it. But none of those names signify God's substance in that way, as has been said.
10. Just as quantity is the cause of equality, and quality of similitude, so is substance the cause of identity. Therefore if all such names signify God's substance, then according to them neither equality nor similitude would be attained, but rather identity, and so the creature would be called the same as God from the fact that it imitates his wisdom or goodness, or any of the other things. This is inappropriate.
--Although such perfections in God are the divine substance, nevertheless, the perfections that have been said of God are not substantial perfections in creatures. So creatures are not called the same as God on account of those perfections. Rather, creatures are only like God in that respect.
11. In God, who is the source of all of nature there can be nothing contrary to nature, nor even can he make anything contrary to nature, as the Gloss has it at Romans 11 (where it says "you were ingrafted contrary to nature"). But it is contrary to nature that an accident should be a substance. Therefore since wisdom, justice, and suchlike are, with respect to themselves, accidents, they couldn't be substances in God.
--It would be contrary to nature if wisdom were in God by the same account by which it exists in things as an accident. But this is not true, as is clear from what has been said above. Nor is the authority cited relevant: God makes nothing against nature in himself because he doesn't make anything in himself.
12. "Good God" is a complex term. But there would be no compexity if God's goodness were his very substance. Therefore it does not seem that "good" signifies the divine substance, and for the the same reason this holds for the other, similar names.
--The diversity of this term, when God is called good, does not refer to some composition that is in God, but to a composition that is in our intellect.
13. Augustine says that God evades every form of our intellect, and thus he cannot be mixed with the intellect. But this would not be the case if these names signified the divine substance, because God would correspond to a form of our intellect. Therefore such names do not signify the divine substance.
--God evades the form of our intellect as exceding every form of our intellect, but not such that our intellect is not assimilated to God by any intelligible form.
14. Dionysius says that man is best united to God when he knows that his knowing knows nothing. But this would not be the case if what he conceived and signified were the divine substance. Therefore, the same as before.
--Because our intellect is not adequate to the divine substance, this which is God's very substance remains, exceding our intellect, and thus is unknown to us. And because of this the ultimate form of human knowledge of God knows that it does not know God, insofar as it knows that that which God is goes beyond everything that it understands.
I realize I'm not going to get many readers interested in my translation of Aquinas. After all, there are better, more professional, more careful translations available.
Think of these as a count-down to my response to Kevin. I've made a deal with myself to get this done before posting anything on my own account.
Whether good, wise, just, and such like are predicated of God accidentally.
Boethius says that God, since he is a simple form, cannot be the subject of an accident. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore there cannot be any accident in God. Moreover, every accident has dependence-on-another. But no such thing can be in God, since what is dependent on another must be caused. But God is the first cause and is in no way caused. Therefore there cannot be an accident in God. Moreover, Rabbi Moses says that such words do not signify (in God) intentions added beyond substance. All accidents signify intentions added, beyond substace, to their subjects. Moreover, an accident is that which can come and go without the subject ceasing to exist. But this cannot be in God, since he is immutable, as Aristotle proved. Therefore there cannot be an accident in God.
Corpus:
It must be maintained without any doubt that there is no accident in God. There are three reasons for this. The first is that nothing extraneous can be adjoined to a nature or essence or form (even though that which has a nature or form or essence can have something extraneous in it). This is obviously the case since, in definitions, which signify the essence of things, whatever is added to or subtracted varies the species, as also happens with numbers, as Aristotle says. But a man who has humanity can have something else that is not included in the concept [ratio] of humanity, such as whiteness and the like, which inhere not in humanity but in a man. Now, in every creature there is a difference between having and had, for in composite creatures there is a double difference, since the individual has the nature of a species (as for instance a man has humanity) and, further, has being; for a man is neither his humanity nor his being, whence some accident can inhere in a man but not in his humanity or in his being. But in simple substances there is only one difference, namely the difference of essence and being. For in angels each and every individual is his nature, since the quiddity of simple things is itself (as Avicenna says), but is not its being. Hence their quiddity is something that subsists in its being. This is why there can be found intelligible accidents in such substances but not material accidents. However, in God there is no difference between having and had, or particpating and what is participated in, but rather his nature and being are one and the same, and thus nothing alien or accidental can inhere in him. Boethius touches upon this line of reasoning when he says, "that which is can have something beyond that it itself is; but being itself can have nothing beyond itself mixed with it."
The second reason is that since accidents are extrinsic to the essence of the subject, and since diverse things are not conjoined without cause, then if some accident inheres in God then this must be from some cause. But it cannot be from some extrinsic cause, for in that case it would follow that that extrinsic cause would be acting on God and would be prior to him, as the mover is prior to the moved, and the maker to the made. For in this way accidents are caused in some subject by something extrinsic in as much as a more exterior agent acts in a subject in which an accident is caused. Similarly, it cannot be from an intrinsic cause, as is the case with per se accidents, which have thier cause in the subject, for the subject cannot be the cause of an accident from the same thing by which it receives the accident, since no potency moves itself to act. Thus it must be by one thing that it is able to receive the accident and by another that it is the cause of the accident, and thus it would be a composite, just like those things that recieve an accident through the nature of matter and cause an accident through the nature of form. But it was shown above that God is not a composite. Hence it is impossible that there be an accident in him.
The third reason is that accidents are compared to the subject as act to potency, since they are a certain kind of form of the subject. Thus since God is pure act without any mixture of potency, he cannot be the subject of any accident. And as it is clear from what has been said before that there is no composition of matter and form in God, nor of any substantial parts, neither of genus and differentia, nor of subject and accident, so too it is also clear that the aforesaid words do not prediate accidents in God.
Objections and Replies:
1. That which is predicated of another does not signify substance, but that which follows after nature predicates an accident. But Damascus says that good and just and holy, said of God, follow after nature. But, then, they don't signify substance; so they are predicated of God accidentally.
--Damascene spoke of those names not in respect of that which they predicate of God, but in respect of that by which they are imposed for signifying. For those words are imposed by us for signifying from some accidental forms that we discover in creatures. For he wanted to prove, from this, that through these things, said of God, we do not come to know his substance.
2. If it be said that Damascus was speaking of the mode of signifying, On the contrary, the mode of signifying that follows the account of a genus must be refered to the thing [res]. For a predicate signifies the substance of a subject when it is predicated quiditatively [in eo quod quid]. But the aforementioned words signify the account of a genus in the mode of that which follows nature, for they are in the genus "quality" which according to its own account [ratio] has relation to a subject, for it is quality according to which we are told how [quale] something is. Therefore this mode of signifying ought to be refered to a thing [ad rem] in order that those features that are signified by the aforesaid words are features that follow after the nature of that of which they are predicated, and, consequently, are accidents.
--Although the genus of human goodness, wisdom, and justice is "quality", nevertheless, this is not their genus insofar as they are predicated of God, in that such things are called qualities insofar as they inhere somehow in a subject. But wisdom and justice are not named from this, but rather from some perfection or from some act, whence such things come to be predicated of God according to the account of differentia, and not according to the account of genus. And because of this Augustine says, "we understand, as far as we can, that he is good without quality, great without quantity." Hence that mode which follows after nature should not be found in God.
3. If it be said that these names are not predicated of God as to their genus (which is quality) because names imposed by us are not properly said of God: -- On the contrary, a species is falsely predicated of those things from which its genus is removed. For instance, concerning what is not an animal it is false to say that it is a man. Therefore, if the genus of the aforesaid words (quality) is not predicated of God, the aforesaid words will be not only improperly predicated but, in fact, false of God; and so it will be falsely said that God is just, or that God is holy. But this can't be right. So we must say rather that the aforesaid words are predicated accidentally.
--If good and just were predicated univocallly of God, it would follow that the predication would be false, their genus being removed. But nothing is predicated of God and creature univocally, as is to be shown below. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
4. Aristotle says that what truely is (i.e., substance) is not an accident of anything. For the same reason, that which is in itself accidental is everywhere accidental. But justice and wisdome and suchlike are per se accidents. Therefore they are also accidents in God.
--The wisdom that is an accident is not in God, but another wisdom is not said univocally. And because of this the conclusion does not follow.
5. Whatever is to be found in created things finds its exemplar in God who is the exemplary form of all things. But wisdom, justice, and suchlike are accidents in creatures. Therefore they are also accidents in God.
--Things do not always perfectly represent their exemplars. Hence sometimes what is in the exemplar is found to exist imperfectly and deficiently in the thing that reflects the exemplar; and so it is with those things that reflect God, who is the exemplar of the creature exceding all proportion.
6. Wherever there is quantity and quality there is accident. But in God there seems to be quantity and quality, for there is similitude and equality in God: we say the son is similiar to the father and equal with him. But similitude is caused from being one in quality, and equality is caused by being one in quanity. Therefore there are accidents in God.
-- We speak of similitude and equality in God not because there is quality and quanity in him, but becuase we say something of him that among us signifies quantity and quality, when we say that God is great and wise and suchlike, etc.
7. Everything is measured by what is first in its genus. But God is the mesure of not only substances, but of all accidents as well, because he is the creator of both substance and accident. Therefore in God there is not only substance, but accident as well.
-- Accidents are not called beings exept in relation to substance as to what is first a being. Hence accidents ought not be measured by a "first" which is an accident, but by a "first" which is a substance.
8. That without which something can be understood is predicated of it accidentally. By this Porphyry proved that there are some separable accidents, since one can understand a white crow or a pale-skinned Ethiopian. But God can be understood without "good", as Boethius explains. Therefore "good" signifies an accident in God, and the same reasoning holds for the other attributes.
--All things without which some thing (understood according to its substance) can be understood have the account of an accident. For it cannot be that, a thing being understood according to its substance, what is of the substance of the thing be not understood (as, that it be understood what a man is, and not what an animal is). But we do not see God's essence; rather, we consider him from his effects. So nothing prohibits us from considering him from the effect of being and not considering him from the effect of goodness. For it is in this way that Boethius speaks. But it should be known that even though we do understand God after a fashion while not understanding his goodness, nevertheless, we cannot understand God while understanding him not to be good (just as we cannot understand a man while understanding him not to be an animal) for this would remove the substance of God, which is goodness. But the saints in their homeland who see God through his essence, in seeing God they see his goodness.
9. Concerning the signification of words, there are two things to consider: that by which they are imposed, and that to which they are imposed. But the word "wisdom" seems to signify an accident in both respects, for it is imposed from what it is to make something wise -- which seems to be the action of wisdom -- and that to which it is imposed is a certain quality. Therefore in all ways this word, and similar words, signify accidents in that of which they are predicated. And so there is some accident in God.
--The word "wisdom" is verified of God as to that from which the word is imposed. However, the word is not imposed from being made wise, but from having sapientialia intellectually. For knowledge as knowledge is in reference to the known, but as an accident or form it is in reference to the knower. And having sapientialia is accidental to man, but not to God.
I've been working on these translations. Actually posting them hasn't been a priority.
Question: whether God is in some genus
To all things that are in a genus something is added beyond genus, and consequently they are composites. But God is entirely simple; therefore he is not in a genus. Moreover, whatever is in a genus can be defined and comprehended under some definition. But God is not like that, since he is infinite. Therefore he is not in a genus.
Corpus:
God is not in a genus. There are three reasons for this. First, nothing is put in a genus according to its esse, but rather according to the account of its quiddity, because the existence of any given thing is its own, and is distinct from the existence of any other thing. But the account of substace can be common. It is for this reason that Aristotle says that being [ens] is not a genus. But God is his own to be. Hence he cannot be in a genus.
Secondly, although matter is not genus and form is not differentia, nevertheless the account of a genus is taken from matter, and the account of difference is taken from form, just as it is clear that the sensible nature from which the account of "animal" is taken is material with respect to reason, from which is taken the differentia "rational". For an animal is that which has a sensitive nature, but rational is that which has reason. So, whatever is in a genus must be composed of matter and form, or of act and potency. This cannot be the case with God, who is pure act, as has been shown. So we must conclude that he cannot be in a genus.
Thirdly, since God is simply perfect, he comprehends the genera of all things in his perfection, for this is the account of what is simply perfect, as is said in Metaphysics V. But that which is in some genus is determined to those things that are of that genus, and thus God cannot be in any genus because then he would not be of infinite essence, nor of absolute perfection, but his essence and perfection would be limited under the account of some determinate genus. From this it is further clear that God is not a species, nor an individual, nor does he have a differentia nor definition. For every definition is of genus and species. Hence neither could there be a demonstration of him, since the middle in a demonstration propter quid is a definition.
Objections and Replies:
1. John of Damascus says, "substance signifies in God the common species, as it were the species of the persons; but hypostasis indicates the individual, namely, father and son and holy spirit, like Peter and Paul." So God is compared to father and son and holy spirit as species to individual. But wherever species and individual are found, there also is found genus, since species is constitued from genus and differentia. Therefore it seems that God is in some genus.
--But John of Damascus was speaking metaphorically, not literally. For God's name, which is God, has a similitude to species in that it is predicated substantially of several numerically distinct things. However, it is not literally a species, since a species is not something numerically one, common to several. A species is "one" only by ratio. But numerically one divine substance is common to three persons, whence father and son and holy spirit are one God, but Peter and Paul and Mark are not one man.
2. When things are in no way different, they are utterly the same. But God is not the same as other things. Therefore he differs from them in some way. But whatever differs from another differ from it by some differentia. Therefore there is some differentia in God by which he differs from other things. But not an accidental differentia, since there is no accident in God, as Boethius says in Lib. de Trin. Now, every substantial differentia divides some genus. Therefore God is in some genus.
--There's a difference between differing and being diverse, as Aristotle says. For "diverse" means, absolutely speaking, that it is not the same. But "differing" is a relative term [it is said ad aliquid], for whatever differs differs from another. Therefore if we take the word "differing" literally, the proposition, "When things are in no way different, they are the same" is false. But, speaking loosely, we can concede that God differs from other things, but it does not follow that he differs from them by some differentia, rather he differs from them through his substance, for this must be said of things that are first and simple. A man differs from a donkey by the differentia "rational", but rational does not further differ from a donkey by some differentia (since then there would be an infinite regress), but by istelf.
3. "Same" can be said generically or specifically or numerically, as is explained in Arisotle's Topics, bk. 1, ch. 6. Therefore similarly the term "diverse" is said in these three ways, for if something is said in many ways, so is its opposite. Therefore, either God is diverse from creatures only in a numerical way, or both numerically and specifically -- and so it would follow that he shares a genus with the creature, and so would be in a genus -- or, if he differs generically from creatures, he will have to be in some other genus than the creature's, for diversity is caused by multiplicity, and so generic diversity requires a multiplicity of kinds [multitudinem generum]. Therefore, in whatever way we say he is distinguished from creatures, God must be in a genus.
--God is said to be generically diverse from creatures, not as if he were in another genus, but as being entierly beyond genus.
4. Anything to which the ratio of the genus "substance" applies, is in a genus. But the account of substance is to exist per se, which applies maximally to God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
"Ens per se" is not the definition of substance, as Avicenna says. For being [ens] cannot be the genus of anything, as Aristotle proves, since nothing can be added to being [ens] that does not participate in it, and a differentia ought not participate in the genus. But if substance could have a definition, (setting aside the fact that it is the most general genus) its definition would be that a substance is a thing whose quiddity is to be not in another. And this definition does not apply to the substance of God, whose quiddity is not beyond his to-be. Hence God is not in the genus of substance, but is above all substance.
5. Whatever is defined is in a genus. But God is defined, for it is said that he is pure act. Therefore God is in some genus
-- God cannot be defined. Whatever is defined is comprehended in the intellect of the definer. But God is incomprehensible by the intellect. Hence, when it is said that God is pure act, this is not a definition of him.
6. Whatever is predicated of another quidditativel (in eo quod quid) is in several and is related to them as their species or genus. But all things predicated of God are predicated of him quidditatively, for when a predication concerns the divine, all the categories are turned into substance, as Boethius says, for it is clear that those predicates are rightly attributed not only to God but also to other things, and thus are in several. So they apply to God either as species to individual or as genus to sepcies, and in both cases God must be in a genus.
--The account of a genus requires univocal predication. But nothing can be univocally predicated of God and creatures, as will be shown below. Hence although what is said of God is predicated of him quidditatively, nevertheless, they are not predicated of him as a genus.
7. Things are measured by what is least in their genus, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics X. But as Averroes says in his Commentary on that passage, God is that by which all substances are measured. Therefore God is in the same genus as other substances.
--Although God does not pertain to the genus of substance as if he were contained in that genus (as a species or individual is contained in a genus), nevertheless it can be said that, by reduction, he is in the genus substance as principle; just as a point is in the genus of continuous quantity, and as unity is in the genus of number; and in this way he is the measure of all substances, as unity is the measure of all numbers.
Continuing my translation of Aquinas, here is article 2:
"Whether in God substance, or essence, is the same as existence [esse]."
Hilary says in Lib. de Trinit., "existence is not accidental to God, but is truth subsisting." But that which subsists is the substance of a thing. Therefore God's existence is his substance. Moreover, Rabbi Moses says that God is a being not by essence, and he lives not by life, and he is powerful not by power, and wise not by wisdom. Therefore God's existence and essence are not different. Moreover, everything is properly denominated from its quiddity, for a name properly signifies substance and quiddity, as it says in IV Metaphys. But the name "He Who Is" [reading "qui est" for "quid est"] is among all other names the most proper name of God (Exod. 4). Thus, since this name is imposed from what existence is, it seems that the existence of God is his substance.
Corpus:
In God there is no difference between existence and substance. The reason for this is that when causes that produce diverse effects share in one effect beyond the diverse effects, they together produce it by virtue of some superior cause of which it is the proper effect. Thus, when a proper effect is produced by some cuase in accordance with its proper nature or form, diverse causes, having diverse natures and forms, should have diverse proper effects. Whence, if they concur in some one effect, it is not the proper effect of any of them, but of something superior by virture of which they act. For instance, different coumpounds (such as pepper, ginger, and the like) produce heat, although they differ from each other in their proper effects. Whence the common effect should be reduced to a prior cause of which it is the proper effect, namely, fire. Similarly in the motion of the heavens, the spheres of individual planets have their own proper motion, and also they have one common motion, which is the proper motion of a superior sphere, for they all revolve according to the diurnal motion. Now, all created causes together produce one effect, which is being [esse], although each has its own proper effect by which they are distinguished from one another. For heat makes something to be hot [calidum esse] and a builder makes a house to be [domum esse]. Thus they all are alike in that they cause something to be, but they differ in that fire causes heat and a builder causes a house. Thus there must be some cause superior to all the rest by virtue of which all cause things to be, and being [esse] must be the proper effect of this higher cause. And this higher cause is God. But the proper effect of any given cause procedes from it in accordance with the similitude of its nature. This, which is esse, must therefore be the substance and nature of God. And because of this it is said in the Book of Causes that that which understands does not give being [esse] except in as much as it is divine, and that the first effect is [esse], and there is no created thing before it.
Objections and Replies:
1. John of Damascus, in Lib Orth fidei, I, says: "that God in fact is, is manifest to us, but what he is as to his substance and nature is incomprehensible and entirely unknown. However, the same thing cannot be both known and unknown. Therefore God's esse and his substance or essence are not the same.
2. And if it be said that we don't know either the substance or the esse of God, on the contrary, there are two distinct questions in view here: whether something is, and what it is. We know how to respond to the one, but not the other, as is clear from the aforementioned author. The responses to "Is there a God?" and "What is God?" are not the same. But "esse" responds to "whether God is" and substance or nature to "what is he?".
3. Or, if it's said that the esse of God is known [cognoscitur], not through itself, but rather through the similitude of the creature, On the contrary, in the creature there is both esse and substance or nature, and since it has both from God, both give it a kind of similarity with God. (That which acts acts in a way that reflects itself and is like itself.) So if the esse of God is known through the simititude of created esse, his substance ought to be known also through the similitude of the created substance. And so of God we would be able to know not only that he is, but what he is.
--"Being" and "to be" [ens et esse] are spoken of in two ways, as is explained in Metaphysis E. For sometimes it means the essence of a thing, or the act of being; but other times it means the truth of a proposition, even one that concerns things that have no esse, as when we say that blindness is, since it is true that a man is blind. Thus when John of Damascus says that God's esse is manifest to us, "esse Dei" is to be taken in the second way, not the first. For in the first way God's esse is the same as his substance: and just as his substance is unknown, so too is his esse. But in the second way, we know that God is, because we concieve this proposition in our intellect, from his effects. And this answers the first three objections.
4. Each thing is said to differ from another through its substance. But that which is common to all cannot bring about the difference of one from another. Hence Aristotle also says that being [ens] should not occur in a definition, since through it the thing defined would not be distinguished from anything else. Thus being itself [ipsum esse] is not the substance of anything that is distinct from another thing, since it is common to all. But God is a thing distinct from all other things. Therefore his being [esse] is not his substance.
--But the divine esse, which is his substance, is no common esse, but is distinct from every other esse. Thus, through that esse God is different from every other being [ens].
5. Things are never different, one from another, unless they have different existences. But one thing's existence is not different from another's as existence, but only insofar as it is in this or that nature. It is by being in some nature that an existence differs from Existence Itself. Thus, if there is any existence that is not in any nature, it would not be different from any other existence. And so it follows that if the divine nature is its own existence then it must be the same as the common existence of everything.
--As it says in the Book of Causes, God's existence is individated and distinguished from every other existence by the fact that it is an existence that subsists through itself and not an existence inhering in some nature distinct from it. When it comes to every other existence which is not subsistent, those things that subsist by existing as something of such and such a nature must have that existence individuated through nature and substance. And concerning these things it is true that the existence of the one is different from the existence of the other on account of them being of different natures. In the same way, if there were such a thing as a heat existing through itself without either matter or subject, it would thus be distinguished from every other heat, whereas heats existing in a subject are distinguished only through their subjects.
6. Being [ens] to which no addition is made is the common being [ens] of everything. But if God is his own existence [esse], he would be [a] being [ens] to which no addition is made. Thus he will be what is common and predicated of everything, and God will be mixed with all things. This is both heretical and contrary to Aristotle, who says in the Book of Causes that the first cause directs all things even though he is not mixed with them.
--The reason common being has nothing added to it is not because addition cannot be made to it. But this is the reason divine existence has nothing added to it. Thus divine existence is not common existence, just as the common nature "animal" does not, in its ratio, have the differentia "rational" added to it, but it is not in the ratio of this common nature that such an addition cannot be made, as is the case with the ratio of "irrational animal", which is a species of "animal".
7. What is entirely simple, cannot be spoken of concretely. And being [esse] is like this; for it seems that being is related to essence as white to whiteness. Therefore it is not appropriate to say that the divine substance is esse.
--The mode of signifying in words that are imposed on things by us follows the mode of understanding. For words signify the concepts of