Credo Ut Intelligam

I still think (6) is missing the point. Why should epistemological naivete render anyone unfit for moral indignation? Well it doesn't, obviously, but that's because morally indignant one is not being consistent. As Christians we should happily grant the atheist his moralism, he is created in God's image after all. However, if atheists like Dawkins, Hitchens and Harris are going to step up to the plate and call Christianity out to play, they better be able to hit those fastballs. It seems obvious to me, however, they don't even know how to hold the bat properly. When you plead epistemic naivete you simply can't go around judging other systems of morality because that implies some sort of standard which you, apparently, are familiar with.

When you ask an atheist why murder is wrong they can offer up "society" or "evolution" as an explaination. The problem is, from where does/did "society" or "evolution" get their authority? When you ask a Christian why murder is wrong they can offer up "the nature and character of God" and "God's written word." Unlike "society" and "evolution", those things are ontologically authoritative; in the Christian's worldview they cannot be questioned because (a) there's nothing ontologically prior to or superior than God and (b) there's nothing more truthful than God's word. If you press an atheist, however, "society" and "evolution" can both be questioned even from within his own worldview.

You keep claiming that the Christian and the atheist are in the same boat but you're failing to demonstrate. I would say they are in two very different boats and, though they're both going the same direction, the Christians on their boat are pumping large quantities of water out of the atheists' boat and that's the only thing keeping their boat floating. The Christian's epistemic ground comes in the form of being made in the image of the Creator and having access, via the Holy Spirit, to the One through whom all things were made and are sustained. What does the atheist have? The concept of God has been around far longer than atheism and is far better developed (especially in the form of Christianity). Atheism is the new dog in town and if it wants to claim dominance then it needs to accomplish a lot more than just loud barking.

The atheist asks "why think 1) is true?" but in asking the question he's already conceded the debate. The concept of "truth" itself is unintelligible at worst and conventional at best given the premises of atheism. Does this mean the atheist can't know truth? No more than it means the atheist can't know morality, but in both endeavors he is in conflict with his avowed atheism. Let's take the best case scenario and say that truth is a matter of social convention. The community of Christians has "x" set of truths and the community of atheists has "y" set of truths; why should it matter at all that "x" and "y" are contradictory from the atheist's viewpoint? Neither community can claim they are better than the other(s) because that would imply some outside standard. So when atheism judges Christianity (and religion in general) it is being inconsistent with its own set of truths, nevermind any question begging by EGMS. The question is, given the input of atheism can the output ever be moralism. I believe the answer is a resounding "No."

By "unfit", I meant with respect to rationality: Why, I was asking, would the lack of an epistemic justification for morality make it irrational to moralize? After all, as you pointed out in another comment, reasoning must stop somewhere. At some point you get down to basic assumptions that are not themselves grounded in anything more basic. The lack of epistemic grounding for such things does not make it irrational or inconsistent to adhere to them. Do you have some argument, other than the one I considered and refuted, explaining why you think the moralizing atheist is inonsistent? Or are you just begging the question when you keep insisting that the moralizing atheist is inconsistent?

What do you mean by "ontological authority"? Do you mean that, in Christianity, unlike, say, Utilitarian Atheism, the ultimate authority is not a principle, but a being? That's certainly a difference between Christianity and Utilitarian atheism. But how is that an argument against one or the other?

When I say the Christian and the atheist are in the same boat, I mean in respect to lacking epistemic grounds for their morality. The demonstration was in 6. We are now discussing whether that demonstration is successful. And the burded of proof is on the Christian to show that it is unsuccessful. You are trying to meet that burden of proof, and I am pointing out the ways in which you are failing. If I have misrepresented your attempts, please clarify. You might begin by telling me which EGMS you are defending. EGMS1? EGMS2? EGMS3? Or do you have some other formulation (EGMS4)?

Your "new dog in town" argument commits the ad antiquitatem fallacy.

In your last paragraph you bring up a different argument (which I think you briefly alluded to before), an argument not about the basis for morality, but about the basis for logic and truth. If that argument were sucessful, then atheism would be shown to be false, and we wouldn't have to bother with EGMS. If unsuccessful, then it's of no use butressing EGMS. Now if you concede that EGMS won't work without that other argument, then we can lay this discussion to rest and talk about that other argument. If you won't concede that, then it's up to you to show that EGMS succeeds on its own.

I don't think EGMS succeeds on its own because of presuppositions about the nature and validity of logical arguments. When the atheist responds with (6) from your previous entry he changes the debate from one about moralism to one about the authority and source of logic and truth (hence, 6 isn't a demonstration that the Christian lacks epistemic grounds). What I have been arguing from the beginning is that the atheist has no epistemic foundation at all, much less can he ground his moralism in "it."

Also, your re-tooling of my argument with "no leprechans" is nonsense. It's like an atheist telling a Christian that if you replace "God" with "Invisible Pink Unicorn" in the Bible then you don't substantially change the meaning of the text whatsoever; this is not a valid redefining. Believing or not believing in leprechauns does not affect how you understand morality whereas beliving or not believing in God does. In other words, the existence/non-existence of leprechauns has no bearing on the concept of morality but the existence/non-existence of God does. Oh, and boulder's don't float...

By "ontological authority" I mean authority which is inherent in being, i.e. the authority that a given object/person has simply by its/his/her existence. Evolution is (supposedly) merely a scientific theory about origins and biological development so no ontological (or universal) authority there as far as morality is concerned. And society, as a collective whole, can certainly "come up" with their own rules so there's ontological authority but there's certainly no universal authority from which to derive morality the way atheists seem to desire. So, I'm willing to grant the atheist epistemic grounding for his moralism if he wants to ground it in his society but this is, then, inconsistent with his atheism unless the society itself is atheistic. Even then, all the atheistic society can say when questioned is "Because we have, as a group, deemed it wrong."

This brings us back to the initial problem, whence the basis for deeming "x" wrong and "y" right? Christianity says God has deemed it for us, atheism says evolution has deemed it? Society has deemed it? Human nature has deemed it? Utilitarianism has deemed it? None of these items have the authority to deem anything right or wrong on a universal scale. The point of EGMS (in whatever variant) is to push the atheist back into his presuppositions wherein his inconsistency attempts to hide amongst shifting assumptions. This, it seems according to (6), is precisely what it does.

You have misunderstood (6). It is not about the source of logic and truth, it is about the epistemic justification for morality.

In an earlier comment, you argued that because atheism is a negative thesis, from which morality cannot be derived, morality is for the atheist nothing other than arbitrary choice or subjective preference. I showed that that does not follow. The mere fact that someone can't derive morality from one of their beliefs (that God does not exist) does not entail that their morality is purely arbitrary. The only difference between this and the leprechauns is that nobody ever tried to derive morality from leprechauns, but theists have tried to derive morality from God. Nevertheless, the point still holds: no atheist is just an atheist. Atheists believe other things, and they can derive their moralities from those other things. THE FACT THAT MARXIST AND UTILITARIAN ATHEISTS HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON (NAMELY, ATHEISM) IS IRRELEVANT. The only thing that is relevant is whether each kind of atheist does have a moral standard in terms of which he can justify his particular ethical exhortations and denunciations, and whether his failure to justify the standard itself either makes him somehow irrational in following it or puts him in a different boat from the Christian, who also cannot justify the ultimate ground of his morality.

Christians believe that there is a being which has moral authority simply by virtue of its existence. Utilitarian atheists don't think morality works like that. They think the ultimate ground of morality is found in the unexplained normativity of a philosophical principle, rather than the unexplained normativity of a being with ontological authority. Where is the argument that one theory is superior to the other?

I think you may be on the right track with this ontological authority stuff, but you still haven't explained why it makes Christianity superior to atheism. And you certainly haven't explained why the atheist is "inconsistent." I asked you to argue for that claim, but you didn't do so. I asked for your EGMS4, but you haven't shown it to me. So I think I'm justified in concluding that you don't have an argument. You are begging the question, and multiplying words in a vain hope of obscuring your lack of reasoning. A real atheist will be even less patient with you than I have been, and your manner of "arguing" will confirm him in his belief that Christians think they can win an argument simply by insisting loudly and repeatedly that their opponents are being inconsistent.

"Boulders don't float."
Neither do castles.

Castles do float, especially ones that are on clouds. Just because atheists don't believe it doesn't mean it isn't true. ;-)

I haven't misunderstood (6) at all. The concept of epistemic justification is absolutely meaningless in a worldview that does not contain God. The atheist can claim that morality has nothing whatsoever to do with the source of truth and logic until he's blue in the face, but that's the point. There are assumptions in the flurry that is (6) that are not consistent with the concept of "non-belief in God." EGMS4 could look something like this, maybe:

1. If there is no God then there is no epistemic grounds for anything including morality.

2. Any worldview that espouses Atheism assumes there is epistemic grounds for something(s) including morality.

3. Therefore any worldview that espouses atheism is inconsistent.

I'm curious, would you say that theism isn't a worldview?

You say "Utilitarian atheists don't think morality works like that. They think the ultimate ground of morality is found in the unexplained normativity of a philosophical principle, rather than the unexplained normativity of a being with ontological authority." How is God's normativity "unexplained"? I've already explained it comes from being God. It is by virtue of what and who He is that He is normative. Also, there's nothing unexplained about the supposed normativity of utilitarianism either. It's normative when/if a group of people adopt it as their ethical system. The mistake here comes in the form of your assumption that the Christian has made a choice in the matter and in the assumption that the atheist can rationally adopt whatever worldview he wishes to justify his morality.

Mr. Atheist: That utilitarian principle of ethics looks pretty good, think I'll grab me a scoop of that. Let's see, now maybe a little naturalism and a healthy serving of skepticism. Man, I got me a nice little worldview goin' on here!

Mr. Christian: So, why does that utilitarian principle look pretty good?

Mr. Atheist: Well, it suits what I think [or feel] is right and wrong.

Mr. Christian: Okay, so how did you come to those conclusions?

Mr. Atheist: As it turns out, my parents are Catholic so I got some of that moralism in my formative years, but since I don't believe in gods anymore I had to find some basis for keeping my morals.

Mr. Christian: Wait, so, your sense of right and wrong actually comes from your Christian upbringing? Isn't it a little inconsistent to deny God while maintaining His system of ethics?

Mr. Atheist: Not at all, that's why I picked out this here utilitarian principle. You see, since Christians can't give a reason for why they picked their god in the first place, I don't have to give a reason for picking this principle; I'll treat it as normative like Christians treat their god as normative and then they can't get on to me about my morality because of my atheism. I don't think morality works the way that Christianity says it works so now I can wave my utilitarian flag around when they come trying to combat my atheism with their morality argument.

Mr. Christian: My, you are a clever one.

Jared- Your EGMS 4 is little more than a restatement of EGMS 1 and, just like that one, the major premise begs the question. The charge of inconsistency has nothing to do with whether a particular belief is inconsistent with the truth. Rather, inconsistency obtains if and only if a particular belief is inconsistent with another belief held by the same individual. You cannot say that an atheist who agrees with your minor premise is being inconsistent unless he also happens to agree with your major premise.

Kevin,

Excellent point. EGMS 4 is supposed to show that atheists actually do believe in God since God is the only epistemic ground for anything and the atheist believes there is epistemic grounds for some thing(s); thus, they are being inconsistent with their atheism. If atheists want to claim that I'm begging the question with my first premise then they're going to have to explain where their standard of (or basis for) truth comes from in order to make that sort of judgment. In other words, how does the atheist know that I'm begging the question without first assuming and then using some authoritative standard (e.g. God)? Not only this, what criteria does the atheist use to choose that standard and why that criteria as opposed to some other? From the Christian's standpoint, atheism is inconsistent from the start because the atheist must first deny that which gives him grounds for denying before moving on to other aspects of his worldview. Let's try a different conversation on the morality front -

Mr. Atheist: I get my morality from "x".

Mr. Christian: No, sorry, God is source/basis for the morality of "x".

Mr. Atheist: Okay, what about "y"?

Mr. Christian: Yeah, God's the source/basis there too. Look, why don't you just use "x" or "y" and then just strongly assert that God isn't really the source/basis?

Mr. Atheist: Yes! And when you Christians come around arguing that I can't have morality without god, I can just turn the question around and say "Oh? And where does your god get his morality from?" When they say "God is inherently moral." I can just say "Well that's arbitrary, circular and begs the question so at best you are in the same boat as me."

Mr. Christian: Glad I could be of service.

Jared- The atheist knows that your first premise begs the question the same way that I figured it out. The question itself is this: "Is God the only epistemic ground for anything?" You begged this question as soon as you answered it in your first premise. The evidence for question begging is in your syllogism; consequently, the atheist doesn't need to explain a thing in order to make the charge. Furthermore, your insistence that he does explain commits the ad ignorantiam fallacy. That is, you are mistaking an apparent lack of evidence on his part for evidence to the contrary. Unless and until the atheist states his agreement with your answer to the original question, he can be accused neither of inconsistency nor of closet theism.

Kevin,

You and Chris keep falling into the trap of the argument. Without some ontologically authoritative source there can be nothing called "truth" or "knowledge" or "logic" or "fallacy" or "question" or "moral" or "right" or "wrong." Language and meaning along with truth and knowledge (and morality) become a matter of natural convention at best. If these things are such conventions then the atheist oversteps his boundaries in attempting to force his system onto mine or in trying to fit my system within the parameters of his; he needs to step back and mind his own business. When we approach him with the gospel he should just politely decline and shoo us on our merry way. If he wants to debate, we don't do it on his terms which is, it seems, exactly what you and Chris want to do.

So, back to square one. Let's ask the atheist the question that I'm begging, "Is God the only epistemic ground for anything?" How should he respond? He can't say "yes" because then he's no longer an atheist. He can't say "no" because then he has to provide something else as an epistemic ground for anything and he can't, not without "borrowing" from some other ontologically authoritative source and even then he's now begging the question too! I'm curious, if you don't think the atheist is begging the question of God, then what question is he begging?

Jared- "Ontologically authoritative source" is too broad a concept to be of any help at this point. Since you have already defined ontological authority as "the authority that a given object/person has simply by its/his/her existence," all you've really said here is that, unless things exist, nothing can be said about them. Furthermore, if morality rightly belongs in the mix of things derived from ontological authority, then your previous attempt to disassociate this authority from evolutionary theory is invalid. Morality as an emergent property cannot be discounted.

Also, could you at least pull out a fallacy other than the one I had just identified in the previous comment? There is nothing that the atheist has to provide if he disagrees that God is the only epistemic ground for anything. Lack of evidence does not constitute evidence to the contrary. Even if we assume that the minor to EGMS 4 is true, it does not follow that identification of these epistemic grounds is necessary to the recognition of moral standards. As to your final question, I don't believe that the atheist is begging the question at all. It is possible to be wrong without resorting to this particular fallacy.

Kevin,

How is "ontologically authoritative source" too broad? It certainly isn't as broad as "unless things exist, nothing can be said about them." More precisely, I am saying that even if things exist nothing can be said about them without an authoritative source as at least a reference point. Evolution, as a natural process, cannot serve as such a reference point because all it (supposedly) is is bio-physical happenings. Neither can morality "emerge" out of something that is inherently amoral. However, let's grant, for a moment, that morality is emergent; it would still only be relatively and subjectively authoritative (i.e. what's "wrong" for you is not necessarily "wrong" for me, like murder for example). The same would be true of "consciousness", "logic", "truth" or any other emergent authority under such a scheme.

There is nothing the atheist has to provide if he disagrees that God is the only epistemic ground for anything? I certainly agree that lack of evidence does not constitute evidence to the contrary, but on what basis does the atheist use such logic as an authoritative measure? The notion that "lack of evidence does not constitute evidence to the contrary" is based on...? Because people have used it effectively in the past? But then the atheist is committing the error of appealing to tradition. Doh! Even he now falls victim to the razor sharp rules of rationality.

You say that "identification of these epistemic grounds" is not necessary for "the recognition of moral standards"; well, what is neccessary for such recognition? You also say that you "don't believe the atheist is begging the question at all." So the atheist now has a worldview which is not based on some tautological truth? I'll gladly grant that it is possible to be wrong without resorting to this particular fallacy, but I will quickly add that it is impossible to be right without resorting to this particular fallacy at some point. This is where EGMS in any of its variants is supposed to bring us: what is your starting point and does that starting point make better sense of our experience than mine?

Begging the question is not the same as assuming something without argument. Begging the question is assuming, without argument, the thing that is in question in a debate, and then trying to use that as a premise in your argument. If you're talking to another Christian, and you use "God exists" as an unargued premise, you have not begged the question, because, in that context, God's existence is not in question. If you're talking to an atheist and you tell him you believe in God, without pretending to present an argument for your position or against his, then you haven't begged the question because only someone who is trying to argue for something can commit that fallacy. When you are in a debate with an atheist who has called into question your claim that without God there can be no such thing as "good", "bad", "logical", "illogical", etc., and then you use that very claim, without arguing for it, as a premise in your argument against atheism ... you have begged the question.

Everyone relies upon unargued assumptions in their systems of belief. That doesn't change the fact that a question begging argument is no good. All Kevin and I are doing is pointing out that your question begging arguments are no good.

Chris,

I don't have a problem with that at all. EGMS doesn't beg the question until the atheist responds with (6). Of course, in responding with (6) the atheist is exposing his unargued assumption(s) and the Christian should question the coherency of the atheist's assumption(s). This is what I have been doing: the atheist can't rationally call into question my claims about God because he has no epistemic voice with which to do so, not an authoritative voice at any rate. That's what I'm asking for and (6) does not address this issue in the least. So I see (6) not as a good response for the atheist but as a good response by the atheist for the Christian; it gets us to the real problem(s).

Out of curiousity, what would you say to an atheist who asks you why your unargued assumption is God? If he asked you for an argument, what would it look like?

Your doing more than "questioning" the atheists coherency: you're giving, or at least trying to give, an argument against the atheist's coherency. And that argument begs the question.

Christian: Is your thought coherent?

Atheist: I think so. At least, I'm not aware of any incoherence in it. Why? Do you think my thought is incoherent?

Christian: Yes I do.

Atheist: On what grounds do you charge me with incoherence?

At this point the Christian needs to give an argument. And it must be a cogent argument, not a fallacious argument.

Your assertion, "the atheist can't rationally call into question my claims about God because he has no epistemic voice with which to do so, not an authoritative voice at any rate," still begs the question. You have not shown that the atheist is in the situation that you say he is in. Until you do, we have no reason to believe that the atheist is unable (rationally) to call you out for begging the question, or to make any other logical moves.

In answer to your final question, it would depend on the situation. If the atheist implied that my belief in God isn't rational unless I can prove it to him, then I'd want to go after that bad epistemology of his before propounding a theistic argument. But if he wasn't implying that, then there are a variety of arguments that I think are cogent. The cosmological argument is one. EGMS2 is another. Unlike you, I think (6) is a good counter-argument to EGMS. But I have a counter-counter-argument, which I will post soon.

It's more like -

Christian: [EGMS2]

Atheist: Oh? [(6)]

Christian: Hold on there a minute, partner. How is it that you are questioning me? On what basis does (6) rest? How is (6) an argument given your unargued assumptions about "x" [the non-existence of god(s), the eternality of matter/universe, the universality of logic/consciousness/rationality, etc.]? See, my worldview starts with the Christian God and from that starting point everything else falls into place. Given your starting point, how does anything fall into place?

Here the Christian has asked the atheist for his epistemic voice. The response? Silence. Now, I very much so see the atheist's jowls flapping and his tongue flopping, but he ain't makin' any noise, and that's a problem. You say I "have not shown that the atheist is in the situation that you say he is in" when, in fact, I have actually put him in that situation in giving him the opportunity to spout (6) as his response to EGMS.

Let's look at it another way. In using EGMS I have made known my unargued assumptions, right?. According to these unargued assumptions atheism is incoherent, as per the argument. Now, given the atheist's unargued assumptions, how is Christianity incoherent? How is such an assessment even made? Play it out. The negative thesis of atheism eliminates all supernaturalism leaving only naturalism as the cause of any/everything. Given naturalism one cannot come to the conclusion that theism is incoherent even given atheism! Why? Because on a naturalistic account the atheist's atheism and the theist's theism are nothing more than the results of the bio-chemical happenings of the neuralogical processes within the brain as it interprets sense datum provided through interaction with the external world. I think that's a pretty darn good reason for believing that the atheist is unable to rationally call me out for "begging the question."

As for my last question, let's say the situation calls for you to go after his bad epistemology; how would you go about that task? I look forward to your counter-counter-argument for (6).

I think we've gotten off track a bit. You believe atheism is not only inconsistent in a trivial way, but in this very profound way such that atheists can't rationally engage in logical reasoning at all. Let's call that sort of predicament, "transcendental incoherence".

Is atheism trancendentally incoherent? You haven't yet convinced me that it is. But suppose I grant for the sake of argument that atheism is transcendentally incoherent. Suppose further that a certain Christian says, "I've got a great argument against atheism: LA LA LA !" An atheist might point out that the Christian has not propounded a great argument against atheism, all he has done is shouted some nonsense syllables. Perhaps the atheist (being mired in transcendental inconsistency) cannot rationally point out to the Christian that "LA LA LA !" is a really bad argument. Still, "LA LA LA" is a really bad argument, for the precisely the reason that the atheist gave. and I can point that out.

Now EGMS is not such a bad argument as "LA LA LA", but (6) seems to show that it is unsuccesful. If you are right, and atheism is mired in transcendental inconsistency, then perhaps the atheist cannot rationally point out that (6) undermines EGMS. Still, (6) undermines EGMS. as I have pointed out.

And you don't evade this when you propound your own argument, distinct from EGMS, to the effect that atheism is transcendentally incoherent. Your argument may work or it may not, but EGMS is still undermined by (6). Unlike your argument, EGMS is not about transcendental incoherence. EGMS is only aimed at moralizing atheism. EGMS1 aims to show that moralizing atheism is inconsistent, not that all forms of atheism are transcendentally incoherent. EGMS2 and EGMS3 aim at even less.

Doug Wilson has, at times, brought up something like your broader argument. But that's not the argument he has spent most of his time on. Most of the time, he has been focused on arguing, not that all forms of atheism are transcendentally incoherent, but that there is something particularly absurd about a morally indignant atheist. EGMS is about the putative problem atheists have with morality in particular. All (6) is trying to show is that atheists don't have that particular problem -- or if they do, then so do Christians.

Now if you want, you could admit that (6) shows EGMS to be unsuccesful, but then propound a different argument, not pointing to any particular problem atheism has with morality, but to the more general problem atheism supposedly has with logic, truth, and meaning. But first I want you to admit that (6) is a sufficient response to EGMS, whether or not your broader argument turns out to be successful.

How would I go after the atheists bad epistemology? Well, I would begin not by attacking him, but by asking him what his epistemology is -- and I would LISTEN to what he was saying, rather than assuming that his epistemology is the same as the kind of bad epistemology I already know how to refute. He may not himself know what his epistemology is, in which case I would ask him the kinds of questions that would help him bring his tacit epistemology to the level of articulate theory. The goal at this stage is not to catch him in incoherence, but to help him understand his own position, and to show him that I also understand it and can describe it sympathetically. If his view turns out to be standard classical foundationalism I would refute it in the same way Plantinga does in Warranted Christian Belief. If his view is similar to classical foundationalism, but not quite the same, it might still be succeptible to Plantinga's refutation, but it might not. It would depend on what the view actually is.

I will admit that (6) shows EGMS to be unsuccessful, but only in a superficial or "trivial" way. (6) isn't a good answer, in my estimation, unless it also is grounded epistemically. This is why I originally said that (6) isn't an effective response and further clarified that it isn't particularly effective for the atheist who is propounding it. What I've been trying to point out is that there is no substance behind (6) to give it the support it needs in order to effectively deal with EGMS. So I can concede that (6) is a good response by the atheist in as much as it moves the debate away from EGMS and to another level, but that next level is actually more problematic for the atheist. The deeper he digs into his atheism, the more lost he becomes.

I like your method of responding to the atheist's bad epistemology.

My view is that when an atheist makes a good response to your initial argument, so that you really can't defend that initial argument anymore, but must go on to argue at "another level", you ought to admit plainly that your initial argument was unsuccessful. That lets the atheist know that you can be reasonable, and he'll have more respect for your follow-up argument: if he knows you're willing to admit when he's scored a point against you, he'll be more willing to admit when you score a point against him. But if you simply jump up to that other level without admiting your defeat then it looks like you're pulling a fast one. It's common for people to do that sort of thing: instead of admitting defeat, they start making a different argument, as if that's an adequate response, and then later in the conversation they come back to the defeated argument and start propounding it all over again, as if it hadn't been defeated.

One of my beefs with presuppositional apologetics -- at least as it is usually taught -- is that it encourages Christians to take up an attitude in which they have decided ahead of time that nothing the atheist says can ever be a legitimate argument, and therefore I don't really have to listen to what the atheist is saying, except for the purpose of catching him in incoherence. Even if they wouldn't consciously accept this, standard presuppositionalist rhetoric gives off that kind of vibe. And those who would already be inclined to that kind of attitude and rhetoric find aid and comfort in the idea that atheism is transcendentally incoherent.

I'm not pretending that this refutes the idea that atheism is transcendentally incoherent. I'm talking rhetoric here, not substance. Rhetoric matters. The attitude we take when arguing is at least as important as the substance of our arguments.

I think that's the right way to go about things, certainly it's the more honorable way. Obviously it's an area I'm still working on; this has been a helpful interaction, thanks for putting up with me :-)

"The attitude we take when arguing is at least as important as the substance of our arguments." I agree.

That's why I think it's so important to listen to people's personal stories when you're reasoning with them about the faith. I suspect very few people's main reason for rejecting Christianity is intellectual: the personal reasons, those that are narrated, not debated, are usually more important at base.

Jared- Your use of the phrase "ontologically authoritative source" isn't nearly as broad as I have made it out to be. But this is only because you're employing the fallacy of equivocation. In a previous comment, you define ontological authority as something that a person or object has simply because it exists. This implies that whatever exists qualifies as an ontologically authoritative source. Just prior to my latest comment, though, the definition of the phrase has been narrowed down to "God."

As to the ad ignornantiam fallacy, even if you were right that an atheist has no grounds to call you on it [and you are not], this would miss the point. He is not the one committing this fallacy: you are.

I am not denying the necessity of epistemic grounds for the recognition of moral standards or anything else. I only deny that the epistemic grounds themselves must be recognized.

Kevin,

Just because something exists doesn't mean it has ontological authority; lollipops exist but they don't have ontological authority, i.e. they have no inherent authority. However, even if I was equivocating it doesn't change the fact that given atheism nothing has ontological authority.

You say that epistemic grounds are necessary for recognizing moral standards but that those grounds themselves don't need to be recognized. If you don't know the grounds then you, in effect, don't know what is necessary for the recognition of the standards, hence, you shouldn't be recognizing them. But, alas, the atheist does recognize moral standards which means he also recognizes the epistemic grounds necessary for recognizing those standards. Of course, he doesn't have to acknowledge this (and he doesn't) but there it is.

Jared- I'm not the one who said that it did. Go back to your original explanation--"the authority that a given object/person has simply by its/his/her existence." Nothing in this statement can be taken to exclude lollipops. I don't believe that you can dismiss equivocation merely by appealing to the [supposed] fact of your premise. A true statement is true no matter what. The point in a debate, however, is to convince your opponent that it is true. Couching it in a fallacy that, on the surface at least, cannot be distinguished from dishonesty does not increase your odds.

It does not follow that ignorance of what is necessary to recognize standards somehow takes away a person's right or ability to recognize them. Like any self respecting epistemological internalist you are confusing epistemic grounds with knowledge of those grounds.