This was promted, in part, by the Wilson-Hitchens debate over on Christianity Today. Wilson has been pressing a rather common apologetic argument, and Hitchens, like an awful lot of atheists, is steadfastly pretending (?) not to get it.
The argument goes something like this:
You say, Mr. Atheist, that religion is dangerous, you exhibit a great deal of moral indignation at the idea that God would require eternal torment for minor disobedience, you claim that it is foolish nonsense and you disapprove of those who teach such foolish nonsense to their children, you decry what you call "genocide" in the Old Testament, and you fulminate with much vigor against all the enormities committed by Christians in history. Could you please tell me what justifies all this moral outrage? What is your standard for right and wrong, and why should anyone else think that your standard is authoritative? You and I both agree in condemning Stalin and Mao for the evils they did. But it's pretty clear why I condemn them. I think there is an absolute moral standard in the Bible. I can appeal to that for justification of my moral stance. But what can you appeal to? If the world is matter in motion, if human beings are just fancy animals, and animals are just fancy chemical reactions, and when we die, the cold, impersonal universe moves on, unconcerned; well, then, what grounds can there be for any moral judgments?
I am amazed at how much difficulty many atheists have even understanding this argument. Here are five common responses:
1) Your suggestions that religious faith is necessary for understanding morality is demonstrably false. Many atheists are morally upstanding people. They know the difference between right and wrong just as much as anyone else. If some (like Stalin) do bad things, so what? Lots of Christians have done very bad things too. Religion is not necessary for morality.
Many atheists make this kind of response even when the Christian's argument is explained clearly, so that there is no ground for such blatant missing-the-point. The argument is not that atheists can't be aware of moral truths, or that atheists can't be decent people. The argument is that they can give no reason for being moral. Like Christians, atheists can know that murder is wrong, but, unlike Christians, they cannot say why it is wrong. They may have their own personal preferences for how they would like people to behave, but personal preferences are no grounds for moral indignation. If some other atheist (say Stalin) prefers to murder in order to advance his own political power, an atheist who (rightly) condemns Stalin can give no grounds for that condemnation.
2) Atheism isn't a "worldview", anymore than "disbelief in leprechauns" is a worldview. It is silly to think that Stalin and I must have the same ethical theory (since we're both atheists). It's silly to insist that I derive my moral philosophy from my "atheistic premise" just as it would be silly for me to insist that Christians derive their ethical theory from their disbelief in leprechauns.
This again misses the point. The argument does not require atheists to derive their moral philosophy from the premise "God does not exist". All it asks is for them to derive their moral philosophy from somewhere. Anywhere! You don't believe in God or anything like God; so you can't ground your morality in that kind of transcendent source. Where do you ground it, then? In addition to believing that there is no God you have many other beliefs that not all atheists share. Fine. Derive morality from some of them. Give some indication of something or other that will justify saying that murder is not merely contrary to your idiosyncratic preferences, but is morally obligatory. What justifies your moral outrage?
3) Morality comes from reason and experience.
This response at least understands the question. But it doesn't answer it. How do reason and experience yield morality? Which experiences? What arguments? If you start with moral assumptions you can certainly derive moral conclusions, but by what miracle can reason produce a moral conclusion without presupposing morality in the premises? Describe a particular act of murder in great scientific detail -- where is the wrongness? Reason can't find it without assuming it. If you assume "human life is valuable" then you may be able to derive "death is bad", but how do you know human life is valuable in the first place? Why should it be any more valuable that any other chemical reaction? And experience fares no better. Experience can tell me that Paul killed Bill yesterday (I saw it with my own eyes). But how do you "experience" the fact that what Paul did was wrong? Was it that sense of revulsion you felt when you saw him do it? But a sense of revulsion is just a sense of revulsion -- a subjective response. If other people don't feel that sense of revulsion, or if they are willing to ignore it in order to get what they want, what can you say? Only that you don't like what they are doing. It makes you feel icky. And why should anyone care what makes you feel icky?
4) Morality comes from society.
While it is quite true that people generally learn their morality from the society they live in, the pedagogical origin of moral beliefs is not what we are concerned with here. We are concerned with the epistemic justification for a standard of morality. And a little questioning soon reveals that most atheists don't really believe that society provides that standard. Was the Nazi "final solution" morally justified because the society approved of it? If everyone in the world wanted to torture a certain two year old, would it be right? Most atheists believe (however slow they may be to admit it) that morality transcends human societies. But even if a few atheists are willing to bite the bullet and say torturing a two year old would be right, if society says so, it still does no good. Simply asserting that society is the standard doesn't justify the claim. How come I have to listen to what the society says? My society disapproves of stealing. But if I want to steal, supposing I can get away with it, why shouldn't I. Yes, I know "society" disapproves, but why should I care?
5) There's this fundamental moral principle (Kant's categorical imperative, Mill's Utilitarian principle, the Golden Rule, whatever).
Says who? Who made Kant an authority over me? Why should I accept Utilitarian ethices when I want to do things that conflict with it? Calling something a fundamental moral principle doesn't make it one. What justifies treating that proposition as a fundamental moral principle?
The preceding five response are pretty much standard fare. There seem to be very few atheists (and agnostics are in a similar boat) who can do better than this. Nevertheless, I suggest that the reason atheists do so badly is not so much because atheism is indefensible as because most atheists (even some of their public intellectuals) aren't very well educated. Consider the following:
6) I admit that the basis for moral judgments is a perplexing philosophical problem. But it is no less so for a Christain than for an atheist. You say there is a big, strong, non-physical being who will hurt me if I don't do what he says. So what? I'll admit, I don't want to be hurt, and I might do what he says for that reason, but that doesn't give him moral authority over me any more than a human tyrant, who can also hurt me if I don't do what he wants. You say this big, strong, non-physical being has more than just power; he also has moral authority. So you say. But why? On what grounds? Because he made me? Why should that matter? Most people think that a man has rights over what he makes with his own hands. But can all of morality be explained by projecting this principle into the heavens? Surely not. Why should I accept that moral principle in the first place? Suppose there were an all powerful being who made creatures just for the fun of torturing them. Would this be good? Why? What makes God's will "morally right"? You see that this is just as much a problem for the Christian as for the atheist. Morality is philosophically puzzling, but we all agree that there is such a thing. And we don't need to solve the philosophical puzzle in order to apply moral standards in ordinary life. It's OK, both for atheists and for Christians, to condemn evil, even if they don't have an epistemological theory that explains why they can do that.
It seems to me that this ought to be the standard atheistic response to a standard Christian argument. But it isn't.
Posted by mccartney at May 17, 2007 01:26 AM | TrackBackThis line of argument doesn't work all that well either; it also completely evades the burden of proof. But then, I guess you know that already.
Posted by: Jared at May 17, 2007 08:50 AMBut the burden of proof isn't on the atheist here. The atheist is responding to an argument. It is the Christian who is trying to show that there is something wrong with (morally indignant) atheism. All the atheist has to do in order to give a cogent response to that argument is to show that that argument does not succeed in establishing its conclusion.
Posted by: Chris McC at May 22, 2007 02:13 PMThe Christian isn't trying to show that there is something wrong with morally indignant atheism, the Christian is pointing out that the atheist is being inconsistent with his worldview by being morally indignant. This would be akin to me pointing out that some ketchup has accumulated at the corner of your mouth; it's not really an argument as much as it is an observation.
The burden of proof, however, is on the atheist to provide a ground for his moralism because the Christian has already done so. To question the Christian's ground does not, then, establish the atheist's ground, hence (6) is a red herring at best. If I point out that ketchup you can't respond with, as Hitchens does, "its innate to all human mouths" or "what about that ketchup on your mouth?" or, as per (6), "hey, we both have ketchup, lets not ask questions." The Christian will readily show the atheist the burger which is responsible for his ketchup, what has the atheist to show? How does the atheist even recognize that it's ketchup? That's the issue.
Not only this, but on what basis does the atheist even question or judge the Christian's ground (as Hitchens, Harris and Dawkins do)? If, according to his own worldview, the universe is simply matter in motion and "thoughts" are merely neurons firing and chemicals wafting about the brain tissue, what authority can the atheist appeal to in order to establish a judgment of any sort? Like Wilson says, you might as well shake up two soda cans then ask a bottle of water which one of the cans is "winning" the "debate." Or, in keeping with my analogy, the atheist can't question the legitimacy of the Christian's appeal to his burger in producing the ketchup.
Of course, he can (and does) question anyway and sometimes is even right. But that's because he, too, is made in the image of God and uses His laws as a moral ground for assessing. Wilson wants the atheists to own up, which is a reasonable request I think.
Posted by: Jared at May 22, 2007 04:52 PMMr. Christian: I'd like to point out, sir, that your atheistic worldview has this ketchup problem: you can't provide an epistemic grounding for your moralism.
Mr. Atheist: OK. Do you recognize that you also have the same problem?
Mr. Christian: Yes.
Mr. Atheist: Can you give an example of any worldview that doesn't have that problem?
Mr. Christian: No.
Mr. Atheist: So the fact that atheism has this problem doesn't imply that any atheist philosophy is worse off, rationally speaking, than any other philosophy. It just means there are some puzzles that no philosophy has yet been able to solve.
Mr. Christian: That's right, I wasn't trying to show that your atheist worldview is worse off, rationally speaking, than any other worldview. In fact I wasn't trying to make an argument at all. Just an observation.
Mr. Atheist: So if you weren't making an argument, why did you hold forth at length on this "observation" of yours in the context of a debate between a Christian and an atheist?
Mr. Christian: because I don't have any good arguments against atheism, and I was sorta hoping you'd let me get away with blowing smoke.
I think Doug Wilson was making an argument, and a good one at that. And there is a moderately good response available, which Hitchens hasn't been able to come up with. On my reading, that means Wilson is winning. If I thought you were right, I'd have to say Hitchens is winning.
In your second paragraph, you write, "The burden of proof, however, is on the atheist to provide a ground for his moralism because the Christian has already done so." But the Christian has not. That's the point. The Christian and the atheist (according to 6) are in the same boat: neither can provide a ground for their moralism. Unless the arbitrary assertion of an ethical principle ("Whatever this powerful being called 'God' tells us to do is morally obligatory for us.") counts as "providing a ground." But if that's the case, then the atheist can do the same via (5). But neither the atheist nor the Christian can answer the question, "Why should I accept your principle?"
The rest of your comment looks to me like a reiteration of the original argument/observation, not an engagement with the response in 6.
Posted by: Chris McC at May 22, 2007 10:32 PMWhen Mr. Atheist asks Mr. Christian "Do you recognize that you also have the same problem?" Mr. Christian shouldn't respond with "Yes." You see, Mr. Christian actually has a burger whereas Mr. Atheist is quite the starving one. Moreover, it stands to reason that since Mr. Christian is the one with the burger and they both have ketchup on their faces and Mr. Atheist has this ravishing hunger, it just might be the case that Mr. Atheist has secretly taken a bite of Mr. Christian's burger. So, "rationally speaking", atheism is far worse off than any philosophy that posits something as grounds. Atheism posits nothing, which is more problematic than something, and it justifies (or rationlizes, anyway) its nothing by stealing the something from elsewhere.
In other words, Mr. Christian does have an epistemic grounding for his moralism (i.e. the burger). It is not arbitrary to assert that the ketchup came from the burger, in fact it makes sense (certainly more sense than trying to argue that it occurs naturally at the corners of all mouths). Now, I'm perfectly willing to let Mr. Atheist question where Mr. Christian got his burger from, but not until Mr. Atheist explains where his ketchup came from. Do you see? The basis for moral judgments isn't just a perplexing philosophical problem for the atheist, it's a bottomless hole they've jumped into and they vaguely remember what the ledge they jumped from feels like.
Not to mention that all the questions in (6) have already been answered. Granted, (6) is a better attempt than (1)-(5), but that's like saying he only missed the jump by 90 feet instead of 100. I see the coversation going a little like this:
Mr. Christian: I'd like to point out, sir, that your atheistic worldview has this ketchup problem: you can't provide an epistemic grounding for your moralism.
Mr. Atheist: OK. Do you recognize that you also have the same problem?
Mr. Christian: No.
Mr. Atheist: What is your epistemic grounding then?
Mr. Chrisitan: God and His written word which He has faithfully preserved.
Mr. Atheist: OK. Well, [insert (6)]
Mr. Christian: On what grounds do you question me at all? By what authority do your questions come? What grounds will you appeal to in order to assess and judge my responses to your questions? Here, let me use an example: if everyone in the world, except for you, believed rape, murder, stealing, lying, etc. were okay, would those things still be morally wrong? What if two-thirds of the population thought those things were okay? What about half? How do you determine where the line should be?
And now (6) has become as "helpful" as (1)-(5).
Chris, just a quick interjection: wouldn't the Christian belief that we are made in the image of God provide a firmer ground for our ethics than the "God is more powerful than us" argument you suggest? After all, a malevolent God could be more powerful than us, but the whole point of transcendental arguments in apologetics is to show that, just as there is an otherwise inexplicable connection between the behavior of natural world and the rules of logic and mathematics, so there is a necessary connection between our moral nature and that of our Creator.
As for Jared's response, it sounds a lot like Gordon Clark's Scripturalism. It doesn't satisfy me, but I can't exactly put my finger on why not.
Posted by: Evan Donovan at May 23, 2007 07:31 PMThese fast-food metaphors are a bit weird. And I'm not sure you're being consistent with what "burger" and "ketchup" represent. Originially, I thought "ketchup-on-the-chin" was a metaphor for the absense of an epistemic grounding for one's moral standard. What, then, is the "burger"? Is it the moral standard itself? In that case you seem to be saying that, even if the Christian doesn't have an epistemic justification for his standard, at least he has a standard, whereas the atheist doesn't. Is that right? But then, in your second paragraph, you identify the burger not with the standard but with the episemic grounding for the standard. In that case, what's the ketchup? I don't see what you're driving at. Can you explain the argument you're making in those paragraph without the metaphors?
You write, "Mr. Christian does have an epistemic grounding for his moralism." But the whole point of 6 is that Mr. Christian does not have that epistemic grounding. Why does 6 not show that? You say something about burger's and ketchup which seems to me to be just a reiteration of the claim, not an argument for it, and not an engagement with the argument against it in 6.
In the conversation as you presented it, when the atheist gets to "[insert 6]" does that not show that the Christian was wrong to say "No"? Doesn't it show that, in fact, the Christian does have the same problem?-- that he cannot justify his moral standard? 6 is designed to show that the Christian does have that problem. Unless there is something wrong with the argument in 6, then it will establish that conclusion. But the Christian's final response doesn't show anything wrong with that argument. Is the Christian tacitly conceding the point? Is it fair to characterize the Christian's final response (in your representation) as saying, essentially, "OK, you're right that I also have the same problem you have in that I can't give an epistemic justification for my standard, but at least I have a standard. What is your standard? If you don't even have one, then you and I are not in the same boat in that respect, even if we are in the same boat with respect to lacking epistemic justification."?
Is this your argument? Honestly, it's my best guess at what your argument is. But I realize I probably still haven't got what you're driving at, since you insist that the Christian does have epistemic justification. But I don't see an argument for that. All I see are some metaphors about burgers and ketchup and black holes and ledges, which, to the extent that I understand them, seem to beg the question.
Posted by: Chris McC at May 23, 2007 08:42 PMEvan:
The question is why God has a "moral nature" to begin with. According to 6, postulating unexplained morality in some sort of being up in heaven is no less problematic than postulating unexplained morality in a certain species of mammal.
And the point of calling God a "big strong non-physical being" is to describe Him in a way that doesn't surreptitiously presuppose his moral character, which words like "God" do. The atheist is asking on what grounds we attribute that moral worth or moral authority to that being. It won't do to say "because he's God!" That's like saying "he has moral worth because he has moral worth," which is true enough, I suppose, but doesn't answer the atheist's charge.
Posted by: Chris McC at May 23, 2007 09:06 PMI see what you're saying, but I don't think there's any way around this problem, which is why I suppose we can be thankful that the most popular atheists don't recognize it (although the more sophisticated ones do). All explanations have to end somewhere, and so the question of where morality comes from must end with God even as the question of where Being comes from must end with Him.
Posted by: Evan Donovan at May 24, 2007 09:11 AMChris,
The ketchup is our moralism with seemingly no epistemic ground and the burger is our epistemic ground (no pun intended, well maybe a little intended). Atheism doesn't have a burger and it doesn't posit anything else in place of the burger, that's the problem. So, sans metaphor the argument goes something like this:
Christianity posits God and His word (and, to some extent, the Church) as morally authoritative. Christianity further posits the nature and character of God Himself as the source of that morality. The Christian's moralism, thus, flows coherently from the premises contained in his worldview. Atheism posits a number of things as morally authoritative (the conventional law, inherent moral understanding, desire for cohesive society, etc.) and further posits nothing as the source of that morality. The atheist's moralism, thus, does not flow coherently from the premises of his worldview. Wilson's argument calls the atheist out. He says that you cannot derrive moral authority or the source of morality from the premises of atheism.
It's no secret that all worldviews are foundationally circular; that is, all worldviews are based on some tautological truth(s). Given the tautological truth(s) of atheism, one cannot derrive any sort of moralism. Hence, atheism must borrow from some other worldview (namely Christianity/paganism or heathen/hedonism here in the West) in order for moralism to work or make sense. So the Christian is not in the same boat as the atheist on the problem of morality and this is all before we even get to (6).
Now, let's define "epistemic justification" a little more clearly. In (6) I presume "basis" in the first sentence could appropriately be replaced with "epistemic justification", am I right? If that is the case then it certainly isn't a perplexing philosophical problem for the Christian, rather it's a delightfully intriguing theological problem. So, from the very beginning the atheist is framing the debate/argument according to his own worldview and that's what's in question. You say that in (6) the atheist is asking "on what grounds we attribute that moral worth or moral authority to that being." You also say that "because he's God" is not an adequate answer but in doing so you allow the atheist's tautological foundations supplant the Christian's without question. This is not something I am willing to grant (and I think Wilson would agree with me here). Why? Because, prior to (6) we've already established that the atheist is in no position, given his premises, to make any moral judgments at all.
The atheist can ask "Why use God as your starting point" to which the Christian can reply, "Well, because I'm a Christian; what's you're excuse?" However, if an atheist were, in one breath, to lay (6) at my feet I would probably respond with something like this:
First off, God isn't just a "big, strong, non-physical being" who can hurt you if you don't listen to him. As a Christian I am working with a particular conception of that "big, strong, non-physical being" who also is "good, loving, merciful, holy and just" and those characteristics can't be painted over or summed up by "big, strong, non-physical being." Also, it seems that given your premises such a truth about God would imply moral authority. Under atheism "might makes right" is an okay system of moralism because you have nothing to judge it; it's simply one out of the myriad which can be adopted. Just because you adopt Christian/pagan moralism doesn't give you the right to judge another system.
You've also questioned the relevance of God-as-Creator and I'm glad you brought this up. You point out that most people think the creator has moral authority over its creations, where did such a concept come from? And if it isn't true do you, then, regard all things with equal value? Moreover, given your premises, why can't all morality be explained by projecting this principle into the heavens? Is this not as valid as adopting a might-makes-right system or a Christian/pagan system? You ask why it would be good if an all-powerful being made creatures just for the fun of torturing them; why wouldn't it be good? You have no grounds for saying whether its good or bad because according to atheism it just is. So no, I don't see that this is just as much of a problem for Christianity as it is for atheism. You're right in saying that we all agree there is such a thing as morality, but my worldview accounts for it and yours doesn't.
Once again, I don't see (6) as any better off than (1)-(5). Turning the question back around on the Christian does not alleviate the atheist's responsibility.
Posted by: Jared at May 24, 2007 11:49 AMI think you still haven't learned the lesson of (2). You keep treating atheism as if it is a worldview. It isn't. It's a purely negative thesis. "Atheism" just means the denial of any form of divine reality. There are many atheistic worldviews, just as there are many divinity-affirming worldviews.
As a Christian I am working with a particular conception of that "big, strong, non-physical being" who also is "good, loving, merciful, holy and just" and those characteristics can't be painted over or summed up by "big, strong, non-physical being
But if you can just assume, as axiomatic, the moral character of God, why can't the atheist just assume, as axiomatic, his Utilitarian principle? (assuming we're dealing with that kind of atheism) Both of you are able to derive other moral claims from your basic axiomatic moral claims. Neither of you can prove you axioms. For you, the axioms are about God, for the atheistic Utilitarian, they are about humanity.
What then is the difference between you and the atheist? It seems like you are saying that the difference is that morality can't be derived from atheism. But so what? Morality can be derived from the atheist's worldview, which includes more than just atheism. It includes, for instance, the axiom of Utilitarian ethics.
In response to your translation of the burger argument: You seem to be pointing to the fact that, in Christianity, morality applies first to God, and derivatively to humans (because they're in God's image), whereas in atheism morality applies to human beings first. I don't see why this is supposed to be an argument against atheism. It's true that if you assume morality applies to God, then you may be able to derive its application to humans. But if the application of morality to God is just as problematic as its immediate application to humans, then Christianity's application of morality to humans in a derivative way is no less problematic than atheism's application of morality to humans in a primary way. Think of two people trying to hang a boulder in the sky. One of them just tries to hang it from nothing. The other tries to hang it from castle that he is also trying to hang in the sky. I don't think the guy with the castle is any better off than the guy with just the boulder.
"Well, at least the guy with the castle is going to hang his boulder from something."
Sorry, not convinced.
Posted by: Chris McC at May 25, 2007 02:33 PMIf atheism isn't a worldview then the Christian's argument can be modified appropriately: any worldview that espouses atheism has no epistemic grounds for morality. No problems there.
The atheist isn't "allowed" to assume the moral character of his utilitarian principle because principles aren't the sort of things that have character. There's no inherent morality contained in the utilitarian principle from which morals can be derived. As a moral theory it interprets a morality that is prior to it, it assumes there is such a thing as "right" and "wrong" before explaining how to discern between the two. Not to mention that the negative thesis of atheism still precludes the atheist from choosing utilitarianism over, say, totalitarianism (though, I suppose those aren't mutually exclusive); it becomes a matter of personal preference. Some atheists like the utilitarian principle and others like the mass-genocide principle, simply a matter of perspective right?. Of course, the utilitarian atheist wants to distance himself from the genocidal atheist but guess what they have in common. This commonality prevents the utilitarian atheist from judging the genocidal atheist. And to pour salt on the wound, it could very well be the case that the genocidal atheist has a community of followers who all believe that the extermination of a particular race is "for the best of everyone" (or for everyone else, in their case) and that ridding the world of that race is their utilitarian (and perhaps evolutionary) responsibility.
It is unfortunate for our particular atheist friend that the utilitarian principle happens to create conflicting moral outcomes. Why would the atheist adopt a system that produces contradictory results? Well, "anything but god(s)!". Atheism actually complicates utilitarianism by taking God out of the picture, if you think about it.
I would like to clarify and say that I'm not pointing to the fact that morality applies first to God; I do not believe that is true. God is the source of morality and from Him morality is applied to us as creatures finitely reflecting Him. On the other hand, the atheist wants to say that morality originates with... the utilitarian principle (or wherever else he fancies that isn't a deity)? And then is, I suppose, derivatively applied to us. I'm pretty sure, though, that morality has been around a bit longer than the utilitarian principle so that one doesn't really work out for him. If the atheist is wanting to argue that morality is inherent aspect/function of the human experience of reality (like language, metaphor, puberty, etc.) then it certainly won't do to view his utilitarianism as axiomatic in the way that Christian's view God and His word as axiomatic. Christians can say "Yeah, morality is an inherent function of humanity because God has created them to function that way as they reflect His image." Atheist's can't really say "Yeah, morality is an inherent function of humanity because of the utilitarian principle."
You seem to be granting, without question, the atheist's ability to apply morality directly to humans without giving an account of what that morality is, where it came from, how was it derived, etc. That almost sounds like a deity, doesn't it? Let's assume "x"'s supremacy and work from there, so what is "x" for the atheist? Does it vary with his worldview? If so, then that's where we go to question because clearly morality doesn't (and can't) come from atheism and the utilitarian principle just isn't going to cut it.
Oh, and the problem with the boulder analogy is that the one individual isn't trying to hang the castle in the sky along with the boulder, rather boulder was carrying him down and now the castle has broken his fall. The castle, as it happens, is floating which makes hanging the boulder on it not terribly difficult (and probably quite a relief). That's my two cents anyway...
Posted by: Jared at May 25, 2007 05:48 PMYou have a habit of playing around with metaphors, as if that gave some sort of support to your position. Saying that the castle is floating begs the question against the atheist. If you can just assert that the castle is already floating, then why can't the atheist just assert that the boulder is already floating?
You keep pointing out differences between the atheist and the Christian without explaining why those differences ammount to an argument against atheism. For a utilitarian atheist, the epistemic starting point for his morality is a principle. For the Christian, it a being, and what that being has said. How does that difference ammount to an argument against atheism? Is it because the principle hasn't been "around" for very long? Please tell me you understand the difference between a principle being true and somebody giving expression to that principle.
When you say that God is the "source" of morality, are you talking about something different from epistemic grounds? Make sure you keep these two questions distinct: "How do you know your putative moral standard actually is morally authoritative?"; and, "What causes people to have moral obligations, or what causes something to have moral value?" I've been discussing argument from epistemic grounding. If you want to propose an argument to the effect that human moral obligations must have a transcendent cause, then go ahead. But that would be different from the argument I'm discussing.
I think you still haven't taken to heart the fact that atheism is not a worldview. You write,
The negative thesis of atheism still precludes the atheist from choosing utilitarianism over, say, totalitarianism ...; it becomes a matter of personal preference. Some atheists like the utilitarian principle and others like the mass-genocide principle, simply a matter of perspective right?. Of course, the utilitarian atheist wants to distance himself from the genocidal atheist but guess what they have in common. This commonality prevents the utilitarian atheist from judging the genocidal atheist.
This is like arguing that the negative thesis, "there are no leprechauns" precludes the disbeliever in leprechauns from choosing utilitarianism, or Christian ethics, over totalitarianism; it becomes a matter of personal preference. Some disbelievers in leprechauns like the utilitarian principle, others like the Bible, and others like the mass-genocide principle, simply a matter of perspective right?. Of course, the utilitarian disbeliever in leprechauns wants to distance himself from the genocidal disbeliever in leprechauns, but guess what they have in common. This commonality prevents the utilitarian disbeliever in leprechauns from judging the genocidal disbeliever in leprechauns.
Now, if we already had established that atheism and morality are incompatible, then it would be true that the moralizing atheist would be, not prevented from, but irrational in, judging the totalitarian atheist. But if we had already established that atheism and morality are incompatible, then we're done, and all the rest is superfluous. The question at hand is whether morality and atheism are in fact incompatible (or rationally deficient in some other way). More particularly, the question is whether the atheist's lack of epistemic grounding for his moral standard implies that he is being irrational or inconsistent when he moralizes. According to (6), it doesn't. You still haven't described any any error in (6). You spend most of your time assuming that the lack of epistemic grounding does imply that the moralizing atheist is irrational, and then jumping up and down on that. But what you are assuming is precisely what is in question.
Posted by: Chris McC at May 25, 2007 08:49 PMEvan:
I think you are right to say "the question of where morality comes from must end with God even as the question of where Being comes from must end with Him." The trick is explaining why having God as the starting point for being and morality is less problematic than having your starting point in the physical universe. The follow-up post I'm working on is an attempt to do just that.
Posted by: Chris McC at May 25, 2007 09:14 PM"The trick is explaining why having God as the starting point for being and morality is less problematic than having your starting point in the physical universe." Indeed. Ironically, it's actually modern science (what with the Big Bang theory and all) that has a problem with the origin question. The Stoics, etc. were perfectly fine with asserting the eternality of matter.
If I remember my Schaeffer (and Lewis), though, it's the question of personality which is the sticking point for materialists - i.e., how could matter become conscious of itself and even long for its own perpetuation? This suggests the primacy of Mind.
Posted by: Evan Donovan at May 25, 2007 11:10 PMHey, Chris, were you a PEW Younger Scholar for Philosophy at Notre Dame in the summer of 1999?
Posted by: Xpm at June 11, 2007 01:03 PMWow, I mistyped my own name!
Posted by: Xon at June 11, 2007 01:04 PMAt least the keys are close to the right ones! ;-)
Posted by: Jared at June 11, 2007 01:49 PMXon: yep, that's me.
It just so happens that I am, at this very moment, wearing a rather tattered, bright green shirt.
Posted by: Chris McC at June 11, 2007 02:10 PM