I would like to respond, briefly, to one other thing Kevin said,
Contrary to what Chris’ says further down in his post, the incompatibilist libertarian claim that libertarian free will is possible (because they are using these words to define the will as the person choosing) is not true. Nor is it the case that the force of my assertion that libertarian free will is impossible is lost against the incompatibilist. I may have conceded free agency, which is all that they mean by free will, but I have not conceded everything that the incompatibilist includes in the concept of free agency. Their idea of free agency is, in my estimation, far too broad. It is not enough that a person is able to act according to his desires, but, in order to be held morally responsible for his actions, it must have been possible for him to desire any one of the full range of natural options related to that choice.
Remember the context of my claims to which Kevin is responding: Edwards argued that libertarian freedom is impossible. He therefore concluded that the libertarian is wrong to ascribe libertarian freedom to human beings. But this argument won't work if, in fact, libertarian freedom is possible. Kevin grants that libertarian freedom is possible, so he can't use this argument.
Kevin is quite right to point out that he still has an important disagreement with the incompatiblist. But not over the question of whether libertarian-free agency is possible. My point is not that Kevin grants free agency. Of course he does. So does Edwards. My point is that Kevin grants something more than Edwards, something more than free agency: Kevin grants the possibility of libertarian-free agency. Kevin and I both agree (with Edwards against the incompatiblist libertarian) that libertarian-free agency is not the same as free agency simpliciter. But we also both agree (with the libertarian incompatiblist against Edwards) that libertarian-free agency is possible -- indeed actual. God has it. Thus, Kevin's claim that libertarian-free will is impossible (using the word "will" differently than the libertarian) is of no force against the libertarian. To be sure, there still is disagreement between Kevin and the (typical) libertarian about free will/agency ("free" simpliciter): they disagree about whether it is compatible with pre-determination. But they don't disagree about whether libertarian-free will/agency is compatible with pre-determination. It isn't. By definition. That's what "libertarian-free" means. And they both agree further that this incompatiblist kind of agency is possible.
Agreements:
1. Libertarian-free will/agency is possible
2. Libertarian-free will/agency is incompatible with predetermination
3. Human beings have free will/agency ("free" simpliciter)
Disagreements
4. Free will/agency = libertarian free will/agency.
5. Free will/agency is incompatible with predetermination.
6. Human beings have libertarian-free will/agency.
If the incompatiblist libertarian insists on making his incompatiblism (4) part of the meaning of his use of the term "free will" and "free agency", then 3 will not be an agreement after all. It will be (in his mouth) equivalent to 6. But if we let the incompatiblist get away with defining "free" this way then we will have to move 4 and 5 into the area of Agreements: 4 will be true by definition, and 5 will be equivalent to 2 (which is also true by definition). Because this would be confusing, I don't recommend we let our common enemy get away with defining words that way. But that doesn't matter w/r/t the point I was making, which was that there is no disagreement over 1, and that therefore Kevin cannot derive ~6 from ~1, as Edwards would do.
Posted by mccartney at April 25, 2007 11:32 PM | TrackBack