And the last of Aquinas's article seven questions:
Whether those temporal relations are in God, according to reason [ratio].
Sed Contra:
Names signify reasons, or understandings, as is said in the first book of De Interpretatione. But then these names must be said relatively. Therefore such relations must be according to reason.
Corpus:
Just as a real relation consists in the order of a thing to a thing, so too a relation of reason consists in an order of intellects, which can come about in two ways: one way is that according to which the order is discovered by the intellect, and attributed to that which is spoken of relatively. And such are those relations that are attributed by the intellect to things understood, insofar as they are understood, such as the relation of genus and species, for it discovers these relations by considering the order of that which is in the intellect to things that are outside, or even an order of intellects to each other. But in another way, according to which such relations as follow upon the mode of understanding, namely that the intellect understands something in order towards another, although the intellect does not discover that order, but rather it follows by some necessity upon the mode of understanding. And such selations the intellect does not attribute to that which is in the intellect, but that which is in the thing. And this happens as something not having order according to itself is understood ordered, although the intellect does not understand it to have an order, since that would be false. But that to which some things have an order must both be beings and both distinct (since there is no order of a same to itself) and bother orderable to each other. But sometimes the intellect takes some two things as beings, of which only one, or neither, is a being, such as when it takes two future things, or one present and the other future, and it understands one with an order to the other, saying that the one is before the other. Hence these relations are of reason only, rather as following the mode of understanding. But sometimes it takes one thing as two, and understands them with some order , such as when it is said that something is the same as itself. And then such a relation is of reason only. But sometimes it takes two as orderable to each other between which there is no mediate order, but rather they are is essentially ordered of themselves, such as when one says that a relation happens [as an accident] to a subject -- such a relation of a relation to something else is a relation of reason only. But sometimes it takes one thing with an order to another in so far as it is the term of an order of the other to the one, even though the one is not ordered to the other, such as taking a knowable as the term of the order of knowledge to it, and so the word signifies knowable things with some order to knowledge, and this is a relation of reason only. And similarly our intellect attributes some relative words to God inasmuch as it takes God as the term of relations of creatures to him. Hence such relations are of reason only.
Objections and Replies:
1. A ratio to which there does not correspond a thing is empty and vain, as Boethius says. But these relations are not in God really, as is clear from what has been said above. Therefore the ratio would be empty and vain if they were in God according to ratio.
-- Something in these relations answers on the part of the thing: namely the relation of creature to God. For just as the knowable is spoken of relatively, not because it is itself refered to knowledge but because knowledge is referred to it, as it says in V Metaph., so too God is spoken of relatively because creatures are referred to him.
2. Things like genus and species and order, which exist only according to ratio are not attributed to things except insofar as they are in the intellect. But those temporal relations are attributed to God not only insofar as he is our intellect: for then it would be nothing to say God is lord, because God is understood to pre-exist creatures, which is clearly false.
--That argument concerns those rational relations that are discovered by reason and are attributed to things existing in the intellect. But the relations we are discussing are not of that sort, rather they are what follows upon a mode of being understood.
3. The word "lord" signifies a relation, since it is relative according to being. But God is lord not according to reason only. Therefore neither are such relations in God according to reason only.
4. If no created intellect existed, God would still be lord and creator. But if no created intellect existed, there would not be a thing of reason. Therefore "lord" and "creator" and suchlike do not involve only relations of reason.
-- Just as someone is the same as himself, really, and not only according to reason, although the relation exists only according to reason, because the cause of the relation is real, namely, the unity of substance which the intellect understands under a relation, so too, the power of coercing his subjects is in God really, which the intellect understands as an order toward his subjects because of the order of his subjects to him. And because of this he is said to be lord really, although the relation is of reason only. And in the same way it appears that he would be lord even if no intellect existed. And this answers objections 3 and 4.
5. That which exists according to our reason only has not existed from eternity. But some relations of God to creatures existed from eternity, such as relations described in the words "knowledge" and "predestination". Therefore such relations are in God not only according to reason.
-- The relation of God's knowledge to the creature is not first and per se, as was said before, but to the essence of the creator, through which God knows all things.
Posted by mccartney at March 30, 2000 05:36 PM | TrackBack