Aquinas, penultimately:
Whether God is really referred to the creature so that that relation is something real in God.
Agustine V de Trinitate, "Clearly God is spoken of relatively according to an accident of that to which God is said to begin to be related." Therefore it seems that those relations are said of God not according to something that is in him, but according to something that is outside of him, and so they do not really posit anything in him. Moreover, just as the knowable is the measure of knowledge, so God is the measure of all things, as Averoes says in his Commentary on X Metaph. But the knowable is not referred to knowledge through a relation that really exists in it, but rather by a relation of knowledge to it, as Aristotle explains in V Metaph. Therefore it seems that God is not spoken of as related to the creature because of some relation that really exists in him. Moreover, Dionysius says, "there is no conversion of similitude in cause and effect, for the effect is called similar to the cause, but not the other way around. But the same reasoning seems to hold concerning the relation of similitude and other relations. Therefore it seems that no other relations can suffer converion from God to creatures. Thus one cannot infer from "the creature is really referred to God" that "God is really referred to the creature".
Corpus:
Relations that are spoken of as God's relations to creatures are not really in God. In order to see this, it must be known that since a real relation consists in an ordering of one thing to another, as has been said, the only place where a mutual real relation is found is in things in which there is the same reason [ratio], on both parts, for the ordering of one to the other. In fact, this is the case in all relations that follow quantity. For since the notion [ratio] of quantity is abstracted from all sensible things, quantity is of the same notion [ratio] in all natural bodies, and with equal reason [ratio] each is referred to the other. But a quantity, absolutely considered, has an ordering to another according to the notion [ratio] of measure and measured, and according to the name of whole and part, and of other such things that follow quantity.
But in relations that follow action and passion, or active and passive power, the ordering of motion is not always on both parts. For what always has the account of a patient, and of a moved or caused thing, must have an ordering to an agent or mover, since the effect is always perfected by the cause and depends on it, hence it is ordered to is as to its perfection. For agents or movers or causes sometimes have an ordering to a patient or moved or caused thing: this happens when some good and perfection of the mover or agent is aquired in the effect, as is most clear in univocal agenst which through the action of their species induce a likeness, and consequently they conservers themselves perpetually as far as that is possible. It is also clear in all other moved things that move, or act, or cause. For from their own motion they are ordered unto the producing of their effects, and similarly in all things in which any good adheres to the cause from the effect.
But in some cases one thing is ordered to another, but not conversely, since they are entierely extrinsic to those kinds of action or virtue that such ordering follows, just as it is clear that knowledge is referred to the knowable because the knower, by an intelligible act, has an ordering to the known thing that is outside of the soul. But that thing outside the soul is not at all reached by such an act, since the act of understanding does not cross over and change exterior matter. Hence that thing that is outside the sould is also entirely outside of the intelligible genus. And because of this the relation that follose the act of understanding cannot be in it. And a similar account holds for sense and the sensible. For although the sensible changes the organ of sense by its action (and thus has a relation to it -- just as also other natural agents have relations to those things that undergo something from them) nevertheless, the alteration of the organ is not sufficient for actually sensing, which comes about rather by the act of the senstive power; and the sensible thing outside the soul has no part in this. Similarly a man is compared to a column as being to the right of it, by reason of the motive power that is in the man according to which he can be right and left, behind, in front, above and below. And thus such relations in a man or animal are real, but not in the thing that lacks such power. Similarly a coin is outside of the genus of that action by which monetary value comes to be (which happens by human convention). Aslo a man is outside of the genus of artificial action, through which an image of him is made. And thus the man has no real relation to his image, nor a coin to its monetary value, but rather conversely.
However, God does not act by a mediated action, understood as something proceding from God and terminating in the creature. Rather, his action is his substance, and whatever is in him is entirely ouside of the genus of a created thing by which the creature is referred to God. Nor does the creator gain some good from the production of the creature. Hence such action is most liberal, as Avicenna says. It is also clear that he is not moved unto what he does, but without any change in him he makes changeable things. Hence it follows that in him there is no real relation to creatures, although there is a relation of creatures to him, as effects related to their cause. But in this Rabbi Moses makes many mistakes. He wanted to prove that there could not be a relation between God and creatures because since God is not a body he has no relation to time or place. He only considered relations that follow quantity, not those that follow action and passion.
1. The mover is really referred to the moved. Hence Aristotle (V Metaph) posits the relation of mover and moved as a species of the category of relation. But God is compared to the creature as mover to moved. Therefore he is really referred to the creature.
--A natural mover or actor moves or acts by a meditating action or motion that is between the mover and the moved, the agent and the patient. Hence, at least in this middle, agent and patient, mover and moved, must come together. And so an agent, as agent, is not extraneous from the genus of patent, as patient. Hence the ordering of one to the other is real in both, especially since the mediating action is some proper perfection of the agent. Consequently that in which the action terminates is its good. But this is not the case with God, as has been said, and thus the two cases are not alike.
2. But if it be said that he moves the creature without himself changing, and so is not really referred to the creature - On the contrary, a relation is not the reason why its own relative opposite relation is said of the same thing, for it is not because something is half that it is double, nor is God the father because he is the son. Therefore if mover and moved are said relatively, the relation of "mover" is not in something because there is in it the relation of "moved". Therefore the fact that God is not moved does not prevent him from being really referred, as mover, to what is moved.
--That a mover is itself moved is not the reason why the relation of mover is really in it, but is a sort of indication of that. For from this indication it appears that it coincides somehow in the genus of the moved, by which it moves what is moved by it. And also it appears that that to which it is moved is good for it, which is why it is ordered to it by its own motion.
3. Just as the father gives being to the son, so the creator gives being to the creature. But the father is really referred to the son. Therefore also the creator to the creature.
--The father gives to the son being of his own kind, since he acts univocally; but God does not give such being to creatures, and thus the two cases are not alike.
4. Things said of God literally, and not metaphorically, posit the thing signified in God. But among those names Dionysius includes this name: "lord". Therefore the thing signified by the name "lord" is really in God. But this is a relation to creatures. Therefore, etc.
--Three things are included in the understanding of the name "lord": namely, the power to coerce subordinates, an ordering to subordinates who follow such power, and the termination of the ordering of of subordinates to the lord, for in the one relative is the understanding of the other. Therefore the signification of this name is saved in God as to the first and third, but not as to the second. Hence Abrosius says that the name "lord" is a name of power; and Boethius says that lordship is some power by which a servant is coerced.
5. Knowledge is really referred to the knowable, as is clear from V Metaph. But God is compared to created things as knower to known. Therefore in God there is some relation to creatures.
--God's knowledge and our knowledge are compared to things in different ways. For God's knowledge is compared to things as their cause and measure. For such things are according to truth as however God orders them by his knowledge. But the same things are the cause and measure of our knowledge. Hence just as our knowledge is really refered to things, but not conversely, so too things are really refered to God's knowledge, and not conversely. Or it must be said that God understands other things by understanding himself. Hence the relation of divine knowledge is not to things directly, but to the divine essence itself.
6. That which is moved always has a real relation to the mover. But the will is compared to what it wills as moved to mover, for what is desirable is mover, not moved. Desire, is a moved mover, as is said in XII Metaph. Since therefore God wills things to be, it seems that he is really referred to the creature.
--The desirable, which moves desire, is an end. But those things that exist for an end move desire only by reason of that end. But the end of the divine will is nothing other than divine goodness. Hence it does nto follow that other things are compared to the divine will as mover to moved.
7. If God is not referred to creatures this, it seems, is for no other reason than because he does not depend on creatures, and because he transcends creatures. But similarly heavenly bodies do not depend on elementary bodies, and transcend them as it were improportionally. Therefore on this view it would follow that there would be no real realation of superior bodies to inferior bodies.
--Heavenly bodies are really referred to inferior bodies according to relations that follow quantity because there is the same notion of quantity in both. And also as to relations following active and passive virute, since they move moved through a mediating action that is not their substance since they attain some good in being the causes of inferior things.
8. Every denomination is from form. But form is something inhering in what it informs. Since therefore God is named from relations to creatures it seems that those same realtions would be something in God.
--That by which something is denominated does not always have to be a form according to the nature of things, but it is enough that it be signified in the manner of a form, gramatically speaking. For a man is denominated from his action and from his clothing, and from other such things, which are not really forms.
9. Proportion is some real relation, such as double and half. But there seems to be some proportion of God to creatures, since there must be proportion between mover and moved. Therefore it seems that God is really referred to creatures.
--If proportion is understood to mean some determinate excess, ther is no proportion of God to creatures. But if proportion is understood to mean a habitude only, then it is celar that such a thing does exist between the creator and the creature: in the creature really, but not so in the creator.
10. Since understanding is of similitudes of things, and spoken words are the signs of things, as Aristotle says, those things are ordered differently among the teacher and the student. For the teacher begins from reality from which he receives knowledge in his understanding, of the conceptions of which his words are signs, but the student begins from the words through which he acquires the conceptions of the teacher's understanding, and from these unto the apprehension of reality. But such things as are said of the aforementioned relations must be received first by some teacher. Therefore with him such relative names follow the conceptions of his understanding, which follow reality. And thus it seems that such realtions are real.
--Although the teacher begins with things, nevertheless, in an other way, conceptions are received in the teacher's mind in an other way than they are in the nature of the thing, since any given thing is received in another by the mode of the receiver. For it is clear that conceptions exist immaterially in the mind of the teacher, and materially in nature.
11. Such relatives as are said of God temporally are either relative according to being or relative according to being said. If they are relative according to being said, then they do not really posit anything in either extreme. But this is false with respect to the aforementioned, since they really exist in the creature related to God. Therefore they must be relative according to being. And so it seems that they really posit something in both extremes.
--The distinction of relatives according to being and according to being said is not the same as that between relations that are real and merely rational. There are some relatives according to being that are not real, such as right and left in a column; and there are some things relative according to being said that nevertheless imply real relations, as is clear concerning knowledge and sense. For things are called relative according to being when the names are imposed toward signifying the relations themselves. But they are called relative according to being said when the names are imposed for signifying qualities, or something like that, principally, from which relations follow. They don't differ as to whether the relations are real or merely rational.
12. This is the nature of relatives: that by the positing of one, the other is posited, and by the elimination of one, the other is eliminated. Thus if there is some real relation in creatures, the relation in God to creatures must be real.
--Although by the positing of one relative, the other is posited, nevertheless, it doesn't have to be posited in the same way in both, but it is enough that one be posited as real, and the other as rational.
Posted by mccartney at February 12, 2000 05:48 PM | TrackBack