Aquinas:
Whether such relations that are between creatures and God exist in a real manner in the creatures.
Whether such relations that are between creatures and God exist in a real manner in the creatures.
Augustine says that "what God, in time, begins to be called (which he was not called before) he is clearly called relatively," but not as an accident of God where something happens to him, but rather as an accident of that in relation to which God begins to be spoken of. Now, an accident is something real in a subject. Therefore a relation to God is something real in creatures. Moreover, when something is referred to another by its changing, it is referred to it in a real manner. But creatures are referred to God by their changing. Therefore they are referred to God in a real manner.
Corpus:
A relation to God is something real in creatures. In order to see the reason for this it should be known that, as Averoes says in his Commentary on Metaph XI, since the to-be of relation is the weakest among all the categories, they therefore thought that relations were among things secondly understood. For what is first understood are things outside the soul, where the first understanding supposes them. But things secondly understood are called intentions consequent on the mode of understanding. For this is what the second understanding understands inasmuch as it reflects upon itself, understanding both that it understands and the mode by which it understands. From this theory it follows that relations are not in things outside the soul, but only in the understanding, just like the intentions of genus and species and second substances. But this cannot be the case. For in no category is anything posited unless it is a thing existing outside of the soul. For being-of-reason is contrasted with being that is divided by the ten categories, as is clear in V Mataph. However, if relations were not in things outside the soul it would not be the case that one of kind of category is relational.
Moreover, the perfection and good that are in things outside the soul are attained not only as something absolute, inhering in things, but also as the order of one thing to another, just as a good army consists in the order of its parts. Aristotle compares the order of the universe to this. Thus there must be some order in things themselves. But this order is a certain relation. Hence there must be some relations in things themselves, according to which one is orderd to another. But one thing is ordered to another either according to quantity or according to some active or passive virtue. For from these alone something in one attains to two, in respect of what is extrinsic. For a thing is measured not only by its intrinsic quantity, but also by an extrinsic quantity. Also, by active virtue, something acts in another, and by passive it is acted upon by another. But by substance and quality something is ordered to itself alone, not to another, except accidentally, namely insofar as quality (or substantial form, or matter) has a ratio of active or passive virtue, and insofar as some ratio of quantity is considered in them, for unity of substance makes things the same, and unity in quality makes them similar, and number, or multitude, dissimilar and diverse in the same -- and dissimilar as something more or less by something else. For thus one thing is called more white than another. And because of this Aristotle in V Metaph, describing different kinds of relations, describes some caused by quantity and others by action and passion.Thus it must be that things having an order to something are really referred to it, and that some real thing in them is a relation. But all creatures are ordered to God both as to their sorce and their end, for the ordering of the parts of the universe to each other exists through the ordering of the whole universe to God, just as the order that exists among the parts of an army exists because of the ordering to the leader, as is clear from XII Metaph. Hence creatures must be really referred to God, and that relation must be something real in the creature.
Objections and Replies:
1. Some relations may be found in which nothing real is posited on either end, as Avicenna says concerning the relation that exists between what is and what is not. But there are no extremes of any relation that are farther from each other than God and creature. Therefore that relation does not posit anything in a real manner on either end.
--When there is a relation between creatures in which neither extreme posits something, this is not because of the distance between the creatures, but because some relation does not obtain according to some ordering that is in things, but only according to an ordering in the understanding. This cannot be said concerning the ordering of creatures to God.
2. That which implies an infinite regress must be rejected. But if a relation to God is some real thing in a creature, there will be an infinite regress, for that relation will be something created, if it is a real thing, and thus, with equal reason, it will itself have a relation to God, and so on to infinity. Therefore one should not suppose that a relation to God in creatures is some real thing.
--Relations themselves are not referred to something else by another relation, but by themselves, since they are essentially relations. In this they are unlike things that have absolute substance. Hence the infinite regress does not follow.
3. Things are referred only to that which is determinate and one. For instance, double is not referred to just anything, but to half, and father to son, and so on. Therefore since there are relative differences in things that have the relations, there must be corresponding differences in what they are related to. But God is one simple being. Thus a relation of all creatures to him cannot be come about by any real relation.
--Aristotle concludes in the same place that if all are referred to what is best, that which is best must be unlimited by species. And so there is no reason why infinite things should not be referred to what is unlimmited by species. But such is God, since the perfection of his substance is not determined to any genus, as has been explained above. And because of this nothing prevents infinite creatures from being referred to God.
4. According to this, creatures are referred to God insofar as they procede from him. But creatures procede from God according to his substance. Therefore according to his substance they are referred to God, and not according to some supervening relation.
--Yes, creatures are referred to God according to his substance, as the cause of the relation, but formally with respect to the relation itself, just as something called causally similar with respect to quality, but formally with respect to similarity: it is from this that the creature is called similar.
5. A relation is a sort of middle between the extremes of the relation. But nothing can be really a middle between God a creature immediately creatued by God. Therefore relation to God is not something real in creatures.
--If a creature is said to be immediately created by God, this rules out the possibility of God's creating it by a mediating cause, but it does not rule out a real "middle" habitude that naturally follows on the production of the creature, just as equality follows the production of quantity indeterminately, so too the real habitude naturally follows on the production of a created substance.
6. Aristotle says that if all appearances were true, reality would follow our opinions and sensations. But all creatures do follow the judgement or knowledge of their creator. Therefore all creatures are referred to God substantially and not by some relation that inheres in them.
--Creature's follow God's knowledge as an effect follows a cause, not in the manner of a proper account of being in such a way that to-be-a-creature would be nothing other than to-be-known-by-God. But this is what they suppose when they say that all appearances would be true, and things would follow opinions and sensations, so that, namely, the to-be of any given thing would be that it be sensed or opined by another.
7. The greater the distance between things, the less seems to be their relation. But the distance between creatures and God is greater than the distance between one creature and another. But the relation of creature to creature is not some real thing, so it seems, for since it is not a substance, it must be an accident, and thus it must be something that is in a subject, and cannot be removed without changing the subject. But this is contrary to what was said above, concerning relations. Therefore the relation of creatures to God is not something real.
--This relation that is nothing other than an ordering of one creature to another: on the one hand it has a certain character as an accident, and on the other it has a certain character as a relation or ordering. For as an accident, it's character is that it is in a subject, but this is not its character as a reation or ordering. Rather, its character as a relation or ordering is that it is "to another" as if crossing over unto the other, and somehow standing by the related thing. And thus a relation is something inherent, although it is not so on account of it being a relation, just as action, as action, is considered as from an agent, but as an accident it is considered as being in the acting subject. And thus nothing prevents such accidental being from falling away without any change of what it inheres in, since its account is not perfected as it is in its own subject, but as it crosses over to another, and when that is taken away, the account of this accident is taken away as to act, but remains as to cause, just as when matter is removed, heat is taken away, although it remains the cause of heat.
8. Just as a created being is infinitely far from a non-being, so also is it infinitely far from God. But there is no relation between a created being and a pure non-entity, as Avicenna says. Therefore, neither is there a relation beween a created being and the uncreated being.
--Created being has no ordering to non-being, but it does have an ordering to uncreated being, and so the two casses are not alike.