Aquinas's eighth article (just three more articles follow after this one):
Whether there is any relation between God and creatures
Whether there is any relation between God and creatures
Augustine says that "creator" is said relatively to creature, just like lord to servant.
Corpus:
Relation differs from quantity and quality in this: quantity and quality are some accidents remaining in a subject, but relation does not signify in the manner of something remaining in a subject (as Boethius says), but as in some kind of transit to another. Hence also the Porretani (?) said that relations are not inherent, but assistent, which is true in a manner of speaking, as will be shown later. However, what is attributed to something as proceding from it unto another makes no composition with it, just as action makes not composition with the agent. And because of this the philosopher also proves in Phys 5 that there can be no motion in "to another", since a relation can cease to be when there is only a change in the other thing, without any change of it, which refers it to the other, as is also clear concering action: action, as such, is not motion, except metaphorically and improperly (just as when we say that something is changed when it goes from rest to act). This would not be the case if relation or action signified something remaining in the subject. From this is appears that it is not contrary to the notion of simplicity for there to be a multitude of relations between it and another. Rather, by as much more simple it is, by so much are many relations concomitant with it. For as much as something is more simple, bu so much is its virtue less limited; hence it's causality extends itself to many. And thus in the book of causes it is said that all of virtue united is more infinite than virtue multiplied. But some relation between a principle and those things that are from the principle must be understood: not only a relation of origin, as the things made come from the principle, but also a relation of diversity, since cause and effect must be distinguished, because nothing is the cause of itself. And thus with the highest simplicity of God there follows infinite habitudes or relations existing between creatures and him, insofar as he produces creatures diverse from himself; nevertheless, they are somehow made like him.
1. Relatives exist at the same time, according to Aristotle. But a creature cannot exist at the same time as God, for God is in every way prior to creatures. Therefore there can be no realtion between creature and God.
--Those relatives where each is with equal reason refered to the other exist at the same time by nature, such as father and son, lord and servant, double and half. But those relatives in which there is not the same reason for referring to the other on both parts are not at the same time by nature, but one is naturally prior, as Aristotle says of sense and the sensible, knowledge and the knowable. And so it is clear that God and creatures should not be at the same time by nature, since there is not the same reason for referring each to the other, on both parts. Nonetheless, even with the relatives that are at the same time by nature, the subjects need not exist naturally at the same time, but only the relations.
2. Wherever there is relation, there is also comparison. But between God and creatures there is no comparison, for things that are not of one genus are not comparable, such as number and line. Therefore there is no relation between God and creatures.
--There is not a comparison wherever there is a relation, but only when the relation is according to one quantity or quality, so that from this one can be called greater or better than the other, or whiter or something else like this. But there can be plenty of relations of things referred each to the other, even when they are of diverse genera, for things that are of diverse genera are diverse from each other. But still, even though God is not in the same genus as a creature, as contained under that genus, he is, nevertheless, in every genus as the principle of the genus; and from this there can be some reation between creatures and God as between a principle and what flows from it.
3. In whatever genus one of a pair of relatives is found, so is the other. But God is not in the same genus as any creature. Therefore no relative can be said between them.
--The subjects of the relations don't have to be in the same genus, only the relations themselves, as is clear from the fact that quantity is said from diverse quiddities. Nevertheless, as has been said, there is not a same account of God and creatures, just as of those that are in diverse genera in no way coordinated with each other.
4. Creature cannot be opposed to creator since opposite is not the cause of its own opposite. But relatives are opposed to each other. Therefore there cannot be a relation between creatures and God.
--The opposition of relation differs in two ways from other oppositions. First, in other opposites, one is said to be opposed to the other insofar as it removes it, for negation removes affirmation, and on account of this is opposed to it. But opposition of privation and habitus and contrariety includes the oposition of contradition, as is said in IV Metaph. But this is not the case with relatives. For the son is not opposed to the father as that one should remove the other, but by reason of a habitude toward the same. And from this the second difference is caused: in other opposities one is always imperfect, which happens by reason of negation which is included in privation and other contraries. But this cannot be the case with relatives. Rather, both can be considered as perfect, as is most clear in relatives of equivalence and in relatives of origin, such as equal, similar, father and son. And thus relation can be attributed to God more than other oppositions. By reason of the first difference an opposition of relation can obtain between creatures and God, but no other oppostion, since the positio of creatures from God is more than their remotio. Still, there is some habitude of creatures to God. But by reason of the second difference there is in what is divine an opposition of persons by relation, and no other, as will become clear later.
5. Whenever something begins to be newly said, it can in some way be said to be made. Therefore it follows if something relative to the creature is said of God, God would in some way become, which is impossible, since he is immutable.
--While becoming is properly a kind of change, it is not according to relation except accidentally, namely, by the change of that on which the relation follows, and the same goes for becoming. [?] For a body that is changed with respect to quantity becomes equal, but change itself does not imply equality, but it has this feature accidentally. Nevertheless, when some relation comes to be newly said of something, this does not mean there must be some change in it, but it is enough that a change come to be in either extreme, for the cause of a habitude among two things is something inhering in both. Hence, on whatever side the change comes to be, from that, which causes the habitude, is taken a habitude that is between both. And for this reason, when a change comes to be in a creature some relation begins to be said of God. Hence he cannot himself be said to become, except metaphorically, because he has a similitude to what becomes inasmuch as something comes to be newly said of God. And so we say, "Lord, you have become our refuge."
6. Whatever is predicated of something is predicated of it either per se or accidentally. But things that imply a relation to creatures are not predicated of God per se, since per se predidates are predicated by necessity and always, unlike accidental predicates. Therefore in no way can any such relatives be predicated of God.
--Such relations, since they begin to be said of God because of a change that comes about in the creature, it is clear that the reason why they are said of God is on the part of the creature, and they are said of God accidentally. Not that an accident is in God, as Augustine says, but according to something existing outside of him which is compared to him accidentally. For God's being does not depend on the creature, just as the being of the architect does not depend on the house. Hence just as it happens to an architect that the house exist, so it happens to God that the creature exists. For of anything that has a relation that it can be without we say it has it accidentally.
Posted by mccartney at February 6, 2000 09:13 PM | TrackBack