Aquinas's next question is: Whether those names are said of God and creatures univocally or equivocally.
Corpus:
It is impossible that anything should be predicated univocally of God an creatures. This is clear because: every effect of a univocal agent is adequate to the strenth of the agent. But no creature, since it is finite, can be adequate to the strength of the first agent, since it is infinite. Hence it is impossible that a similitude to God be received univocally in a creature. This is also clear because even if the account of the form existing in the agent and in the effect are one, still, a diverse mode of existing prevents univocal predication. For although the account of a house that is in matter and a house that is in the mind of the builder be the same -- since one is the account of the other -- still, "house" is not univocally predicated of both since the species house has material existence in matter, but in the mind of the builder immaterial existence. Let it be granted, though imposible, that the goodness in God and creatures are of the same account. Still, good would not be predicated univocally of God since it is in God immaterially and simply, and it is in creatures materially and multiply. Moreover, being [ens] is not said univocally of substance and accident because substance is a being as having existence per se, but an accident as something of which to be is to be in. From this it is clear that a diverse habitude toward existing prevents univocal predication of being. Rather, God has existence in a different way than creatures, for he is his own to be, and this is not the case for any creature. Hence in no way is "to be" said univocally of God and creatures, and consequently neither is any of the other predicables among which being itself is first [or, among which he is the very first being?]. For where there is diversity existing in what is first, diversity must also be found in others, which is why nothing can be univocally predicated of substance and accident.
But some people have said the opposite: that nothing is predicated analogically of God and creatures, but only by pure equivocation. And Rabbi Moses is of this opinion, as is clear from things he has said. But that opinion cannot be true, since in pure equivocation, which the philosopher names from the case of equivocals, something is not said of one in respect to another. [?] But all things said of God and creatures are said of God according to some respect to creatures, or contrariwise, as is clear from all the opinions set forth concerning the explanation of divine names. Hence it is impossible that it is by pure equivocation.
Again, since all of our thoughts concerning God are taken from creatures, if there were no agreement between the them except in name only, we would know nothing of God except empty names, which would not describe him [?] And it would follow that all philosophers proofs concerning God would be fallacious. And thanks to this, if it be said that all everything that is in potency is reduced to act by a being in act -- and if it be inferred from this that God is a being in act, since it is through him that everything is brought into existence -- this would involve the fallacy of equivocation. And the same holds for all the others.
Moreover, an effect must be somehow like its cause. Hence it must be that concerning effect and cause nothing is predicated by pure equivocation, just like health concerning medicine and an animal. And thus is must be said that concerning God and creatures nothing is predicated univocally; however, those things that are predicated in common are predicated not by pure equivocation, but, rather, analogically. But this predication can happen in two ways. First, there can be predication of two things in respect of a third, as being is said of quality and quantity in respect of substance. Secondly, there can be predication of two things in respect of one to the other, as when being is said of substance and quantity. In the first way of predication, there must be something prior to the two, to which both have respect, as substance is prior to quantity and quality. But in the second way this is not the case, rather one of the two must be prior to the other. And thus since nothing is prior to God, but he himself is prior to the creature, predication of God happens in accord with the second way of analogy, and not the first.
1. The measure and the measured are of one account. But divine goodness is the measure of all created goodnes, and his wisdom of all wisdoms. Therefore they are said univocally of God and creature.
--This argument concerns the kind of measuring in which the measure can be coequal or commensurate to the meausred. But God is not a measure in this way, since he infinitely excedes all that is measured by him.
2. Things that are similar are things that share a form. And a creature can be similar to God, as is clear from Gen, 1.26: "let us make man in our image and similitude." Therefore there is some sharing of form between the creature and God. But wherever there is sharing of form something can be predicated univocally. Therefore something can be univocally predicated of God and creatures.
--A creatures similiarity to God falls short of univocal similarity in two ways. First, it is not by way of participation in one form, as two things are hot by participation in one heat, for what is said of God and creatures is predicated of God essentially, but of the creature by participation, so that the creature's similarity to God is understood as how a hot thing is similar to heat, not as how a hot thing is similar to a hotter thing. Secondly, the form that creatures participate in falls short of the account of what God is, just as the heat of fire falls short of the account of the virtue of the sun, by which it gererates heat.
3. Greater and lesser do not make for a diversity of species. But when the creature and God are called good, the difference seems to be this: that God is better than every creature. Therefore God's goodness and the creature's goodness are not diverse in species; and so "good" is predicated univocally of God and creatures.
--Greater and lesser can be considered in three ways, and so they can be predicated in three ways. In one way, as things participate in quanity alone, just as snow is called whiter than a wall since whiteness in the snow is more perfect than in the wall, but it is is still of one account, which is why this kind of diversity of greater and less does not give rise to a diversity of species. In another way, one thing participates and another is said essentially, as we may say that goodness is better than the good. In the third way, according as the same something corresponds to one thing in a more eminent way than to another, just as heat to the sun more than to fire. And these two ways prevent a unity of species and univocal predication. And according to this something is predicated more or less of God and creatures as is clear from what has been said.
4. There can be no comparing things that are diverse in genus, as Aristotle proved. For there is no comparing the speed of alteration with the speed of local motion. But between God and creature some comparison is attained, for it is said that God is the highest good, and the creature is good. Therefore God and creature are in one genus, and thus something can be predicated univocally of them.
--God is not compared to creatures as called better, or the highest good, as if participating in a nature of the same kind with creatures, as a species of some genus, but rather as the principle of a genus.
5. Nothing is known except through a species of one account. For the whiteness that is in a wall is known by the species which is in the eye only if they are of one account. But God knows all beings through his goodness, and the same goes for the other things. Therefore the goodness of God and creature are of one account, and so good is predicated univocally of God and creatures.
--By as much as an intelligible species is more eminent in something, by that much it is more perfectly known, just as the species of a stone is more perfectly known in the intellect than in sense. Hence through this God can most perfectly know things through his essence, inasmuch as his essence is a supereminent likeness of things, and not an adequated likeness.
6. The house that is in the mind of the builder [artifex] and the house that exists materially are of one account. But all creatures procede from God as artifacts from a craftsman [artifex]. Therefore the goodness that is in God is of one account with the goodnes that is in the creature, and so ... the same as before.
--There is a twofold likeness between creatures and God. One is of the creature to the divine intellect, and so the form understood by God is of one account with the thing understood, although it does not have the same mode of being, since the understood form exists only in the intellect, but the form of the creature exists also in the thing. In another way according as the divine essence itself is the superexcelling likeness of of all things, and not of one account. And it is from this kind of likeness that it happens that good and suchlike are predicated in common of God and creatures, but not from the first kind. For this is not the account of God when it is said "God is good", that the goodness of creatures is understood, since it should be clear already from what has been said that even the house that is in a builder's mind is not called a house univocally with the house that exists in matter.
7. Every equivocal agent's acting is led back to something univocal. Therefore the first agent, which is God, must act univocally. But of an agent acting univocally and its proper effect something can be univocally predicated. Therefore of God and creature something can be univocally predicated.
--The action of an equivocal agent must be prior to that of a univocal agent, since a univocal agent does not have causality beyond the whole species, its own cause must be elsewhere. But only beyond every individual of the species. But an equivocal agent has causality beyond the entire species. Hence the first agent acts equivocally.
Sed Contra:
1. Aristotle says that the eternal and the temoral have nothing in common except a name. But God is eternal and creatures anre temporal. Therefore God and creatures cannot have anything in common except a name. And so names are predicated of God and creatures in a purely equivocal manner.
--Aristotle is speaking of what is in common naturally, not logically. But things that have a diverse mode of being do not have in common something according to being from a natural perspective. But they can have something in common intentionally from the perspective of logic. Also, naturally, terrestrial and celestial bodies are not of one kind, but logically they are. Nonetheless, Aristotle did not mean to exclude analogical commonness, but only univocal. For he wanted to show that the corruptible and the incorruptibe do not have a common genus.
2. Since the genus is the first part of a definition, when the genus is taken away, the concept signified by the name is removed. Hence if some name is imposed to signify what is in another [genus?], the name will be equivocal. But wisdom said of creatures is in the genus of quality Since therefore wisdom said of God is not a quality, as was shown above, it seems that this name "wisdom" is predicated equivocally of God and creatures.
--Although diversity of genus takes away univocation, nevertheless, it does not take away analogy. Which is clear in this way: healthy, insofar as it is said of urine is in the genus of a sign, but insofar as it is said of medicine, it is in the genus of cause.
3. Where there is no similitude nothing can be predicated in common, except equivocally. But between creatures and God there is no similitude, for Isaiah says (40.18) "to whom will you make God out to be similar?" Therefore it seems that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.
--God is in no way said to be similar to a creature, but contrariwise, since, as Dionysius says, the conversion of similitude is not received in cause and effect but only in things that are coordinate, for a man is not called similar to his image, but, contrariwise, because that form by which a similitude obtains is in the man prior to being in the image. And thus we do not say that God is similar to creatures, but contrariwise.
4. If it be said that although God cannot be called similar to a creature, a creature can be called similar to God -- On the contrary, it says in Ps 82.2 "God, who is similar to you?" the implied answer being: no one.
--When it is said that no creature is like God, as Dionysius says in the same chapter, this should be understood according as effects have less than their cause, falling short of it incomparably. And this is not to be understood according to quantity participated in, but in the other two ways, as was said above.
5. No accidental thing can be similar to substance. But wisdom in creatures is accidental; but it is substance in God. Therefore man through his wisdom cannot be similar to divine wisdom.
6. Since in creatures, existence is one thing and form or nature is another, nothing is, by form or nature, similar to that which is existence. But those names predicated of creatures signify some nature or form. But God is that which is his own existence. Therefore through such things said of creatures the creature cannot be similar to God, and so ... the same as before.
--Accidents cannot be like a substance by the likeness that obtains according to a form of one account; but as for the likeness that is between cause and effect, nothing prevents this from obtaining. For the first substance must be the cause of all accidents. And this anwers both 5 and 6.
7. God differs from creatures more than number differs from whiteness. But it is stupid to say that number is similar to whiteness, or conversely. Therefore even more stupidly is it said that some creature is similar to God, and so ... same as before.
--Whiteness is neither in the genus of number, nor is it the principle of that genus, and thus no similitude of one to the other obtains. But God is the principle of every genus, and thus all are somehow similar to him.
8. Whenever things are similar to each other, they agree in something. But that in which they agree is transmutable from each to the other. But God is entirely untransmutable. Therefore there can be no similitude between God and creatures.
--This argument concerns things that agree in a genus or in matter, which is not how things are with God and creatures.
Posted by mccartney at February 6, 2000 08:43 PM | TrackBack