Past the half-way point.
Here is Aquinas on the question: "Whether those names are synonyms"
Synonymous names when conjoined, result in a nugatory repetition, as if one were to say "clothes and garments" Therefore if those names were synonyms, it would be nugatory to say that God is good, or, God is wise, which is false. Moreover, whoever denies one synonym of something denies also the rest. But some people deny his power without denying his knowledge or goodness. Therefore those names are not synonyms. Moreover, this is clear from Averoes's commentary on Metaph. XI. He says that these names, said of God, are not synonyms.
Corpus:
All intelligent people agree that these names are not synonyms. This is easy to maintain for those who say that these names signify not the divine substance, but rather essential intentions, by some addition, or his working in his effects, or the negations of creaturely things. But supposing that these names signify the divine substance, as has been shown above, the right answer seems more difficult to defend, since on this view there is one and the same simple thing signified by all those names: the divine substance.
But it must be known that the significiation of a name does not refer to things immediately, but by the mediation of the intellect. For the spoken words are marks things that exist as passions in the soul, and their conceptions in the intellect are similitudes of things, as Aristotle explains in I De Interp. The fact that names are not synonyms can therefore come either from the things signified or from the concepts of the understanding that names are made to signify. So these names that are said of God cannot be prevented from being synonymous on account of any diversity in the thing signified, as was suggested above, but only on account of the conceptions of intellects. And thus Averoes commenting on the metaphysics XI says that in God multiplicity exists only according to a difference in the intellect, and not in being, which we say is one in reality and many in concept. But it cannot be that nothing in reality answers to these diverse concepts existing in our intellect, for our intellect attributes to God those names of which they are the concepts. So were there nothing answering to these concepts in God, either according to himself or to his effects, the intellect would be false in attributing them to him, and so would be all propositions signifying such attributions; which is inappropriate.
There are some concepts to which nothing answers in the thing understood; but the intellect does not attribute what is conceived in that way to things as they are in themselves, but only insofar as they are understood. This is clear in the case of the concepts of genus and species, and other intellectual intentions. For there is nothing in things outside the soul to which there is a similitude of the concept of genus, or species. But that doesn't mean the understanding is false, since it doesn't attribute what it conceives in that way (genus and species) to things as they are outside of the soul, but only as they exist in the understanding. For as the understanding reflects upon itself it finds that just as it understands things existing outside the soul, so it understands that they also are understood, and so just as there is some conception of the understanding corresponding to the thing itself, which is outside ths soul, so too there is a concept corresponding to the thing understood as such. For instance, the concept of man corresponds to the thing outside the soul, but the concept of genus or species corresponds only to something understood. But it is not possible for such things to be the concepts of names that are said of God, since thus the intellect would not attribute them to God as he is in himself, but only as he is understood, which is clearly false, for then the meaning of "God is good" would not be that he is such, but that he is understood in that way.
And thus some say that the concepts of these names are diverse because of their diverse connotations, as they connote differet effects of God. On their view, "God is good" signifies his essence with some effect connoted, so the meaning would be that God is and causes goodness. In this way the diversity of the concepts would be caused by a diversity of effects. But this does not seem appropriate, since when the effect procedes from the cause according to similitude, the cause should be understood to be a certain way before the effect is that way. It is not that God is called wise because he causes wisdom; rather he causes wisdom because he is wise. Hence Augustine says that we are good because God is good, and insofaras we are, we are good. Moreover, on this view it would follow that such names are said of creatures prior to the creature, just as health is said of the healthy prior to what is conducive to health (which is also called "healthy" because it causes health). If nothing else were understood when it is said that God is good than that God is and is the causer of goodness, it would follow that all names of divine effects could with equal reason be predicated of him, so that it would be said "God is the sky" since he causes the sky.
And, again, if this is said of causality in act, it is clearly false, since on this view we wouldn't be able to say that God, from eternity, is good, wise, etc. -- for he was not actually causing from eternity. But if this is understood rather of causality according to virtue (so that he is called good because he is and has the virtue of instilling goodness) then one would have to say that the name "good" signifies that virtue. But that virtue is some supereminent similitude of its effect, just like any virtue of an equivocal agent. Hence it would follow that the intellect, conceiving goodness, would be assimilated to that which is in God and which is God. And so something that is in God, and is God, would correspond to the concept of goodness. And thus one would have to say that all these many different names have an element that corresponds to God in himself, of which all these understood conceptions are similitudes. For there can be only one form of one similitude, according to a species that is of the same concept as it. Nevertheless, there can be diverse imperfect similitudes, falling short of perfect representations. Therefore, since, as is clear from what was said above, concepts of perfections found in creatures are imperfect similitudes and not of the same account as the divines essence -- since this is the case, nothing prevents that one essence from corresponding to all the aforesaid conceptions, as through those things that represent it imperfectly. And so all concepts are something in our intellect subjectively but they exist in God as in the root verifying these conceptions. For these conceptions of the intellect would not be both true and fit for making a claim about reality unless, by way of similitue, if the reality correspond not to those concepts. Therefore the cause of the diversity or multiplicity of names is on the part of our intellect, which cannot pertain to the seeing of God's essence as it is, but rather it sees him through many similitudes that fall short of him and that reflect him so that he can be seen in creatures as if in a mirror. Hence, if one were to see the essence itself one would not need many names nor many concepions. And because of this God's word, which is his perfect coneption, is one. Because of this Zach 14.9 says "in that day the Lord will be one and his name will be one" when God's essence will be seen and the knowledge of God will not be derived from creatures.
Objections and Replies:
1. Synonyms are names that signify entirely the same thing. But all these names, said of God, signify the same thing, because they signify the divine substace, which is entirely simple and one, as has been shown. Therefore they are all synonymous.
--Although these names signify one thing, they do so by many concepts, as has been said, and because of this they are not synonyms.
2. Damascus says that in divine things, all are one, except unbegottenness, begetting, and procession. But names signifying one are synonyms. Therefore all names said of God, except those that signify the personal properties, are synonyms.
--Damascus understood that in divine things all are one in reality, except the personal properties which constitute a real distinction of persons. Nevertheles, he did not rule out the idea that those things that are said of God differ in concept.
3. Sameness is transitive. But wisdom in God is the same as his substance. Similarly will and power. Therefore wisdom, power and will in God are entirely the same, and so it follows that these names are synonyms.
--Just as goodness and wisdom are one with the divine essence in reality, so they are one with each other, while, nevertheless, the concepts of these names differ, as has been said.
4. If you say that these names signify what is one in reality, but they signify diverse concepts, and thus are not synonyms -- On the contrary, a concept to which nothing answers in reality is false and empty. But if the concepts of these names are many, and the thing is one, it seems that those concepts are empty and false.
--It is already clear from what has been said before that although God is entirely one, nevertheless those many conceptions are not false, since one and the same thing, imperfectly represented by those concepts, answers to all of them. However, they would be false if nothing answered to them.
5. And if you say that those concepts are not empty since something that is in God answers to them -- On the contrary, a created things is assimilated to God according as it procedes from him by an ideal similitude. But plurality of ideas or of ideal concepts is not reached in respect of creatures, for God himself according to his one essence is the idea of all. Therefore the concepts of names that are said of God from the similitude of creatures do not have anything responding to them on the part of the divine substance.
--There is complete unity on the part of God, and multiplicity on the part of creatures, so in God's understanding of several creatures there must be one essentially intellgibile form with many respects to diverse creatures, and in our understanding, which from the multiplicity of creatures ascends unto God, there must be there are many species with relations to one God.
6. What is most one cannot be the root and ground of multitude. But the divine essence is most one. Therefore the aforementioned concepts of names cannot be grounded or rooted in the divine substance.
--Those concepts are grounded in the divine essence not subjectively but as in the cause of truth, or as in what is represented by all. And this does not take away from his simplicity.
7. A distinction among relations that really are in God makes for a plurality of persons. Therefore if there were something in God answering to those concepts attributed in common there would also be a further multiplication of persons in God in accordance with the miltitude of attributes. And so there would be more than three persons in God, which is heretical. And thus it seems that all of those names are synonyms.
--Paternity and filliation are complementary opposites, and thus they give rise to a distinction of suposits. But this is not the case with goodness and wisdom.
Posted by mccartney at February 6, 2000 08:39 PM | TrackBack