More Aquinas: asking whether those words we've been talking about signify the divine substance
Augustine says "God's to-be is the to-be that is to-be-strong or to-be-wise, and if you speak of this simplicity what you say will signify his substance." Therefore all such words signify the divine substance. Moreover, Boethius says that when someone turns predication toward divine things, speaking in categories other than relation, everything is turned into substance, as "just", though it may seem to signify quality, signifies rather substance. The same holds for "great" and other such words. Moreover, whatever is spoken of by participation is led back to something said per se and essentially. But the aforesaid names are said of creatures by participation. Therefore when they are led back unto God as unto the first cause, they must be said essentially of God, and so it follows that they signify his substance.
Corpus:
Some have supposed that those names said of God do not signify the divine substance. Rabbi Moses says this most explicitly. Rather, he says, these names must be understood of God in two ways. First, by the similitude of his effects. In this way God is called wise not because wisdom is something in him, but because he works his effects in the way of wisdom, namely, by ordaining each thing unto the end that it ought to have. And in the same way he is called alive insofar works in the way of the living, as acting from himself. In another way, God is spoken of by the way of negation. In this way we say that God is alive, not meaning that life is something in him, but rather removing from God that way of being by which inanimate things exist. Similarly, when we call God intelligent, we do not mean to signify that intellect is something in him, rather we remove from God that mode of being by which the brutes exist. And so on. But both of these ways seem to be insufficient and inappropriate.
The first way is insufficient and inappropriate for two reasons: (a) according to this explanation there would be no difference between saying that God is wise and saying that God is angry, or even that God is fire; for he is called angry because he works in the way of the angry when he punishes, since this pertains to men who act from anger. And he is called fire because he works in the way of fire when he purges, which fire does in its own way. But this is contrary to what the saints and prophets suppose when they speak of God, for they affirm some things of God and others they remove from him: they say that he is alive, wise, and suchlike, and that he is not a body, nor subject to passions. But according to the foregoing opinion, all things can with equal reason be affirmed and denied of God, not one thing more than another. (b) According to our faith we suppose that creation has not always existed. If this be granted it would follow that we could not say that God was wise or good before creatures existed. For before there were creatures, he was not at work in any effects, neither in the way of what is good nor in the way the wise. But this is entirely repugnant to a healthy faith, unless someone might want to say rather that God could be called wise before creatures, not on account of his actually working as to something wise, but merely because he would have been able to work in that way. But in that case it would follow that someting existing in God would be signified through this, and consequently it would be substance, since whatever exists in God is his substance.
The second way (the way of negation) seems inappropriate for the same reason. For every kind of thing from which we might name God involves something that must be removed in some way from God. For each name of a kind includes the signification of a difference by which other kinds that are divided against it are excluded, just as the name "lion" includes the difference "quadruped" through which a lion differs from a bird. Therefore if predications of God were introduced only in the negative way (calling God alive because he doesn't have being in the mode of inanimate objects, as has been said) we would in that way be able to say that God is a lion because he doesn't have being in the mode of a bird. And, moreover, the understanding of a negation is always grounded in some affirmation (this is clear from the fact that every negative is proved from an affirmative). Hence unless the human understanding knows something affirmative of God it would not be able to deny anything of God. But it would not be able to know anything affirmative if nothing that it says of God were verified affirmatively of him.
And thus, according to the saying of Dionysius it must be said that such names signify the divine substance, but deficiently and imperfectly. Since every agent acts inasmuch as it is in act (and consequently it acts in a manner that reveals a similarity) the form of the thing made must in some way be in the agent -- but this can come about in various ways. When an effect is adequate to the virtue of the agent, the form must be in maker and made according to the same account. For then maker and made coincide in the same species. This happens when there is univocal making: for man begets man and fire generates fire. But when the effect is not adequate to the virtue of the agent, the form is not in the agent and the thing made according to the same account. Rather, it is in the agent more eminently. For according as it exists in the agent the agent has virtue toward producing the effect. Hence if the whole virtue of the agent is not expressed in the thing made, it remains that the way in which the form exists in the agent excedes the way in which it exists in the thing that is made. And we see this in all equivocal makings, as when the sun generates fire. Now, no effect is adequate to the virtue of the first maker, which is God. Otherwise, from his one virtue there would procede only one effect. But since we find that many and varying effects are produced from his one virtue, we are shown that each and every effect falls short of the virtue of the agent. Thus, no form of any divine effect is in God through the same account by which it is in the effect. Nonetheless it must still be there in some other way, and thence it is that all forms which are distinct and divided from one another in diverse effects are united in him as in one common virtue, just as all the forms that are produced in inferior things through the virtue of the sun exist in the sun according to the unity of its virtue to which all things generated by the action of the sun are similar according to their forms. In the same way, the perfections of created things are assimilated to God according to the unity and simplicity of his essence.
But our intellect, when it receives awareness from created things, is informed by the similitudes of perfections that are found in creatures, such as wisdom, virtue, goodness, and suchlike. Hence, just as created things are somehow (however difficiently) assimilated to God through their perfections, so also our understanding is informed by species of these perfections. But when the understanding is assimilated to something through its intelligible form, then what it conceives and describes according to that intellgible species is verified of that thing to which it is similar through its species, for knowledge is the assimilation of the understanding to the thing known. Hence it must be that what the understanding (informed by the perfections of these species) thinks and says of God does exist in God who answers to any of the aforesaid species as that to which all are similar. But if, by the intelligible species of such things, our intellect were adequate in assimilating to the divine essence, it would comprehend that essence, and that very conception would be a perfect account of God, just as walking animal biped is a perfect account of man. But it does not perfectly assimilate to the divine essence by the aforesaid species, as has been said. Thus even though such names (which the understanding attributes to God by such conceptions) may signify that which the divines substance is, nevertheless, they do not perfectly signify it as it is, but rather as it is understood by us. Thus it must be said that each of those names signifies the divine substance, but not as if comprehending it, but rather imperfectly. And because of this, the name "He Who Is" fits God best, since it does not determine any form in God, but rather signifies being indeterminately. And this is what Damascus meant when he said that the name "He Who Is" signifies an infinite ocean of substance. But this solution is confirmed by that word of Dionysius, who says that "since divinity fore-encompases all, existing simply and illimitably in itself, it is rightly praised and named from diverse things." He says "simply" because those perfections that are in creatures according to diverse forms are attributed to God according to the simplicity of his essence. He says "illimitably" in order to show that no perfection found in creatures comprehends the divine essence so that the intellect could define God in himself under the account of those perfections. This is confirmed also through what it says in the Metaphysics V: what is simply perfect has in itself the perfections of every genus. Averoes identifies this as God in his Commentary on that passage.
Objections and Replies:
1. Damascus says in book 4, "each of those things that are said in God must signify not what he is according to substance, but rather they must show that he is neither some habitude nor something of those from which he is separated, nor something of those which follow after nature or operations." But the to-be that is substantially predicated of something signifies what its substance is. Therefore the aforesaid names are not predicated substantially of God, as if they are things that signify his substance.
--Damascus understood that such names do not signify what God is, as if defining and comprehending his substance. Thus he also adds that the name "He Who Is", which signifies God's substance indefinitely, is most propertly attributed to God.
2. No name that signifies the substance of something can be truly denied of it. For Dionysius says that in divine things, negations are true, but affirmations are incompact. Therefore, such names do not signify the divine substance.
--When Dionysisus said that the negations of these names are true of God he did not assert that the affirmations are false and incompact. For as to the thing signified, which is in him in some way, they are truly attributed to God, as has already been shown. But as to the mode which they signify of God, they can be denied. For each of those names signifies some definite form, and that is not to be attributed to God, as has been said. Thus, absolutely, they can be denied of God because they do not correspond to him by the mode which is signified. For the mode is signified according as it is in our understanding, as has been said. But they correspond to God in a more sublime mode. Hence affirmation is called incompact as not entirely appropriately put together because of the diverse mode. And thus, according to the teaching of Dionysius, these things are said of God in three ways. First, affirmatively, so that it is said that God is wise, and we must say this of him because there is in him a similitude of the wisdom that flows from him. But since wisdom is not in God as we understand and name it, it can be denied, so that it is said that God is not wise. However, wisdom is not denied of God because he falls short of wisdom, but because it is more supereminently in him than is said or understood. Thus it right to say that God is beyond wisdom. And so in these three ways of speaking according to which God is called wise, Dionysius explains perfectly how these things are attributed to God.
3. These names signify the outflowing of divine goodness into things, as Dionysius says. But the goodnesses that procede from God are not the divine substance itself. Therefore, suchlike names don't signify the divine substance.
--These names are said to signify the divine outflowing because they are first imposed for signifying those outflowings according as they exist in creatures, and from their similitude our intellect is led by the hand so that it attributes such things to God in a more eminent way.
4. Origin says that God is called wise because he fills us with wisdom. This, however, signifies not the divine substace, but one of his effects. Therefore the aforesaid names don't signify the divine substance.
--What Origin said should not be understood as meaning that we intend to signify that God is the cause of wisdom when we say that God is wise, but that from the wisdom that he causes our intellect is led by the hand so that it attributes wisdom to him, as has been said.
5. In the Book of Causes it is said that the first cause is not named except by the first caused, which is intelligence. But when a cause is named with the name of its effect, it is not predicated essentially, but causally. Therefore, those names that are said of God are not predicated of God substantially, but only causally.
--When it is said that God is intelligent, he is named by the name of what he has caused. Because the name that signifies the substance of what he has caused cannot be definietely attributed to him according to the mode the name signifies. And so this word, although it corresponds to him in some way, nevertheless does not correspond to him as his name, since what the name signifies is a definition. But it does correspond to what has been caused as its name.
6. Names signify conceptions of intellects, as Aristotle makes plain. But we can't understand the divine substance, for we know not concerning him what he is, but only that he is, as Damascus says. Therefore we cannot name him by any name, nor signify his substance.
--This argument proves that God cannot be named by a name that defines or comprehends or is adequate to his substance, for, indeed, we do not know, concerning God, what he is.
7. Everything participates in divine goodness, as Dionysius makes plain. But not everything participates in his substace, which is in the three persons alone. Therefore "divine goodness" does not signify his substance.
--Just as all things participate in God's goodness (not as numerically the same, but by similitude) so too they participate by similitude in God's being. But they differ in this: goodness indicates the habitude of some cause, for the good is diffusive of itself, but essence is signified in that in which it is, as remaining there.
8. We cannot know God except from the similitude of the creature, since, as the Apostle says, "the invisible things of God, understood from the creation of the world through those things that have been made, have been made plain" (Rom1.20). But we name things according as we know them. Therefore we name the invisible things of God from their similitude with creatures. But when something is named from the similitude of another, that name is not predicated of it substantially, but metaphorically (this is clear from the fact that they are said first of things from which the similitude is taken, and only later are said of God -- and what signifies the substance of something is predicated of it first).
--In the effect there is to be found something by which it is assimilated to its cause and something through which it differs from its cause, and that either from matter or from something of the sort, as when a brick is hardened by fire. For when mud becomes hot by fire, it is similar to fire. But it differs from fire in that, being made hot, it is thickened and hardened. But this comes from its material condition. Therefore if that in which the brick is similar to fire is said of fire, it is properly said of it, and more eminently, and first. For fire is hotter than the brick, and, again, more eminently so: for the brick is hot as something made hot, but fire is naturally hot. However, if that in which the brick differs from fire is said of fire, it will be false. And whoever has the name of this condition in his intellect could not attribute it to fire, except metaphorically. For fire, which is the most subtle of bodies, is falsely called "thick." But it can be called "hard" because of the violence of its action, and its not-easy potency for being acted upon. Similarly there is something in creatures that is similar to God, which, as to the thing signified, indicates no imperfection -- such as: to be, to live, and to understand, and the like -- and these are properly said of God, but of him first and more eminently than of creatures. But there are other things according to which creatures differ from God, as a consequence of the fact that they are from nothing -- such as: potentiality, privation, motion, and other things like this -- and these things are false of God. Whoever has the names of of these conditions in his intellect could not attribute them to God, except metaphorically -- names like "lion", "rock", and the like -- because these things have matter in their definitions. But they are said of God metaphorically because of the similitude of the effect.
9. According to Aristotle, to signify substance is to signify that and nothing else. Therefore, if the name "good" signifies the divine substance, nothing will be in the divine substance that would not be signified by that name, just as also nothing is in human substance that is not signified by the name "man". But the name "good" does not signify wisdom. Therefore wisdom will not be in the divine substance, and by similar reasoning the same thing will hold for all the other names. Therefore, it cannot be that suchlike names should all signify the divine substance.
--This argument assumes that the only way to signify a substance is by defining or circumscribing it. But none of those names signify God's substance in that way, as has been said.
10. Just as quantity is the cause of equality, and quality of similitude, so is substance the cause of identity. Therefore if all such names signify God's substance, then according to them neither equality nor similitude would be attained, but rather identity, and so the creature would be called the same as God from the fact that it imitates his wisdom or goodness, or any of the other things. This is inappropriate.
--Although such perfections in God are the divine substance, nevertheless, the perfections that have been said of God are not substantial perfections in creatures. So creatures are not called the same as God on account of those perfections. Rather, creatures are only like God in that respect.
11. In God, who is the source of all of nature there can be nothing contrary to nature, nor even can he make anything contrary to nature, as the Gloss has it at Romans 11 (where it says "you were ingrafted contrary to nature"). But it is contrary to nature that an accident should be a substance. Therefore since wisdom, justice, and suchlike are, with respect to themselves, accidents, they couldn't be substances in God.
--It would be contrary to nature if wisdom were in God by the same account by which it exists in things as an accident. But this is not true, as is clear from what has been said above. Nor is the authority cited relevant: God makes nothing against nature in himself because he doesn't make anything in himself.
12. "Good God" is a complex term. But there would be no compexity if God's goodness were his very substance. Therefore it does not seem that "good" signifies the divine substance, and for the the same reason this holds for the other, similar names.
--The diversity of this term, when God is called good, does not refer to some composition that is in God, but to a composition that is in our intellect.
13. Augustine says that God evades every form of our intellect, and thus he cannot be mixed with the intellect. But this would not be the case if these names signified the divine substance, because God would correspond to a form of our intellect. Therefore such names do not signify the divine substance.
--God evades the form of our intellect as exceding every form of our intellect, but not such that our intellect is not assimilated to God by any intelligible form.
14. Dionysius says that man is best united to God when he knows that his knowing knows nothing. But this would not be the case if what he conceived and signified were the divine substance. Therefore, the same as before.
--Because our intellect is not adequate to the divine substance, this which is God's very substance remains, exceding our intellect, and thus is unknown to us. And because of this the ultimate form of human knowledge of God knows that it does not know God, insofar as it knows that that which God is goes beyond everything that it understands.
Posted by mccartney at February 6, 2000 08:37 PM | TrackBack