I realize I'm not going to get many readers interested in my translation of Aquinas. After all, there are better, more professional, more careful translations available.
Think of these as a count-down to my response to Kevin. I've made a deal with myself to get this done before posting anything on my own account.
Whether good, wise, just, and such like are predicated of God accidentally.
Boethius says that God, since he is a simple form, cannot be the subject of an accident. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore there cannot be any accident in God. Moreover, every accident has dependence-on-another. But no such thing can be in God, since what is dependent on another must be caused. But God is the first cause and is in no way caused. Therefore there cannot be an accident in God. Moreover, Rabbi Moses says that such words do not signify (in God) intentions added beyond substance. All accidents signify intentions added, beyond substace, to their subjects. Moreover, an accident is that which can come and go without the subject ceasing to exist. But this cannot be in God, since he is immutable, as Aristotle proved. Therefore there cannot be an accident in God.
Corpus:
It must be maintained without any doubt that there is no accident in God. There are three reasons for this. The first is that nothing extraneous can be adjoined to a nature or essence or form (even though that which has a nature or form or essence can have something extraneous in it). This is obviously the case since, in definitions, which signify the essence of things, whatever is added to or subtracted varies the species, as also happens with numbers, as Aristotle says. But a man who has humanity can have something else that is not included in the concept [ratio] of humanity, such as whiteness and the like, which inhere not in humanity but in a man. Now, in every creature there is a difference between having and had, for in composite creatures there is a double difference, since the individual has the nature of a species (as for instance a man has humanity) and, further, has being; for a man is neither his humanity nor his being, whence some accident can inhere in a man but not in his humanity or in his being. But in simple substances there is only one difference, namely the difference of essence and being. For in angels each and every individual is his nature, since the quiddity of simple things is itself (as Avicenna says), but is not its being. Hence their quiddity is something that subsists in its being. This is why there can be found intelligible accidents in such substances but not material accidents. However, in God there is no difference between having and had, or particpating and what is participated in, but rather his nature and being are one and the same, and thus nothing alien or accidental can inhere in him. Boethius touches upon this line of reasoning when he says, "that which is can have something beyond that it itself is; but being itself can have nothing beyond itself mixed with it."
The second reason is that since accidents are extrinsic to the essence of the subject, and since diverse things are not conjoined without cause, then if some accident inheres in God then this must be from some cause. But it cannot be from some extrinsic cause, for in that case it would follow that that extrinsic cause would be acting on God and would be prior to him, as the mover is prior to the moved, and the maker to the made. For in this way accidents are caused in some subject by something extrinsic in as much as a more exterior agent acts in a subject in which an accident is caused. Similarly, it cannot be from an intrinsic cause, as is the case with per se accidents, which have thier cause in the subject, for the subject cannot be the cause of an accident from the same thing by which it receives the accident, since no potency moves itself to act. Thus it must be by one thing that it is able to receive the accident and by another that it is the cause of the accident, and thus it would be a composite, just like those things that recieve an accident through the nature of matter and cause an accident through the nature of form. But it was shown above that God is not a composite. Hence it is impossible that there be an accident in him.
The third reason is that accidents are compared to the subject as act to potency, since they are a certain kind of form of the subject. Thus since God is pure act without any mixture of potency, he cannot be the subject of any accident. And as it is clear from what has been said before that there is no composition of matter and form in God, nor of any substantial parts, neither of genus and differentia, nor of subject and accident, so too it is also clear that the aforesaid words do not prediate accidents in God.
Objections and Replies:
1. That which is predicated of another does not signify substance, but that which follows after nature predicates an accident. But Damascus says that good and just and holy, said of God, follow after nature. But, then, they don't signify substance; so they are predicated of God accidentally.
--Damascene spoke of those names not in respect of that which they predicate of God, but in respect of that by which they are imposed for signifying. For those words are imposed by us for signifying from some accidental forms that we discover in creatures. For he wanted to prove, from this, that through these things, said of God, we do not come to know his substance.
2. If it be said that Damascus was speaking of the mode of signifying, On the contrary, the mode of signifying that follows the account of a genus must be refered to the thing [res]. For a predicate signifies the substance of a subject when it is predicated quiditatively [in eo quod quid]. But the aforementioned words signify the account of a genus in the mode of that which follows nature, for they are in the genus "quality" which according to its own account [ratio] has relation to a subject, for it is quality according to which we are told how [quale] something is. Therefore this mode of signifying ought to be refered to a thing [ad rem] in order that those features that are signified by the aforesaid words are features that follow after the nature of that of which they are predicated, and, consequently, are accidents.
--Although the genus of human goodness, wisdom, and justice is "quality", nevertheless, this is not their genus insofar as they are predicated of God, in that such things are called qualities insofar as they inhere somehow in a subject. But wisdom and justice are not named from this, but rather from some perfection or from some act, whence such things come to be predicated of God according to the account of differentia, and not according to the account of genus. And because of this Augustine says, "we understand, as far as we can, that he is good without quality, great without quantity." Hence that mode which follows after nature should not be found in God.
3. If it be said that these names are not predicated of God as to their genus (which is quality) because names imposed by us are not properly said of God: -- On the contrary, a species is falsely predicated of those things from which its genus is removed. For instance, concerning what is not an animal it is false to say that it is a man. Therefore, if the genus of the aforesaid words (quality) is not predicated of God, the aforesaid words will be not only improperly predicated but, in fact, false of God; and so it will be falsely said that God is just, or that God is holy. But this can't be right. So we must say rather that the aforesaid words are predicated accidentally.
--If good and just were predicated univocallly of God, it would follow that the predication would be false, their genus being removed. But nothing is predicated of God and creature univocally, as is to be shown below. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
4. Aristotle says that what truely is (i.e., substance) is not an accident of anything. For the same reason, that which is in itself accidental is everywhere accidental. But justice and wisdome and suchlike are per se accidents. Therefore they are also accidents in God.
--The wisdom that is an accident is not in God, but another wisdom is not said univocally. And because of this the conclusion does not follow.
5. Whatever is to be found in created things finds its exemplar in God who is the exemplary form of all things. But wisdom, justice, and suchlike are accidents in creatures. Therefore they are also accidents in God.
--Things do not always perfectly represent their exemplars. Hence sometimes what is in the exemplar is found to exist imperfectly and deficiently in the thing that reflects the exemplar; and so it is with those things that reflect God, who is the exemplar of the creature exceding all proportion.
6. Wherever there is quantity and quality there is accident. But in God there seems to be quantity and quality, for there is similitude and equality in God: we say the son is similiar to the father and equal with him. But similitude is caused from being one in quality, and equality is caused by being one in quanity. Therefore there are accidents in God.
-- We speak of similitude and equality in God not because there is quality and quanity in him, but becuase we say something of him that among us signifies quantity and quality, when we say that God is great and wise and suchlike, etc.
7. Everything is measured by what is first in its genus. But God is the mesure of not only substances, but of all accidents as well, because he is the creator of both substance and accident. Therefore in God there is not only substance, but accident as well.
-- Accidents are not called beings exept in relation to substance as to what is first a being. Hence accidents ought not be measured by a "first" which is an accident, but by a "first" which is a substance.
8. That without which something can be understood is predicated of it accidentally. By this Porphyry proved that there are some separable accidents, since one can understand a white crow or a pale-skinned Ethiopian. But God can be understood without "good", as Boethius explains. Therefore "good" signifies an accident in God, and the same reasoning holds for the other attributes.
--All things without which some thing (understood according to its substance) can be understood have the account of an accident. For it cannot be that, a thing being understood according to its substance, what is of the substance of the thing be not understood (as, that it be understood what a man is, and not what an animal is). But we do not see God's essence; rather, we consider him from his effects. So nothing prohibits us from considering him from the effect of being and not considering him from the effect of goodness. For it is in this way that Boethius speaks. But it should be known that even though we do understand God after a fashion while not understanding his goodness, nevertheless, we cannot understand God while understanding him not to be good (just as we cannot understand a man while understanding him not to be an animal) for this would remove the substance of God, which is goodness. But the saints in their homeland who see God through his essence, in seeing God they see his goodness.
9. Concerning the signification of words, there are two things to consider: that by which they are imposed, and that to which they are imposed. But the word "wisdom" seems to signify an accident in both respects, for it is imposed from what it is to make something wise -- which seems to be the action of wisdom -- and that to which it is imposed is a certain quality. Therefore in all ways this word, and similar words, signify accidents in that of which they are predicated. And so there is some accident in God.
--The word "wisdom" is verified of God as to that from which the word is imposed. However, the word is not imposed from being made wise, but from having sapientialia intellectually. For knowledge as knowledge is in reference to the known, but as an accident or form it is in reference to the knower. And having sapientialia is accidental to man, but not to God.