I've been working on these translations. Actually posting them hasn't been a priority.
Question: whether God is in some genus
To all things that are in a genus something is added beyond genus, and consequently they are composites. But God is entirely simple; therefore he is not in a genus. Moreover, whatever is in a genus can be defined and comprehended under some definition. But God is not like that, since he is infinite. Therefore he is not in a genus.
Corpus:
God is not in a genus. There are three reasons for this. First, nothing is put in a genus according to its esse, but rather according to the account of its quiddity, because the existence of any given thing is its own, and is distinct from the existence of any other thing. But the account of substace can be common. It is for this reason that Aristotle says that being [ens] is not a genus. But God is his own to be. Hence he cannot be in a genus.
Secondly, although matter is not genus and form is not differentia, nevertheless the account of a genus is taken from matter, and the account of difference is taken from form, just as it is clear that the sensible nature from which the account of "animal" is taken is material with respect to reason, from which is taken the differentia "rational". For an animal is that which has a sensitive nature, but rational is that which has reason. So, whatever is in a genus must be composed of matter and form, or of act and potency. This cannot be the case with God, who is pure act, as has been shown. So we must conclude that he cannot be in a genus.
Thirdly, since God is simply perfect, he comprehends the genera of all things in his perfection, for this is the account of what is simply perfect, as is said in Metaphysics V. But that which is in some genus is determined to those things that are of that genus, and thus God cannot be in any genus because then he would not be of infinite essence, nor of absolute perfection, but his essence and perfection would be limited under the account of some determinate genus. From this it is further clear that God is not a species, nor an individual, nor does he have a differentia nor definition. For every definition is of genus and species. Hence neither could there be a demonstration of him, since the middle in a demonstration propter quid is a definition.
Objections and Replies:
1. John of Damascus says, "substance signifies in God the common species, as it were the species of the persons; but hypostasis indicates the individual, namely, father and son and holy spirit, like Peter and Paul." So God is compared to father and son and holy spirit as species to individual. But wherever species and individual are found, there also is found genus, since species is constitued from genus and differentia. Therefore it seems that God is in some genus.
--But John of Damascus was speaking metaphorically, not literally. For God's name, which is God, has a similitude to species in that it is predicated substantially of several numerically distinct things. However, it is not literally a species, since a species is not something numerically one, common to several. A species is "one" only by ratio. But numerically one divine substance is common to three persons, whence father and son and holy spirit are one God, but Peter and Paul and Mark are not one man.
2. When things are in no way different, they are utterly the same. But God is not the same as other things. Therefore he differs from them in some way. But whatever differs from another differ from it by some differentia. Therefore there is some differentia in God by which he differs from other things. But not an accidental differentia, since there is no accident in God, as Boethius says in Lib. de Trin. Now, every substantial differentia divides some genus. Therefore God is in some genus.
--There's a difference between differing and being diverse, as Aristotle says. For "diverse" means, absolutely speaking, that it is not the same. But "differing" is a relative term [it is said ad aliquid], for whatever differs differs from another. Therefore if we take the word "differing" literally, the proposition, "When things are in no way different, they are the same" is false. But, speaking loosely, we can concede that God differs from other things, but it does not follow that he differs from them by some differentia, rather he differs from them through his substance, for this must be said of things that are first and simple. A man differs from a donkey by the differentia "rational", but rational does not further differ from a donkey by some differentia (since then there would be an infinite regress), but by istelf.
3. "Same" can be said generically or specifically or numerically, as is explained in Arisotle's Topics, bk. 1, ch. 6. Therefore similarly the term "diverse" is said in these three ways, for if something is said in many ways, so is its opposite. Therefore, either God is diverse from creatures only in a numerical way, or both numerically and specifically -- and so it would follow that he shares a genus with the creature, and so would be in a genus -- or, if he differs generically from creatures, he will have to be in some other genus than the creature's, for diversity is caused by multiplicity, and so generic diversity requires a multiplicity of kinds [multitudinem generum]. Therefore, in whatever way we say he is distinguished from creatures, God must be in a genus.
--God is said to be generically diverse from creatures, not as if he were in another genus, but as being entierly beyond genus.
4. Anything to which the ratio of the genus "substance" applies, is in a genus. But the account of substance is to exist per se, which applies maximally to God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.
"Ens per se" is not the definition of substance, as Avicenna says. For being [ens] cannot be the genus of anything, as Aristotle proves, since nothing can be added to being [ens] that does not participate in it, and a differentia ought not participate in the genus. But if substance could have a definition, (setting aside the fact that it is the most general genus) its definition would be that a substance is a thing whose quiddity is to be not in another. And this definition does not apply to the substance of God, whose quiddity is not beyond his to-be. Hence God is not in the genus of substance, but is above all substance.
5. Whatever is defined is in a genus. But God is defined, for it is said that he is pure act. Therefore God is in some genus
-- God cannot be defined. Whatever is defined is comprehended in the intellect of the definer. But God is incomprehensible by the intellect. Hence, when it is said that God is pure act, this is not a definition of him.
6. Whatever is predicated of another quidditativel (in eo quod quid) is in several and is related to them as their species or genus. But all things predicated of God are predicated of him quidditatively, for when a predication concerns the divine, all the categories are turned into substance, as Boethius says, for it is clear that those predicates are rightly attributed not only to God but also to other things, and thus are in several. So they apply to God either as species to individual or as genus to sepcies, and in both cases God must be in a genus.
--The account of a genus requires univocal predication. But nothing can be univocally predicated of God and creatures, as will be shown below. Hence although what is said of God is predicated of him quidditatively, nevertheless, they are not predicated of him as a genus.
7. Things are measured by what is least in their genus, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics X. But as Averroes says in his Commentary on that passage, God is that by which all substances are measured. Therefore God is in the same genus as other substances.
--Although God does not pertain to the genus of substance as if he were contained in that genus (as a species or individual is contained in a genus), nevertheless it can be said that, by reduction, he is in the genus substance as principle; just as a point is in the genus of continuous quantity, and as unity is in the genus of number; and in this way he is the measure of all substances, as unity is the measure of all numbers.