Continuing my translation of Aquinas, here is article 2:
"Whether in God substance, or essence, is the same as existence [esse]."
Hilary says in Lib. de Trinit., "existence is not accidental to God, but is truth subsisting." But that which subsists is the substance of a thing. Therefore God's existence is his substance. Moreover, Rabbi Moses says that God is a being not by essence, and he lives not by life, and he is powerful not by power, and wise not by wisdom. Therefore God's existence and essence are not different. Moreover, everything is properly denominated from its quiddity, for a name properly signifies substance and quiddity, as it says in IV Metaphys. But the name "He Who Is" [reading "qui est" for "quid est"] is among all other names the most proper name of God (Exod. 4). Thus, since this name is imposed from what existence is, it seems that the existence of God is his substance.
Corpus:
In God there is no difference between existence and substance. The reason for this is that when causes that produce diverse effects share in one effect beyond the diverse effects, they together produce it by virtue of some superior cause of which it is the proper effect. Thus, when a proper effect is produced by some cuase in accordance with its proper nature or form, diverse causes, having diverse natures and forms, should have diverse proper effects. Whence, if they concur in some one effect, it is not the proper effect of any of them, but of something superior by virture of which they act. For instance, different coumpounds (such as pepper, ginger, and the like) produce heat, although they differ from each other in their proper effects. Whence the common effect should be reduced to a prior cause of which it is the proper effect, namely, fire. Similarly in the motion of the heavens, the spheres of individual planets have their own proper motion, and also they have one common motion, which is the proper motion of a superior sphere, for they all revolve according to the diurnal motion. Now, all created causes together produce one effect, which is being [esse], although each has its own proper effect by which they are distinguished from one another. For heat makes something to be hot [calidum esse] and a builder makes a house to be [domum esse]. Thus they all are alike in that they cause something to be, but they differ in that fire causes heat and a builder causes a house. Thus there must be some cause superior to all the rest by virtue of which all cause things to be, and being [esse] must be the proper effect of this higher cause. And this higher cause is God. But the proper effect of any given cause procedes from it in accordance with the similitude of its nature. This, which is esse, must therefore be the substance and nature of God. And because of this it is said in the Book of Causes that that which understands does not give being [esse] except in as much as it is divine, and that the first effect is [esse], and there is no created thing before it.
Objections and Replies:
1. John of Damascus, in Lib Orth fidei, I, says: "that God in fact is, is manifest to us, but what he is as to his substance and nature is incomprehensible and entirely unknown. However, the same thing cannot be both known and unknown. Therefore God's esse and his substance or essence are not the same.
2. And if it be said that we don't know either the substance or the esse of God, on the contrary, there are two distinct questions in view here: whether something is, and what it is. We know how to respond to the one, but not the other, as is clear from the aforementioned author. The responses to "Is there a God?" and "What is God?" are not the same. But "esse" responds to "whether God is" and substance or nature to "what is he?".
3. Or, if it's said that the esse of God is known [cognoscitur], not through itself, but rather through the similitude of the creature, On the contrary, in the creature there is both esse and substance or nature, and since it has both from God, both give it a kind of similarity with God. (That which acts acts in a way that reflects itself and is like itself.) So if the esse of God is known through the simititude of created esse, his substance ought to be known also through the similitude of the created substance. And so of God we would be able to know not only that he is, but what he is.
--"Being" and "to be" [ens et esse] are spoken of in two ways, as is explained in Metaphysis E. For sometimes it means the essence of a thing, or the act of being; but other times it means the truth of a proposition, even one that concerns things that have no esse, as when we say that blindness is, since it is true that a man is blind. Thus when John of Damascus says that God's esse is manifest to us, "esse Dei" is to be taken in the second way, not the first. For in the first way God's esse is the same as his substance: and just as his substance is unknown, so too is his esse. But in the second way, we know that God is, because we concieve this proposition in our intellect, from his effects. And this answers the first three objections.
4. Each thing is said to differ from another through its substance. But that which is common to all cannot bring about the difference of one from another. Hence Aristotle also says that being [ens] should not occur in a definition, since through it the thing defined would not be distinguished from anything else. Thus being itself [ipsum esse] is not the substance of anything that is distinct from another thing, since it is common to all. But God is a thing distinct from all other things. Therefore his being [esse] is not his substance.
--But the divine esse, which is his substance, is no common esse, but is distinct from every other esse. Thus, through that esse God is different from every other being [ens].
5. Things are never different, one from another, unless they have different existences. But one thing's existence is not different from another's as existence, but only insofar as it is in this or that nature. It is by being in some nature that an existence differs from Existence Itself. Thus, if there is any existence that is not in any nature, it would not be different from any other existence. And so it follows that if the divine nature is its own existence then it must be the same as the common existence of everything.
--As it says in the Book of Causes, God's existence is individated and distinguished from every other existence by the fact that it is an existence that subsists through itself and not an existence inhering in some nature distinct from it. When it comes to every other existence which is not subsistent, those things that subsist by existing as something of such and such a nature must have that existence individuated through nature and substance. And concerning these things it is true that the existence of the one is different from the existence of the other on account of them being of different natures. In the same way, if there were such a thing as a heat existing through itself without either matter or subject, it would thus be distinguished from every other heat, whereas heats existing in a subject are distinguished only through their subjects.
6. Being [ens] to which no addition is made is the common being [ens] of everything. But if God is his own existence [esse], he would be [a] being [ens] to which no addition is made. Thus he will be what is common and predicated of everything, and God will be mixed with all things. This is both heretical and contrary to Aristotle, who says in the Book of Causes that the first cause directs all things even though he is not mixed with them.
--The reason common being has nothing added to it is not because addition cannot be made to it. But this is the reason divine existence has nothing added to it. Thus divine existence is not common existence, just as the common nature "animal" does not, in its ratio, have the differentia "rational" added to it, but it is not in the ratio of this common nature that such an addition cannot be made, as is the case with the ratio of "irrational animal", which is a species of "animal".
7. What is entirely simple, cannot be spoken of concretely. And being [esse] is like this; for it seems that being is related to essence as white to whiteness. Therefore it is not appropriate to say that the divine substance is esse.
--The mode of signifying in words that are imposed on things by us follows the mode of understanding. For words signify the concepts of intellects, as is explained in the beginning of De Interpretatione. Our intellect in this way understands esse in the mode in which it is found in inferior things from which it draws its knowledge. In these things esse is not subsistent but inherent. But reason finds that there is something that is esse-subsisting. So it is right to say "to be", meaning this concretely. Nevertheless, when the intellect does this, attributing to-be to God, it transcends its mode of signifying, since it attributes to God that which it signifies, but not the mode of signification.
8. Boethius says, "whatever is, in order for it to be, participates in what to-be is. But in order for it to be something, it participates in something [else]." But God is. Therefore, over and above his to-be, there is something in him on account of which he is something.
--But Boethius was talking about those things that have existence by participation, rather than essentially. When we are speaking of what is through its own essence, if we were to attend carefully to the import of the words, we should say that he is existence itself [ipsum esse], rather than saying that he is something that exists.
9. We cannot attribute to God, who is most perfect, that which is most imperfect. But to-be is most imperfect, much like prime matter; for just as prime matter is determined by all forms, so too, being [esse], because it is most imperfect, has to be determined by all its categories. Therefore just as there is no prime matter in God, neither ought we to attribute being [esse] to the divine substance.
--This being [esse] of which I speak is the most perfect of all beings. For clearly act is always a perfection of potency. We can understand signate form in act only by supposing it to be. For humanity or fire can be considered as existing in the potency of matter, or in the aptitude of the agent, or again as in the intellect. But what has being is considered as existing in act. Hence it is clear that this being of which I speak is the actuality of every act, and because of this it is the perfection of all perfections. And it must not be thought that anything is added to it that would be more in the nature of a form than it, determining it as act determining potency, for being that exists in this way is different, with respect to its essence, from that to which it is added so as to determine it. But nothing extraneous to being can be added to it, since nothing but non-being is extraneous to being, and non-being cannot be, either as form or as matter. Hence being is not determined by something else in the way in which potency is determined by act, but rather as act by potency. For even in the definition of forms their proper matter is put in place of the differentia, as when it is said that the soul is the act of the body of a physical organism. And in this way one existence is distinguished from another, as the existence of this or that nature. For this reason Dyonisius says that even though living things are more noble than existing things generally, nevertheless to be is nobler than to live, for living things have not only life, but, together with life, at the same time they also have being.
10. That which is signified as an effect should not be applied to the first substance, which has no source. But existence is of this sort, for all beings have existence from their essence as the source of their existence. Thus it is not right to say that the substance of God is existence itself.
--The order of ends accords with the order of agents. Thus the final end corresponds with the first agent, and proportionally, by order, other ends to other agents. For consider the ruler of a city, and a general, and single soldier. The ruler of the city is prior in the order of agents: at his command, the general goes to war. And the soldier is under the general, for he fights in accord with the general's orders. But the end of the soldier is to overcome enemy soldiers. This end is ordained for the further end of victory for the army, which is the general's end. And this end is further ordained for the good of the city or kingdom, which is the end of the ruler or king. Therefore, existence, which is properly the effect and end of the work of the first agent, ought to have the place of the last end. But the end although it be first in intention nevertheless comes afterwards in operation and is the effect of other causes. Thus, also, created existence [esse creatum], which is the proper effect responding to the first agent, is caused by other sources, although the existence that is first in causing is the original source.
11. Every proposition in which the same thing is predicated of itself is per se nota. But if the substance of God is his own existence, then when it is said, "God exists", the subject will be the same as the predicate. Thus that proposition will be per se nota, which seems to be false, since it is demonstrable. So the existence of God is not his substance.
--Some propositions are of themselves per se nota even though they are not per se nota to this or that person. This happens when the predicate is from the ratio of the subject, but the ratio of the subject is unknown to someone. For example, if someone didn't know what a whole is, then the proposition, "the whole is greater than the part" would not be per se nota to him. In this way propositions come to be known [notae] by the knowledge [cognitis] of their terms, as is said in the first book of the posterior [Analytics?]. Thus, the proposition, "God exists" is, of itself, per se nota, since the same thing is in the subject as in the predicate, but, to us, it is not per se nota, since we don't know what God is. Hence, among us, demonstration is needed, but not among those who see God's essence.
Posted by mccartney at January 10, 2000 08:03 PM | TrackBack