Credo Ut Intelligam

Choice and Sin

Picking up the conversation, ...

Kevin, why do you object to calling God's freedom libertarian? Here is what I understand the word 'libertarian' to mean: Suppose I make a choice. Was there any prior reality such that I could not have chosen differently given that that prior reality was the way it was? If not, my choice was libertarian free.

Now, nothing is prior to God's choice unless it is his nature. But his nature is what it is by absolute necessity. So if God's nature determined his choice (in the sense that he could not have chosen differently unless his nature were different) then his choice was also absolutely necessary: since his nature could not have been different, his choice could not have been different unless it were libertarian free. But he could have chosen differently (it was not only in his power not to create, it was also possible for him). Therefore his choice was libertarian free.

As for human choices, we agree that none are libertarian inasmuch as there is at least one prior reality (God's secret will) that fits the bill: we could not have chosen differently unless God had willed it. But I have claimed that there is no prior created reality that fits the bill: nothing in our nature or circumstances.

My first argument for this claim was based on how things seem. If things seem to be a certain way, that is evidence that they are that way, unless we have some reason to think appearances are deceiving. You say, "What may seem to be happening at the moment is beside the point." But you cannot mean this. Perhaps what you meant to say was that what may seem to be happening provides only prima facie evidence about what is actually happening, evidence which can be countered and/or undermined by other considerations. If you agree that things seem as I say they seem, then the burden of proof is on you to produce those other considerations and show that there is reason to think appearances are deceiving.

Moving on, you write:
"Chris effectively demonstrates that if Adam always acts according to his strongest inclinations, then the fall was ultimately necessitated by the way God made Adam and the situation in which he placed him. But that point was already established once I accepted the WCF III.1-"God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass:"

No. That point was not already established by the WCF. I have agreed that everything (including the fall) was necessitated by God's secret will, which is what the WCF asserts. The WCF does not assert that there is any created reality that necessitates the fall. You do. On your theory, the fall was necessitated by Adam's nature and circumstances.

I assert that nothing God does is poorly done. Nothing God makes is ill-made. Something that by it's nature must become corrupt is ill-made. On your theory, creation, by its nature, had to become corrupt because of how God made it.

Arminians often argue that we Calvinists make God morally responsible for sin when we allow that he forordained Adam's fall. But to forordain that a creature sin is not the same as to commit a sin. God certainly forordained the murder of our Lord Jesus Christ. His forordination of that murder was a most righteous and holy act, done for the upright end of procuring redemption, quite the opposite of the performance of the murder by wicked men for wicked ends. The same can be said of Adam's fall.

My argument against your position is not like this failed anti-Calvinist argument. My argument is that nothing God makes is ill-made, and on your theory creation looks ill-made. On my theory, God created Adam with the ability to fall, but not with the necessity of falling in the circumstances in which God placed him. The mere possibility of corruption (and that only if we misuse what God has made and given us) is not, I claim, grounds for calling creation ill-made. But the necessity of corruption is.

I also claimed that on your theory it looks like God set us up for the fall (and this doesn't seem consistent with his character). For on your theory, the fall was necessitated by the "set up", that is, by the way God made things. On my theory the fall was not built-in, but was entirely contingent with respect to secondary causes. That is why your theory suffers more difficulty than Calvinism generally in safeguarding the perfect holiness and righteous character of God.

Finally, since on my theory, the will can follow any of its inclinations, without being determined by the strongest, all I need to do in order to explain how someone with a perfect nature can sin is to explain how someone with a perfect nature could have some inclination towards a sinful act. And that is what I did.

I do agree with you that IF Edwards's theory is right, IF the will always follows a prior strongest inclination, THEN it is impossible to explain how someone with a perfect nature could have sinned: Someone with a perfect nature would have properly ordered inclinations, so that the greater good would be more attractive to the will than the lesser. And on Edwards's theory, such a person would be unable to choose the lesser good. But on my theory someone with properly ordered inclinations can choose the lesser over the stronger inclination, with no prior reality determining that choice other than God's secret will.

So if you ask me why a man with perfectly ordered inclinations sinned, I answer: because he was able to sin (he had some inclination toward a sinful act) and because he did choose to sin. And if you ask me why he did choose to sin, I say: because God forordained it, and if you are looking for an answer in terms of secondary causes, you are looking for what is not there: a choice, by its very essence, is undetermined by secondary causes.

Posted by mccartney at August 27, 2005 10:52 AM | TrackBack