Credo Ut Intelligam

First, aren't you creating a false dichotomy? Are there really only two ways of thinking about the problem of evil? This is a very "Western" way of looking at things, not to mention the fact that 'evil' isn't given any type of solid definition.

Secondly, if we can assume a Christian perspective in our response then why not simply appeal to the fact that the non-believer's intellect is tainted by sin and is, by default, unable to understand the place of evil in the created order? Or, perhaps even better, why noy appeal to God's omniscience by pointing out that if there was a better way of doing things then God would've done it that way?

Thirdly, is it not possible for the Christian to respond by positing the problem of good? I mean that's what evil boils down to isn't it, a lack of good? If the non-believer can ask, "why is there evil if God is all good?" then can't the believer ask, "why is there good if there is no God?"

1) I never said there were ONLY two ways of thinking about the problem of evil. I do say that these two are different. Sorry if that's "Western"; I don't accept the proposition "Western=wrong".

Evil doesn't need to be defined, we are all familiar enough with it to know there's a lot of it around, and that it is opposed to good. (Isn't this hankering after definitions a very "Western" way of looking at things?) ;-)

2) We need to convince our oponent that an incoherence does not arise from within Christianity. So he and we are both considering what follows from the assumption that Christianity is true. This is all I meant by the claim that "we can take a Christian perspective." To him, it seems that an incoherence arises from within the Christian perspective. And we need to give him convincing reasons that this incoherence does not arise. Your reasons will not be convincing to him.

3) Your "problem of good" is not defense but counter-attack, for which we cannot assume a Christian perspective. Apart from such a perspective it is not clear that the existence of goodness is incompatible with atheism.

Why does having a good reason for the crucifixion offer a "high probability" that there is a good reason for all other evil?

Of course, Chris, I'm on your side on this issue; I'm just not sure how you're moving from one particular instance to all the rest, even if that one instance represents a very great evil.

My exact words were "it follows, not with certainty but with a high degree of probability, that God MAY have a good reason for permitting all the lesser evils." The probability here is epistemic. And the epistemically probable proposition is that that God MAY have a good reason. This is all I need to answer the charge that Christianity is internally incoherent.

The problem of evil at first seems to make it implausible to think that God COULD have a good reason for permitting evil. It just seems wrong to permit evil for any reason (unless it's not in your power to prevent it without doing or permitting a greater evil, i.e., unless you're not omnipotent). But on closer inspection we see that, given Christianity, it does not seem implausible that God should permit the most horrendous evil. Why then should it be implausible to think that he MAY have reasons for permitting lesser evils?

The problem isn't that there is evil, it's that observing that there is evil is an implicit acknoledgement of God because the fact is, if there is no God, all the idiot existentialists and nihilists are right and there is no evil or good, it is all subjective.

Proposition: "if there is no God, all the [question-begging epithet deleted] existentialists and nihilists are right and there is no evil or good."

Why do you believe this proposition? Do you find it intuitively obvious? It certainly doesn't seem obvious to me, or to most of the most intelligent people I know (who believe in good and evil but not God). Might I suggest you back it up with an argument?

I should also point out that this isn't exactly relevant to my post (though I'd be happy to discuss it). The problem I was dealing with was the claim that Christianity is incoherent because it proclaims the existence of both God and evil. Now, from that perspective, if your proposition is true what follows?

a) God and evil cannot both exist
b) If there is no God then there is no evil or good.
.. add a dash of logic and stir ...
c) therefore, there is no evil!

In other words, either the nihilists/existentialists are right and nothing is evil or good, or else the Christian Scientists are right and everything is good and there is no evil. ... not exactly the conclusion you were looking for, eh?

So your claim won't help us defend Christianity against the charge of incoherence, which was my project in the post. On the other hand, if you think I have succeeded (or someone else has) in showing that Christianity is not incoherent in this regard, you might go on to propose a new project, arguing that non-theists who believe in good and evil are being incoherent. This is an interesting thesis and I'm looking forward to seeing how you argue for it.

James- Your response does not address the central issue of this post, which is the apparent incoherency within Christianity brought about by the existence of evil. [I notice now that Chris has observed the same thing.] If you meant for it to answer the point that the existence of evil implies the non-existence of God, it still doesn't quite work as an argument; unless you're simply trying to reaffirm the position of true believers among themselves. However, in this case, many existentialists are not going to take your assumption that total subjectivity implies the non-existence of good or evil. Exisitentialists do not necessarily believe what you have attributed to them.

Now to the Christocentric defense itself. This only works to show that God may have good reason for allowing each specific case of evil. However, that good reason, especially in the case of the crucifixion, arises from the existence of evil itself. The cross is part of the ultimate solution to evil. Showing that God has a good reason for using a specific case of evil (in this case, fixing the problem of evil) does not answer the question of why he permitted the problem to exist at all.

In "defense" of James: Maybe it's only the "idiot" existentialists who believe there's no good or evil.

In defense of the Christocentric defense: There is no problem of evil over and above the problem of each specific case of evil. If we explain the reason for each particular evil, there's no problem of evil left. The Christocentric defense gives us good reason to think that there may be an explanation for each specific case of evil, though it only provides an actual explanation for one. So, the problem here is clearly not a matter of the scope of some universal quantifier (for those of you who know what that means).

What your objection shows is that we cannot use "crucial" model for understanding the kinds of good reasons God might have had for allowing all the other evil in the world. But the Christocentric defense doesn't require that we do this. In fact, it doesn't require that we pretend to have any idea what God's reasons for permitting other evils might be, not even in the vaguest outlines.

The Christocentric defense was never meant as a response to the argument, "I can't think of a reason, therefore there probably isn't one" (That would be too easy). It was meant as a response to the intuitively plausible claim that it is repugnant to the intellect to say that an almighty all-good being would permit evil, that it just seems wrong to permit evil for any reason (unless it's not in your power to prevent it without doing or permitting a greater evil, i.e., unless you're not omnipotent).
The Christocentric defense shows that this is false (more accurately, it show that a Christian can say it's false without being ad hoc). So the original objection to Christianity does not stand.

Now, perhaps we can modify the objection to say something like this: it is repugnant to the intellect to say that an almighty all good being would permit evil unless he thereby deals with other evil through propitiatory sacrifice. It just seems wrong to permit evil for any reason (unless it's not in your power to prevent it without doing or permitting a greater evil or unless you are permitting the evil in order to provide atonement for sinners).

But this proposition has nothing like the initial plausibility of the first one. In fact, it suffers from the same defect that the original objection accuses Christianity of: it is ad hoc. Kevin, unless you have some other way of rehabilitating the original objection, I think the Christocentric defense will remain unscathed.

I suppose I could have stated that better- my fault. Of course there is no more problem of evil if we deal with each specific case. Now to attempt a better job at saying what I meant.

I don't object to the Christocentric defense as such: God had good reasons for allowing the evil of the crucifixion; therefore, it is highly probable that he has good reasons for allowing any other evil. But your argument is more specific in that the stated good reason behind the death of Christ is limited to the salvation of sinners. Consequently, the kind of good reasons to which this is applicable is also limited. Now we're only talking about evil that lessens an overall greater evil. This specific evil is not repugnant and it is likely that neither are those of its kind. If the goal of the argument is to reduce the repugnancy factor, it is considerably less effective when applied to any evil that is not of this kind. Even with the concession that virtually all evils fit into this evil reducing category (without always seeing how), there is still at least one evil that does not. The first specific evil cannot have been for the good reason of reducing even more evil. The Christocentric defense, as stated, does not answer the repugnancy of this particular evil. This is all it takes for the original objection to stand.

I do believe that the Christocentric defense will work, but the focus needs to change. We could use the simple axiom - God is more important than we are. The salvation of sinners is a good reason for the death of Christ, but it is not the primary good reason. Jesus died for sinners in order to glorify God. This is a sufficiently good reason for allowing evil to exist in the first place. I do not claim that this is a fully comprehensible reason; nor do I claim that many won't find it repugnant as well. However, this will not be the result of any internal incoherency within Christianity. It will be because their concept of God's attribute of goodness is more in line with stuffed bears and artificial sweetener than it is with an all consuming holiness.

I don't push the problem of evil either as an argument against mere theism, or as an argument against the coherence of Christianity, but I do have two comments on this, because I can't let a defense go unchallenged when I perceive a weakness.
1) The Christocentric defence: it may be integral to Christianity that the crucifixion was necessary for a good reason, but that position itself seems undefensible. In fact, one of my chief challenges to Christianity is on moral grounds: the Crucifixion as a form of substitutionary sacrifice (according to conservative soteriology) is held up as an example of justice and mercy, yet the only identifiable attributes I can discern in such a scheme are injustice and unmercifulness.

I would challenge you to justify the "good reason" behind the crucifixion before using it to conclude the probability of all lesser evils having a good reason.

2) The free will defense cannot stand. If free will is a good enough reason to permit evil, and if evil is necessary if there is to be free will, then we must conclude about heaven that it is either less than perfect for lack of free will, or less than perfect for the presense of evil.