Credo Ut Intelligam

well said Chris. I wish I had something to add to this discussion at the moment, but alas, my brain is cluttered with thoughts of grass that's far too tall and a small dog with allergies, and wondering if these are related?

anyway, I look forward to peeking in on your thoughts now and then. see you in a coupla months.

I'm glad that you recognize that you don't have an epistemology. I am also glad that you understand that, though you believe there is a difference between knowledge and true belief, that you cannot tell what that difference is.

You've gotta give him credit for honesty and humility, two qualities rarely found these days, especially in those inclined toward's philosphy & theology.

A fine piece. Might I add some comments. Mainly, one can still be a particularist and not hold to (1) and (3). Not all intuitions will necessarily be 'correct', just by the fact that they're intuitions (and I know of no particularist advocate who would hold to such a position, e.g., Chisholmian or Moorean epistemological positions with respect to particularism). Rather, intutions may be taken on a case-by-case basis. The degree of, shall we say, 'intuitive obviousness' will vary from case to case, this itself is intuitively obvious :). I.e., we would not be so hurried to claim the propositional content of our intuitions is correct about "My car is not broken into", as we would be to claim that it's correct about, "I am eating eggs right now". Suppose, in the former case, you've been in the mall while your car has been parked outside in a large parking lot, for several hours, in a neighborhood somewhat known for its high number of car-thefts. In the latter, suppose your are at this instant ingesting eggs, which you also cooked moments ago. The point is that different intuitions would be taken individually into account with respect to each particular situation one finds herself in. If the need arises, then one can formulate criteria. But not all intuitions will entail knowledge, and on the flipside, not all intuitions may need criteria.

Also, how would we escape an infinite regress regarding methodism? The skeptic asks, e.g., "how do you know you need a criterion for knowledge?"

proposition 1 was for illustrative purposes only.

I argued that if proposition 3 is false then the particularist project will fail. The circumstances you mentioned are already contained descriptively in the particular cases of 3. We are not talking about your intuition that "your car is not broken into," which intuition you have in circumstances C. Rather we are talking about your intuition that "someone's true belief (in circumstances C) that his car is not broken into counts as knowledge."

Although I'm not sure I understand your second comment, there is something I would like to say w/r/t methodism. If methodism is the claim that "we need to have a definition of knowledge before we can distinguish particular instances of knowledge from instances of mere true belief," then, as should be clear from my post, I reject methodism. But a given methodist epistemology could be accepted without accepting methodism itself.

For example, suppose Descartes is right: knowledge = indubitable true belief. But Jones has never heard of Descartes and has never thought about the question what makes true belief knowledge. Jones's intuition tells him that he knows that he exists. I say that Jones knows that he knows that he exists even though he doesn't know what knowledge is in general. Descartes' methodist epistemology could be right even if methodism itself is false.

Unfortunately Descartes' epistemology is wrong. But I can't rule out the possibility that some methodist epistemology is right.

Thank you for the thoughtful reply. Yes, you intended (1) to just be parallel of (3), I was aware of that.

I am also aware that you hold the denial of (3) to count against particularism, and that (3) was intended to include intuitions for particularism. However, as I mentioned, the intuitions for particularisism carry intuitive 'obviousness' as well. The egg analogy would apply to these. But that is NOT to say that those intutions are therefore infallible, nor does any particularist I know of maintain such a position for intuitions regarding particularism itself, nor is such a position necessary for particularism. An intuition that particularism is itself correct may certainly be rejected with the presentation of overriding reasons, just as an intuition in circumstance C (eating eggs) does not require infallibility, regardless of it's obviousness. Which advocate of particularism has held that (3) (or something similar) must be true in order for particularism to succeed? Or where are you getting that idea? I'm curious.

I agree that a 'methodist epistemology' can be formed without holding to methodism, but at that point we just travel into the beginnings of particularism. The methodist cannot formulate criteria for why he knows that formulating criteria needs to take place, and at the same time hope to avoid an infinite regress. And that's why particularism allows for formulating criteria in given circumstances, but does not see it as necessary in all cases (as in the Jones example).

a) if 3 is false then particularist project will fail
b) 3 is false
c) therefore the particularist project will fail.

You seem to think my justification for (a) is that some particularist has asserted it. On the contrary, as far as I know, nobody has as much as mentioned proposition (a) until I wrote this blogpost. My justification for (a) is that it is obviously true. You won't find a true definition of "good apple" by asking yourself what all the apples in this barrel have in common, when some of the apples in that barrel are bad apples. The project of finding a definition of "good apple" in that manner will fail. Similarly you won't find a true definition of knowledge by asking yourself what all the instances of true belief that are in this barrel (labelled: EACH INSTANCE OF TRUE BELIEF IN THIS BARREL SEEMS INTUITIVELY TO BE AN INSTANCE OF KNOWLEDGE) have in common, when some of the instances of true belief in that barrel are not instances of knowledge. The particularist project of finding a definition of "knowledge" in that manner will fail; which is what (a) says: if 3 is false (i.e. if not all of the instances of true belief in that barrel are instances of knowledge) then the particularist project will fail. So (a) is true. Since (b) is also true, the conclusion must be true: the particularist project will fail.